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Abstract 
 
Perceptual decision-making describes the process of choosing one of at least 
two response alternatives based on sensory evidence. This sensorimotor 
process underlies a range of human behaviours and has been studied 
extensively by both psychologists and neuroscientists. There is now a 
consensus, that perceptual decision-making can be explained by sequential 
sampling models, which assume that we make decisions by accumulating 
sensory evidence over time until a decision threshold is reached and the 
response is executed. Although these models are designed to explain 
behavioural data, the accumulation-to-bound processes they predict have 
recently been shown to occur in the brain. In this project, we set out to explore 
these neural correlates of decision-making in the human brain by combining 
mathematical modelling with neuroimaging. We fitted sequential sampling 
models to human decision-making data collected in a number of paradigms and 
directly compared the associated accumulation profiles with neural signals, 
which were generated either by using electroencephalographic (EEG) 
recordings or through transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). We found that 
decision-related accumulation profiles can be observed using a parietal EEG 
signal, namely the event-related potential centroparietal positivity (CPP). 
Additionally, we showed that accumulation is fed forward to the motor system, 
where it can be measured using TMS-induced motor evoked potentials. We 
demonstrated that, under a number of manipulations, namely difficulty, 
response speed instructions, non-stationary evidence, decision biases, and 
number of alternatives, these signals display profiles similar to those predicted 
by sequential sampling models. Our findings support the notion that sequential 
sampling occurs in the human brain and demonstrate that a model-based 
approach in which sequential sampling models and neuroimaging are combined 
and inform each other, can shed light on the underlying mechanisms of human 
perceptual decision-making. 
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1. General Introduction  
 
The ability to use information from the environment to quickly choose between 
two or more alternatives and guide our actions is a crucial part of human 
cognition. Whether we need to decide if it is safe to cross a road or which queue 
to join at the till, we constantly use sensory evidence to select appropriate motor 
responses countless times every day. In fact, it could be argued that virtually all 
human behaviour is based on perceptual decisions. The term ‘perceptual 
decision’ has been used for several decades and describes any decision (i.e. 
any choice between two or more alternatives) which is performed relatively 
quickly (typically within 1000 to 2000 ms) and is made based on sensory 
evidence (Krulee, Podell, & Ronco, 1954; Newsome, Britten, & Movshon, 1989; 
Ulehla, 1966). 
 
Due to its central role in human cognition, a large body of research, in the fields 
of both psychology and neuroscience, has been dedicated to the understanding 
of perceptual decision-making, and a number of accounts have been suggested 
to explain the underlying mechanisms of how we make these decisions.  
 
1.1. Sequential Sampling Models 
 
One particularly influential concept in the field of perceptual decision-making 
has been that of sequential sampling models. This term describes a family of 
computational models which have a number of assumptions in common, at the 
core of which is the notion that perceptual decisions are made by sequentially 
integrating sensory stimuli and extracting decision-relevant information about 
the nature of the stimulus. This sensory evidence is accumulated over time and 
compared against a decision threshold. Once this threshold is reached, a 
decision is made and the appropriate response is initiated. While all sequential 
sampling models share the basic notion that sensory evidence is accumulated 
until a threshold is reached, there are a number of models that differ in 
important aspects, including complexity or the extent to which they are 
13 
 
neurophysiologically plausible. One aspect in which models within this 
framework differ is the nature of their stopping rule, which distinguishes 
between two types of models: random-walk models with a relative stopping rule, 
and accumulator models with an absolute stopping rule (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004).  
1.1.1. Random-walk Models 
Random-walk models typically assume that, in a binary decision, evidence for 
both alternatives is integrated in a single accumulator. The accumulation 
process begins at a starting point located midway between two thresholds, each 
associated with one of the response alternatives, and evidence is accumulated 
to a single total, with evidence in favour of alternative ‘M’ reflecting evidence 
against alternative ‘N’. 
 
One example of a random-walk model is the Diffusion model, which is arguably 
the most commonly applied of all sequential sampling models (Ratcliff, 1978; 
Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; see Figure 1.1). In this model, a single accumulator 
with a threshold at a distance of a/2 to either side of the starting point z, which is 
drawn from a uniform distribution with the range Sz, accumulates evidence over 
time according to a Wiener diffusion process. The accumulation profile is 
determined by the drift rate, which is drawn from a normal distribution with the 
mean v and the standard deviation η, as well as within-trial variability σ2. 
Therefore, when the process is discretised, the accumulation at a certain time 
point corresponds to the sum of the information at the previous time point, a 
systematic amount of information I and Gaussian noise with mean 0 and 
standard deviation σ. 
 𝑑𝑥 =  𝐼 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎2) (1.1.) 
The reaction time (RT) is defined by the time taken for the accumulation to 
reach the threshold, plus a non-decision time Ter which is uniformly distributed 
with a range of STer and accounts for any time used for sensory encoding and 
motor processing before and after the accumulation process respectively. 
14 
 
  
Figure 1.1: Diffusion model: a random-walk model in which accumulation begins at a starting point z and 
continues at an average rate v, towards one of two boundaries, each associated with a given response. 
The time taken to reach the boundary plus a non-decision time Ter determine the reaction time (RT). 
Additionally, the model assumes inter-trial variability, as z and Ter have a uniform distribution with the 
ranges Sz and STer, and v is normally distributed with the standard deviation η. Note that accumulation can 
also follow a downward trajectory (dotted line), depending on which alternative receives more evidence.  
 
The Diffusion model is one of the most prominent sequential sampling models 
and has been shown to account for behavioural data in a variety of paradigms, 
primarily in the context of perceptual decision-making tasks, such as lexical 
decision-making (Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 
2010), and discriminations of brightness (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998), direction 
(Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), and orientation (Smith, Ratcliff, & Wolfgang, 2004), 
but has also been shown to account for RT distributions in value-based 
decisions (Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Milosavljevic, Malmaud, & Huth, 2010), 
reinforcement learning (Frank et al., 2015), and memory tasks (Ratcliff, Thapar, 
& McKoon, 2004).  
 
However, one of the major limitations of the Diffusion model is that, in its 
original form, it can only account for binary decisions and cannot be extended to 
choices with several alternatives. Since in a binary decision, evidence for both 
alternatives is integrated in a single accumulation process, it is not obvious how 
this model could account for more than two choices. A number of solutions have 
been suggested, most of which split the accumulation into several diffusion 
processes, each racing towards a boundary. This approach allows for the 
addition of an arbitrary number of processes. However, it does not follow the 
original assumptions as the inhibition between competing alternatives is lost 
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and has to be added to the model so that evidence added to one accumulator is 
subtracted from the other (Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016). 
 
Additionally, the Diffusion model has been criticised for not being 
neurophysiologically plausible as it assumes that accumulation can occur with 
both a positive and a negative mean slope. In its original formulation, the 
Diffusion model was designed to account for behavioural data and did not claim 
to model neural processes. However, more recent research makes increasing 
use of sequential sampling models to explore neural correlates of decision-
making. Accumulation-to-bound processes like those predicted by sequential 
sampling models are now assumed to describe the activity of neural populations 
during decision-making (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). Since this activity cannot drop 
below zero, or more specifically, can only drop to a limited extent based on the 
level of baseline activity, models which assume only positive accumulation are 
more appropriate to explain neural activity (Usher & McClelland, 2001). Overall, 
while the Diffusion model can account well for behavioural data in a range of 
decision-making tasks, it struggles to extend to more complex applications 
which are becoming increasingly relevant in the perceptual decision-making 
literature. 
1.1.2. Accumulator Models 
The second type of sequential sampling model, namely the accumulator model, 
distinguishes itself from random-walk models primarily due to its absolute 
stopping rule. These models assume one accumulator for each response 
alternative, so that in a binary choice, evidence is accumulated in two separate 
totals. Both accumulators race towards a common threshold and the response 
is determined depending on which accumulator reaches the threshold first. 
Since accumulator models assume a separate accumulation process for each 
response alternative, they can easily be extended to decisions with any number 
of alternatives by simply adding accumulators. 
 
In a typical accumulator model, such as what we refer to as a race model, the 
integration of evidence in each accumulator starts at a starting point z, drawn 
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from a uniform distribution with range Sz, and accumulates towards a threshold 
A. The rate at which the evidence accumulates differs across accumulators and 
is given by the drift rates vm and vn for accumulators associated with response 
‘M’ and ‘N’ respectively, as well as noise σ2 (see Figure 1.2). The RT is defined 
by the time taken for the first accumulator to reach the threshold as well as a 
non-decision time Ter, drawn from a uniform distribution with the range STer. At 
each point in time, a given accumulator m accumulates the input evidence 
supporting its alternative Im, as well as noise so that the quantity accumulated at 
each time point is described by: 
 𝑑𝑥𝑚 =  𝐼𝑚 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) (1.2.) 
To remain physiologically plausible, this accumulation process is usually 
restricted to positive values at each time step.  
 𝑥𝑚(𝑡 + 1) = max (0, 𝑥𝑚(𝑡) +  𝑑𝑥𝑚) (1.3.) 
 
  
Figure 1.2: Race model: an accumulator model in which evidence for each alternative is accumulated in a 
separate accumulator. In both accumulators, accumulation begins at a starting point z (drawn from Sz) and 
accumulates at a rate v (one for each accumulator) towards a threshold A. The response time is 
determined by the time required for the fastest accumulator to reach A, plus a non-decision time Ter (drawn 
from STer). 
One of the most prominent examples of an accumulator model is the leaky 
competing accumulator model (LCA; Usher & McClelland, 2001). This model 
was designed to be as neurophysiologically plausible as possible and includes 
a leakage parameter, based on the finding that neural excitatory input currents 
decay over time (Abbott, 1991; Hodgkin & Huxley, 1990; Stein, 1967). Although 
this effect is decreased by recurrent self-excitation in populations of neurons, 
Usher and McClelland (2001) argued that his passive decay means that 
information is not integrated perfectly and that leaky integrators are a more 
physiologically plausible model of evidence accumulation. Additionally, the LCA 
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also implements physiological evidence suggesting lateral inhibition between 
neuronal populations (Desimone, 1998; Reynolds, Chelazzi, & Desimone, 
1999), by including a parameter for mutual inhibition between accumulators 
(see Figure 1.3).  
 
The model assumes that the integration of evidence in each accumulator starts 
at a starting point z, and races towards a threshold A. The quantity accumulated 
at each time point for a given accumulator m is therefore defined by the 
evidence input Im (as described above, Im and In are determined by the drift 
rates vm and vn for accumulators associated with response ‘M’ and ‘N’ 
respectively), the leakage over time k, inhibition from the other accumulator β, 
and noise σ2:  
  𝑑𝑥𝑚 =  𝐼𝑚 − 𝑘 𝑥𝑚 − 𝛽𝑥𝑛 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)  (1.4.) 
In line with a typical accumulator model and to further strengthen the neural 
plausibility of the LCA, a threshold function is added to prevent accumulation 
from dropping below zero. 
 𝑥𝑚(𝑡 + 1) = max (0, 𝑥𝑚(𝑡) + 𝑑𝑥𝑚) (1.5.) 
Like most other models, the LCA defines the RT of a given decision by the sum 
of time taken to reach the threshold and a non-decision time Ter.
  
Figure 1.3: Leaky competing accumulator (LCA) model: Left: An accumulator model in which evidence for 
each alternative is accumulated in a separate accumulator. The accumulators start at a starting point z and 
race towards a threshold A, at rates of vm and vn. Right: Unlike the race model presented in Figure 1.2, the 
accumulators ∑m and ∑n are not independent but inhibit each other (inhibition defined by β), and 
accumulated evidence input (I) is subject to leakage (k) over time. The response time is determined by the 
time required for the fastest accumulator to reach A, plus a non-decision time Ter. 
 
The LCA has been shown to accurately describe perceptual decision-making in 
tasks such as length or motion discriminations (Gao, Tortell, & McClelland, 
2011; Usher & McClelland, 2001), lexical decisions (Dufau, Grainger, & Ziegler, 
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2012), and value-based choices (Bogacz, Usher, Zhang, & McClelland, 2007), 
as well as choices with more than two alternatives (Niwa & Ditterich, 2008; 
Tsetsos, Usher, & Chater, 2010; Tsetsos, Usher, & McClelland, 2011). 
 
However, the complexity of the LCA compared to other, more commonly used 
sequential sampling models, while increasing the biological plausibility of the 
model, also entails disadvantages, as it does not have a known likelihood 
function, which implies that the model can only be fitted through the slow 
process of simulating data for each proposed set of parameters (Turner & 
Sederberg, 2014). Additionally, since the LCA has a relatively large number of 
parameters which, although conceptually different, have similar effects on the 
simulated RT, there can be a trade-off between them (in particular between 
inhibition and leakage) which makes it difficult to recover accurate parameters, 
suggesting that the model may be formally non-identifiable (Miletic, Turner, 
Forstmann, & Van, 2017). Nevertheless, the LCA is a commonly applied model 
and is particularly useful for accounting for more complex decisions, as well as 
for linking sequential sampling to neural processes. 
 
1.2. Neural Correlates of the Decision 
Variable 
 
Sequential sampling models were originally developed to account for RT and 
accuracy data and although some models, like the LCA, were designed to be 
physiologically plausible, the sequential sampling framework does not claim and 
was not developed to model neurobiology. Nevertheless, several neural signals 
have now been suggested to display characteristics of accumulation profiles 
similar to those predicted by sequential sampling models. Researchers now 
routinely explore the notion that sequential sampling occurs in the brain and 
reflects the neural mechanism underlying perceptual decision-making. 
 
There are a number of characteristics that identify a signal as a correlate of the 
decision variable, i.e. as a signal reflecting the accumulation-to-bound process 
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as defined by sequential sampling models. The most fundamental ones include 
the assumption that the signal should display overall accumulation-to-bound 
dynamics, i.e. it must build up over the course of the decision-making process, 
and peak at the time of response. Specifically, the peak amplitude should reach 
a stereotyped level which is constant across decisions, indicating the crossing 
of a set threshold. Additionally, a neural correlate of decision-making should co-
vary with the intensity of the physical stimulus. Decisions in which the quality of 
the sensory evidence is high (i.e. easy decisions) are, on average, associated 
with high drift rates and should therefore lead to steeper mean slopes in the 
neural signal and shorter RTs. There are a number of neural signals which have 
been suggested to meet these criteria and reflect an accumulation-to-bound 
process similar to the one predicted by sequential sampling models. 
 
1.2.1. Neural Activity in Non-human Primates 
Neurophysiological research in non-human primates has been particularly 
successful at identifying such signals. This research provides rich data as it 
primarily makes use of single-unit recording, in which a microelectrode is 
inserted into the brain in order to record both spatially and temporally highly 
specific voltage changes, a method which is rarely applied in humans. A typical 
experiment exploring the decision-making process involves single-cell recording 
in behaving monkeys who engage in binary perceptual decisions and indicate 
their choices using saccadic eye-movements. A particularly commonly used 
perceptual decision-making task is the random dot motion task (see Figure 1.4). 
In this task, an array of moving dots is displayed on a screen, a proportion of 
which moves coherently in one direction while the remaining dots move in 
random directions. The monkey is trained to indicate the direction of the 
coherent motion by making a saccade into the same direction (Gold & Shadlen, 
2000; Newsome et al., 1989; Palmer, Huk, & Shadlen, 2005). 
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Figure 1.4: Typical decision-making experiment with non-human primates: after a fixation cross, the 
monkey is presented with a random dot motion task. In this task, a proportion of dots (here: 70%) move 
either to the left or to the right (here: right) while the rest of the dots move in random directions. The 
monkey identifies the direction of the perceived motion and indicates its response by making a saccadic 
eye-movement towards a target in the direction of the detected motion. 
 
A number of structures have been found to be recruited during these saccadic 
decisions. The middle temporal area (MT) is associated with the detection of 
visual motion, while the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), the frontal eye field 
(FEF), and the superior colliculus (SC) are associated with the control and the 
initiation of eye movements (Bruce & Goldberg, 1985; Maunsell & van Essen, 
1983; Segraves, 1992; Shadlen & Newsome, 1996). The firing rates of neurons 
in each of these areas have been associated with decision-related 
accumulation. For example, MT activity has been correlated with behavioural 
choice, i.e. a high firing rate in a given directionally selective MT neuron was 
shown to be related to an increased probability of the choice of that direction 
(Britten, Newsome, Shadlen, Celebrini, & Movshon, 1996). However, this 
relationship was found to be weak, and it has since been concluded that MT 
activity may represent the evidence, i.e. the input into the decision 
accumulators, rather than the decision variable itself (Ditterich, Mazurek, & 
Shadlen, 2003). 
 
Activity in the FEF, which, like the SC and the LIP, is innervated by MT and 
controls the selection of visual targets as well as the appropriate saccadic 
movements (Schall, 2002, Bruce & Goldberg, 1985), has been found to predict 
responses by reaching a stereotyped maximum, suggesting accumulation-like 
dynamics (Hanes & Schall, 1996). Microstimulation studies have further 
supported the role of FEF activity as a correlate of decision-making (Gold & 
Shadlen, 2000), but only when a specific motor response is associated with 
each choice (Gold & Shadlen, 2003). Similar dynamics have been reported for 
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neuronal activity in the SC, which has been associated with dynamics simulated 
by the Diffusion model (Ratcliff, Cherian, & Segraves, 2003). 
 
Similarly, a number of studies have suggested that activity in the LIP shows 
characteristics of the accumulation process predicted by sequential sampling 
models. Shadlen and Newsome (1996) recorded the activity of LIP neurons 
during a motion discrimination task and found that a subset of these neurons 
appeared neither sensory nor motor, but rather reflected the integration of 
decision-relevant sensory evidence. In a later study, the authors found that LIP 
activity predicted the saccadic eye movement the monkey used to indicate its 
decision, in both correct and incorrect trials. In those trials in which the motion 
was towards the response field of the LIP neurons, their activity built up over the 
course of the motion viewing and peaked at the time of the saccade. 
Additionally, the authors found that the magnitude of the build-up was 
dependent on the strength of the viewed motion, and concluded that these 
neurons accumulate sensory evidence to select an appropriate saccadic eye 
movement (Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). In a series of experiments, Shadlen 
and his colleagues strengthened this conclusion as they confirmed further 
characteristics of the decision variable to be consistent with LIP activity. For 
example, Huk and Shadlen (2005) found that briefly perturbing the strength of 
the decision-relevant evidence had a lasting impact, not only on the overt 
decision but also on the activity of LIP neurons, thereby supporting its role as 
the time integral of the sensory evidence. It was further found that LIP activity 
indicated the completion of the decision when it reached a stereotyped 
threshold (Roitman & Shadlen, 2002), even when further information was 
available (Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen, 2008), that LIP activity may also reflect 
decision certainty (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009), and that it is linked to the speed-
accuracy trade-off (Hanks, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2014). Activity in the LIP is 
therefore generally viewed as a neural substrate of the accumulation process 
suggested by sequential sampling models. 
 
While research with non-human primates has provided valuable insights into the 
underlying mechanisms of perceptual decision-making, and has important 
advantages over research with human subjects, primarily due to the possibility 
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of employing invasive methods to record neural activity with great temporal and 
spatial resolutions, there are also clear limitations associated with animal 
research. While neurophysiological recordings in monkeys can give a unique 
insight into brain activity at a neuronal level, it provides no information about 
system-level activation. Since single-cell recordings can only measure changes 
at the targeted site while being blind to activity in even closely surrounding 
areas, this may give a false impression of the spatial selectivity of the neural 
substrates measured in this way. Additionally, monkeys have to be trained for a 
prolonged period of time in order to successfully perform even simple decision-
making tasks, such as motion discrimination tasks. This research is therefore 
limited to comparatively simple designs with arguably low ecological validity. 
Importantly, there are limitations in the interpretability of monkey data as, 
besides anatomical differences between monkeys and humans, the monkey’s 
behaviour may also differ as over-training may cause durable task-specific 
sensorimotor mappings which may cause monkeys to perform differently than 
they would in a spontaneous perceptual decision. Therefore, it is crucial to 
explore human perceptual decision-making directly. 
 
1.2.2. Activity in the Human Brain 
Several lines of research have been dedicated to exploring perceptual decision-
making and identifying potential neural correlates of the decision variable in the 
human brain. There are a number of methodologies available to study human 
brain activity, each providing different insights but also different limitations to 
explore decision-making. 
1.2.2.1. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
One method which is commonly used to study human decision-making is 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Blood oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) fMRI is a non-invasive neuroimaging technique which 
measures brain activity by detecting local changes in blood oxygenation. As a 
given brain area becomes active, blood flow increases which in turn changes 
the ratio of oxyhaemoglobin to deoxyhaemoglobin. fMRI exploits the fact that 
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these two proteins have different magnetic properties in order to detect these 
local increases in relative blood oxygenation (Matthews & Jezzard, 2004). 
 
Functional imaging-based approaches have been useful in decision-making 
research as this method has a very high spatial resolution on a system-wide 
level and allows researchers to identify discrete brain structures as well as 
whole networks involved in different cognitive processes. This has been used to 
identify a number of brain regions involved in perceptual decision-making. For 
example, the pre-supplementary motor area and the striatum have been 
associated with decisions under time pressure (Forstmann et al., 2008, 2010), 
while it has been suggested that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is involved 
in the processing of decision biases (Chen, Jimura, White, Maddox, & Poldrack, 
2015; Lopez-Persem, Domenech, & Pessiglione, 2016). 
 
A number of brain areas have also been suggested to be directly involved in the 
accumulation of decision-related evidence, and arguably resemble the decision 
variable. For example, Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, and Ungerleider (2004), 
found characteristics of a decision-related accumulation process in the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), as greater activity was observed during 
easy compared to hard decisions. Other researchers have suggested the 
inferior frontal sulcus (Noppeney, Ostwald, & Werner, 2010), the right insula 
(Ho, Brown, & Serences, 2009), as well as inferior temporal, frontal, and parietal 
regions (Ploran et al., 2007; Tosoni, Galati, Romani, & Corbetta, 2008) to be 
involved in the decision-related accumulation of evidence. In a review of studies 
which combined fMRI approaches with sequential sampling models, Mulder, 
van Maanen, and Forstmann (2014) identified a frontoparietal network as 
associated with evidence accumulation. However, the authors also noted large 
variations in identified regions.  
 
It is important to note that fMRI measures brain activity indirectly through 
changes in blood oxygenation, which respond slowly compared to 
electrophysiological signals. This low temporal resolution implies that signals 
have to last several seconds to be detected by fMRI, which makes it difficult to 
observe the dynamics of fast perceptual decisions, which usually do not take 
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longer than one second. To identify signals which may represent evidence 
accumulation, fMRI research therefore relies on a number of assumptions, 
which can make the interpretation of findings problematic. Specifically, it 
remains unclear how decision variable signals such as those identified in non-
human primates would translate into BOLD response patterns. One particularly 
controversial assumption has been made by studies which claim that, since 
easier decisions are associated with steeper accumulation, the amplitude of the 
BOLD response in an accumulation-related region should be greater for easy 
compared to hard trials (Heekeren et al., 2004). Other authors have made the 
opposite assumption and argue that, given that activity falls off after a response 
is made, prolonged activity in hard decisions leads to a greater total activity and 
therefore a larger BOLD signal (Ho et al., 2009).  
 
Although there seems to be a consensus regarding the involvement of frontal 
and parietal structures in the decision-related accumulation of evidence (Mulder 
et al., 2014), methodological inconsistencies and the associated large variety of 
brain regions suggested to be involved in accumulation make an interpretation 
difficult. Overall, fMRI provides the best spatial resolution in human imaging 
studies and is a useful tool to identify which brain regions are associated with 
decision-making. However, its comparatively poor temporal resolution makes 
fMRI less suitable to explore the dynamics of a decision variable which changes 
on a millisecond timescale. 
1.2.2.2. Electroencephalography and Magnetoencephalography 
An alternative to fMRI research is provided by electroencephalographic (EEG) 
and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) recordings. These techniques do not 
offer the same spatial resolution as fMRI data and are not able to identify 
specific brain regions. However, their high temporal resolution, which allows for 
the measurement of brain activity on a millisecond-by-millisecond basis, makes 
them a more appropriate choice to directly track decision variable signals which 
can build up and reach their maximum within hundreds of milliseconds.  
 
EEG is a non-invasive technique, which, unlike fMRI, directly measures 
electrical activity in the brain, using electrodes on the scalp. A given individual 
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neuron receives and sends signals which are primarily electrical in nature. The 
neuron’s electrical activity is comprised mainly of action potentials and 
postsynaptic potentials. Action potentials are discrete voltage spikes which are 
triggered in the cell body and travel, unchanged in amplitude, along the axon to 
the axon terminals where they cause the release of neurotransmitters into the 
synaptic cleft. When these neurotransmitters bind to the postsynaptic neuron, 
they alter the ion permeability of the membrane which leads to graded changes 
in voltage, called postsynaptic potentials. Both postsynaptic potentials and 
action potentials of individual neurons are far too small to be picked up by 
electrodes placed on the scalp. However, in the cerebral cortex, large numbers 
of pyramidal cells are oriented perpendicular to the cortical surface. Therefore, 
when a population of cells is active, postsynaptic potentials, which are more 
durable than action potentials, summate and can be recorded from the scalp. 
Typically, a total of 64 electrodes are placed on the scalp according to a 10-20 
system (Jasper, 1958), which defines the location of the electrodes based on 
the distance between adjacent electrodes as either 10% or 20% of the front-
back of left-right distance of the skull (although other systems, such as the 
equidistant montage, are also commonly used).  
 
One of the most commonly applied ways to analyse EEG data is to segment it, 
time-lock each segment to a specific event, typically the stimulus onset, and 
take the mean of all segments in order to average out any activity which is not 
time-locked and therefore arguably not functionally related to the event. The 
resulting waveform is referred to as an event-related potential (ERP) and can be 
defined as a set of potential changes in response to a specific experimental 
variable (Donchin & Heffley, 1978). Alternatively to its temporal form, a Fourier 
transform can be used to analyse EEG data with regards to its spectral 
components. The Fourier transform is based on the notion that any waveform 
can be decomposed into a number of sinusoidal functions of different 
frequencies. In the context of EEG, the data are typically represented as a set 
of oscillations and interpreted in the context of a number of predefined 
frequency bands, namely the delta (< 4 Hz), theta (4-8 Hz), alpha (8-14 Hz, 
although low alpha frequencies are sometimes referred to as mu), beta (14-31 
Hz), and gamma (> 31 Hz) bands.  
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MEG measures brain activity in a similar way to EEG and produces comparable 
data. However, instead of measuring electrical activity, it records magnetic 
fields produced by electrical currents. This can be advantageous as magnetic 
fields are less influenced by passing through the skull and other tissues. 
Nevertheless, MEG and EEG record very similar data which are commonly 
analysed in the same way, providing similar insights. Note that, in the following, 
we often refer only to EEG (primarily because it is the method we chose in this 
project), but the same signals and conclusions largely apply to MEG data. 
 
A range of studies using both EEG and MEG have been conducted to explore 
decision-making. For example, a series of experiments by Philiastides and 
colleagues, who used face-car discrimination tasks, identified an early (170 ms) 
and a late (300 ms) ERP component as decision-relevant (Philiastides, Ratcliff, 
& Sajda, 2006; Philiastides & Sajda, 2007; Philiastides & Sajda, 2006). 
However, these components were interpreted as reflecting processes which 
occur prior to accumulation itself (Ratcliff, Philiastides, & Sajda, 2009). 
Additionally, results from regressor-based approaches have suggested, for 
example, that evidence accumulation correlates with spectral power in the theta 
band (van Vugt, Simen, Nystrom, Holmes, & Cohen, 2012), and that the 
encoding of decision-relevant evidence fluctuates with parietal oscillations in the 
delta band (Wyart, de Gardelle, Scholl, & Summerfield, 2012). 
 
In the search for M/EEG correlates of the decision variable, a number of studies 
have explored signals which are associated with motor preparation. Contrary to 
previous formulations which assumed that response preparation followed the 
decision formation in a serial fashion (Donders, 1969; Sternberg, 1969), there is 
now considerable converging evidence to suggest that sensorimotor decisions 
can be observed in the same brain regions which prepare and execute the 
motor response, both from research using neurophysiological methods in non-
human primates (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005; Romo, Hernandez, & Zainos, 2004), 
and human EEG signals (Donner, Siegel, Fries, & Engel, 2009; Kelly & 
O’Connell, 2013). These findings suggest that the level of accumulation at any 
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given time is continuously fed forward into the motor system and reflected in the 
level of response preparation.  
 
This has led to the suggestion that event-related desynchronisation (ERD) in 
the beta frequency may correlate with decision-related accumulation (Donner et 
al., 2009). Oscillations of this frequency are known to decrease in power over 
the premotor cortex, primarily contralateral to the response, when a motoric 
response is prepared (Doyle, Yarrow, & Brown, 2005; Jasper & Penfield, 1949; 
Pfurtscheller, 1981; Zaepffel, Trachel, Kilavik, & Brochier, 2013). Since this 
signal is known to reflect the preparation of a motoric response, it should also 
reflect the decision-related accumulation of evidence, assuming that the 
decision variable is visible in the motor system. Donner et al. (2009) were able 
to demonstrate this by recording MEG during a random dot motion task. They 
found that activity in the beta frequency displayed a ramp-like profile, similar to 
the gradual build-up predicted by sequential sampling models and that this 
activity predicted the decision several seconds prior to the response. The 
significance of beta ERD in decision-making has since been supported in a 
number of studies, reporting its sensitivity to uncertainty (Tzagarakis, Ince, 
Leuthold, & Pellizzer, 2010), and bias (de Lange, Rahnev, Donner, & Lau, 
2013), as well as its reaching of a stereotyped maximum before the response 
(Kubanek, Snyder, Brunton, Brody, & Schalk, 2013).  
 
Another EEG signal which has a known link to motor preparation and has been 
suggested to reflect accumulation is the lateralised readiness potential (LRP), 
an ERP component, recorded over the motor cortex (Ikeda & Shibasaki, 1992; 
Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). The LRP is the lateralised part of the slow 
negativity which is observed during the preparation of a limb movement, which, 
like beta ERD, is stronger on the hemisphere contralateral to the movement, 
and has more recently been linked to decision-making (Noorbaloochi, Sharon, & 
McClelland, 2015; Rinkenauer, Osman, Ulrich, Muller-Gethmann, & Mattes, 
2004). Importantly, it has also been suggested that the LRP closely follows an 
accumulation profile as predicted by sequential sampling models (Kelly & 
O’Connell, 2013; Polanía, Krajbich, Grueschow, & Ruff, 2014). 
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However, it is important to note that both signals, beta ERD and LRP, are 
signals of motor preparation and can only track the decision formation if the 
decision is associated with a specific motor response. Decisions which do not 
require overt, typically hand, movements, as well as decisions in which the 
stimulus-response mapping is not known during the accumulation process, 
cannot be explored using these signals (O’Connell, Dockree, & Kelly, 2012; 
Twomey, Kelly, & Connell, 2016). This dependence on the associated response 
demonstrates that these motor preparation signals can, at best, reflect a down-
stream process similar to accumulation, but that the accumulation process itself 
occurs in a different brain region.  
 
One signal which has been proposed to reflect accumulation itself is an ERP 
component called centroparietal positivity (CPP; O’Connell et al., 2012). As the 
name suggests, this ERP is recorded over parietal electrodes and shows a 
large, slow positivity, which has been suggested to reflect the decision-related 
accumulation of evidence. O’Connell et al. (2012) used a gradual target 
detection task and found that the CPP displayed a profile which built up 
gradually over the course of the decision, before reaching a stereotyped 
maximum which predicted the response time. In a follow-up study using a 
random dot motion task with different levels of difficulty (i.e. different levels of 
motion coherence) it has also been shown that the rate at which the build-up 
occurs depends on the quality of the sensory evidence, further supporting the 
CPP’s role as a decision variable signal (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et 
al., 2012; see Figure 1.5). Importantly, the authors were able to fully dissociate 
the CPP from other EEG signals which are associated with sensory and motor 
processing, and found that, unlike sensory signals, the CPP displays the 
accumulation profile only when the sensory evidence is decision-related, and, 
unlike motor signals, does so even when no motor response is required 
(O’Connell et al., 2012; Twomey et al., 2016). Additionally, the CPP has been 
shown to display the same waveform in both visual and auditory decision-
making. Together, these findings suggest that the CPP provides insight into the 
decision-related accumulation of evidence, independent of modality or stimulus-
response mappings. 
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Figure 1.5: CPP (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013): from left to right: stimulus-locked CPP, response-locked CPP, 
and ERP topography. Waveforms in different colours are associated with different levels of difficulty (20%, 
35%, 50%, and 70% coherence in a random dot motion task). The CPP builds up at a rate which depends 
on the level of difficulty and peaks at a stereotyped maximum at the time of response. The topoplot on the 
right shows the centroparietal location of the positivity (figure slightly edited from Kelly and O’Connell 
(2013)). 
Note that the CPP has been suggested to be equivalent to the P300, a well-
researched sensory-evoked centroparietal, positive ERP component which 
peaks between 300 and 600 ms after the onset of a task-relevant stimulus 
(Sutton, Braren, Zubin, & John, 1965; Twomey, Murphy, Kelly, & O’Connell, 
2015). Although the P300 has been researched in the context of decision-
making before, its exact functional relevance remained unclear, with most 
researchers merely arguing its involvement in stimulus processing 
(Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005; Pritchard, 1981). Although it is not 
yet clear whether all characteristics observed in studies utilising the P300 are 
consistent with accumulation-to-bound processes (Summerfield & Tickle, 2015), 
its potential equivalence with the CPP provides an interesting new perspective. 
 
Although there is compelling evidence to suggest that the CPP is indeed an 
electrophysiological marker of evidence accumulation, alternative 
interpretations of the findings have been proposed. One contentious issue is 
that the CPP only predicts the time of the decision, but not the outcome, i.e. 
based on the CPP alone, choices for one alternative are indistinguishable from 
choices for another alternative. This led to the suggestion that the CPP may not 
reflect evidence accumulation, but rather confidence in the decision, as a 
decision variable is expected to predict the decision outcome, while confidence 
in the decision is non-selective (Urai & Pfeffer, 2014). However, it is important to 
note that the nature of EEG recordings does not allow us to distinguish between 
the activities of populations of neurons in close spatial proximity to each other. If 
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we hypothesise that a process close to that proposed by sequential sampling 
models is indeed taking place in centroparietal regions, an assumption which, 
due to its limited spatial resolution cannot be confirmed by EEG, we might 
assume that in a binary choice, there are two pools of neurons, one 
accumulating the evidence for each alternative. Even in this case of a true 
decision variable in centroparietal regions, volume conduction would lead EEG 
electrodes to record a summation of both accumulators, resulting in a signal not 
dissimilar to the CPP.  
1.2.2.3. Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
Recently, a third approach to explore neural dynamics during decision-making 
in the human brain, namely transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), has 
become more relevant. TMS is a form of brain stimulation which can be used to 
disrupt activity in a given brain area and thereby identify its function. For 
example, Philiastides, Auksztulewicz, Heekeren, and Blankenburg (2011) used 
this approach to identify the DLPFC as a relevant region in the decision-making 
process. However, this TMS method can only provide insight into the 
involvement of a given brain region, and cannot track an evolving accumulation 
process over time. 
 
Therefore, a different approach has recently been suggested. This approach 
uses TMS in order to measure the build-up of response preparation during 
decision-making. When TMS is applied over the motor cortex, it can induce 
electrical responses in the muscle associated with the stimulated region, called 
motor evoked potentials (MEPs). These responses were first observed during 
the 1980s using a technique called transcranial electric stimulation, which had 
similar effects to TMS, but large practical limitations, primarily because brief 
high-voltage electric shocks on the scalp made the procedure painful (Merton & 
Morton, 1980; Merton, Hill, Morton, & Marsden, 1982). Shortly thereafter, 
Barker, Jalinous, and Freeston (1985) developed TMS, in which a coil of wire is 
connected to an electrical capacitance, which, when discharged, causes a brief, 
large current pulse in the coil. This current causes a magnetic field oriented 
perpendicular to the coil, which in turn causes an electric field leading to current 
flows parallel to the coil in any conductive structures in close proximity. When 
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the coil is placed on the scalp, the magnetic field is only minimally impeded by 
the skull and is therefore able to produce currents in the brain. When a TMS coil 
is placed over the motor cortex and a current is produced in the primary motor 
cortex (M1), it can elicit contractions in contralateral, typically hand, muscles 
(Barker et al., 1985; Rothwell, Day, Thompson, Dick, & Marsden, 1987). 
 
Importantly, the magnitude of these contractions can give insight into the level 
of motor preparation in M1 and adjacent premotor areas, as the MEP amplitude 
is a direct indicator of corticospinal excitability (Bestmann et al., 2008; Hadar, 
Makris, & Yarrow, 2012; Kiers, Fernando, & Tomkins, 1997). It has now been 
suggested that this measure of motoric preparation can be used to track the 
decision variable (Hadar, Rowe, Di Costa, Jones, & Yarrow, 2015). This claim is 
based on the same arguments that support tracking of motor-related EEG 
signals, such as the LRP, as a correlate of the decision variable, i.e. that 
response-related motoric activation does not follow the decision formation in a 
serial fashion as previously suggested (Donders, 1969; Sternberg, 1969), but 
instead occurs throughout the decision-making process, with accumulation 
constantly being fed forward into the motor system (Coles, Gratton, Bashore, 
Eriksen, & Donchin, 1985; Gluth, Rieskamp, & Büchel, 2013; Hadar et al., 2012; 
Michelet, Duncan, & Cisek, 2010; Servant, White, Montagnini, & Burle, 2015). 
Together, these findings imply that the level of accumulation for a given 
alternative at any given time point is reflected in the level of preparation of the 
corresponding response, which can be measured using recordings of MEPs. 
 
Supporting this claim, Michelet et al. (2010) explored MEPs during an Eriksen 
flanker task, in which arrows indicating the appropriate response were either 
presented alone or surrounded either by congruent arrows which pointed in the 
same direction as the target arrow, or incongruent arrows, which pointed in the 
opposite direction and had to be ignored. TMS was applied at a number of time 
points throughout the decision-making process. It was found that, when the 
target arrow was not surrounded by incongruent arrows, the MEP size in the 
responding muscle increased over the course of the decision while the MEP 
size in the non-responding muscle decreased. In the incongruent condition, on 
the other hand, the same pattern was preceded by an initial increase in the non-
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responding muscle. These findings suggest that MEP size reflects accumulation 
as it not only increases over the course of the decision but also dynamically 
tracks the evolution of the decision in incongruent trials. Importantly, the authors 
also found that MEP amplitudes reached a constant maximum immediately prior 
to the response across conditions, suggesting an accumulation-to-bound 
dynamic similar to the one predicted by sequential sampling models. Similarly, 
Klein-Flugge and Bestmann (2012) found that the difference in MEP amplitudes 
in the responding muscle compared to the non-responding muscle predicted the 
decision prior to the completion of the decision formation, and Klein, Olivier, and 
Duque (2012) found that MEP amplitudes were sensitive to decision biases, 
further supporting the potential role of corticospinal excitability as a correlate of 
the decision variable. 
 
One limitation of using MEP amplitudes to track the accumulation process in 
this way is that stimulation can only occur at discrete time points and only one 
MEP at one time point can be retrieved from each decision-making process, 
which makes it difficult to reveal the continuous dynamics of a decision variable. 
Hadar et al. (2015) addressed this limitation. In a perceptual discrimination task 
in which participants were asked to categorise faces as either male or female, 
TMS pulses were applied at random time points throughout the decision-making 
process. Although only one MEP could be sampled per trial, MEPs from all trials 
were pooled, sorted by latency, and smoothed using a Gaussian kernel, 
allowing the authors to recover a continuous time-varying MEP signal, 
comparable to an ERP component. It was found that more difficult 
categorisations were associated with longer motoric activity in the responding 
muscle than easier ones. The authors also fitted a Diffusion model to their data 
and identified similarities between the simulated accumulation profile based on 
the model and the MEP signal, further supporting the conclusion that the MEP 
signal reflects decision-related accumulation. 
 
This methodology to use TMS to induce MEPs and measure their amplitude as 
a correlate of decision-making is an interesting new approach to explore 
decision-making. However, to date, only a small number of studies have 
explored this MEP signal, and more research is needed to validate its role as a 
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decision variable. Nevertheless, it provides advantages over more established 
EEG or fMRI methods due to its spatial and temporal resolution. TMS methods 
provide great temporal resolution, although it is important to note that this is 
limited by the number of stimulations and their timing. Additionally, while EEG 
provides little information about the anatomical structures producing recorded 
signals, we can be confident that MEPs reflect activation in M1, and potentially 
also in premotor structures (Ahdab, Ayache, Brugières, Farhat, & Lefaucheur, 
2016). However, its motor-specificity also implies that the MEP method can only 
give insight into decisions which involve a motor response, which limits its 
applicability. Nonetheless, initial findings suggest that it is a promising new 
method to track decision-making. 
 
1.3. Model-based Analysis of Neural Signals 
 
As outlined above, perceptual decision-making has been studied extensively in 
the fields of experimental psychology, mathematical psychology, and cognitive 
neuroscience, each focusing on behavioural data, formal models, and neural 
data respectively, and contributing to our understanding of decision processes. 
More recently, however, the importance of combining all three approaches to 
gain better insights into perceptual decision-making has become increasingly 
apparent. This triangulation of methods (sometimes referred to as model-based 
cognitive neuroscience; Forstmann, Wagenmakers, Eichele, Brown, & 
Serences, 2011) provides several obvious advantages over traditional 
approaches. For example, mathematical models can break a complex cognitive 
process into several separate mechanisms, which are easier to test using 
neural data. An example of this is the introduction of bias in decision-making. 
Biased decisions are known to lead to faster RTs (Hick, 1952), but it is not clear 
how this difference in RT could be achieved in the brain, as possibilities include 
that sensory evidence which supports an existing bias could be integrated faster 
due to an attentional bias, or that decision processes could remain unchanged 
while only the biased response is prepared and therefore executed faster. 
Mathematical models, on the other hand, predict that biases are implemented 
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by reducing the amount of evidence required to form the decision (Bode et al., 
2012; Gao, Zheng, & Wang, 2010; Leite & Ratcliff, 2011). Applying this 
knowledge to neuroimaging data allows for clear, testable predictions, and 
therefore greater insights into perceptual decision-making in the brain. 
 
Conversely, neural data can be used to inform mathematical models. An 
example of this has been highlighted by Ditterich (2010), who set out to 
evaluate a variety of sequential sampling models and their ability to account for 
behavioural data in decisions with multiple alternatives. He found that a number 
of different models explained the data equally well while assuming different 
underlying mechanisms. However, it was emphasised that this does not render 
these models indistinguishable, as, while they make similar behavioural 
predictions, their internal dynamics displayed marked differences, necessitating 
the comparison to neural data to identify the best model. 
 
To date, the majority of neuroimaging studies which explore perceptual 
decision-making, including those that aim to identify neural correlates of the 
decision variable, have not made use of this inter-disciplinary approach. While 
virtually all studies reported thus far have explored and evaluated neural signals 
in the context of the sequential sampling model framework, the vast majority of 
these studies have relied solely on conceptual predictions made by these 
models without applying them directly. fMRI research is arguably an exception 
as it commonly applies sequential sampling models and uses variations in 
model parameters to identify brain regions associated with accumulation (for a 
review, see Mulder et al., 2014). However, as outlined above, fMRI is not a 
suitable method to directly track the dynamically evolving decision variable. 
 
M/EEG methods, on the other hand, are more useful to identify neural 
correlates of the accumulation process but have rarely been combined with 
mathematical modelling. Of course, any study exploring potential neural 
substrates of the decision variable, which is defined only by sequential sampling 
models, necessarily does so in the context of these models. However, many 
studies do not fit sequential sampling models to their data and instead, rely on a 
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conceptual understanding of the models to make solely intuitive predictions 
which are then tested using neural data. 
 
For example, it is well-established that accumulation, as described by 
sequential sampling models, builds up gradually over the course of the decision 
and peaks at the time of response. Additionally, it has repeatedly been 
demonstrated that task difficulty, i.e. the quality of the sensory information 
during a perceptual decision, influences the drift rate in sequential sampling 
models, with easier decisions being associated with steeper accumulation 
profiles (Donkin, Averell, Brown, & Heathcote, 2009; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; 
Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). These concepts have been used in a number of 
neuroimaging studies to identify neural correlates of the decision variable based 
on their shape, and without applying the models directly (Donner et al., 2009; 
O’Connell et al., 2012; Twomey et al., 2016). 
 
While this approach has been successfully adding to our understanding of 
perceptual decision-making in the brain, it is difficult to apply to more complex 
designs. In simple and fast binary decisions based on stationary evidence, it is 
comparatively easy to predict the shape of the accumulation process, and the 
manipulation of decision difficulty has consistently been shown to have the 
same impact on the accumulation profile. However, more recently, research is 
moving on to more complex, more ecologically valid designs, as both 
neuroscience and modelling studies have showed increasing interest in designs 
including decisions under different levels of speed pressure, decision biases, 
and decisions with multiple alternatives (Bogacz, Wagenmakers, Forstmann, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2010; Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008; Mulder, 
Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2012; Summerfield & de Lange, 
2014; Tsetsos et al., 2011). 
 
To study these more complex forms of perceptual decision-making, the 
collaboration of disciplines is crucial. This is particularly important when neural 
data is used to explore the decision variable. With increasing complexity in the 
design, and importantly, increasing complexity in sequential sampling models, 
implementing nonlinearities such as inhibition between alternatives, it becomes 
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increasingly difficult to make intuitive predictions about the profile of the 
decision variable. With complex relationships between parameters, different, 
equally likely models can predict qualitatively different accumulation profiles 
which cannot be predicted by conceptual reasoning alone (Ditterich, 2010).  
 
Additionally, even a specific model can make different predictions depending on 
how a specific paradigm is implemented. With the exception of the manipulation 
of difficulty, most experimental manipulations of decision-making can be 
explained by a given model in a number of different ways. An example of this is 
the implementation of response caution, which is modelled by varying the 
amount of evidence that needs to be accumulated to reach a decision (Brown & 
Heathcote, 2008; Marshall, Bogacz, & Gilchrist, 2012). While sequential 
sampling models, by convention, vary the decision threshold to achieve this 
effect, varying the starting point instead would lead to mathematically equivalent 
results, while producing different accumulation profiles. Therefore, it is important 
for studies investigating neural correlates of decision-making using complex 
designs to directly apply models to their data, rather than merely using the 
sequential sampling model framework as a basis for intuitive hypotheses. 
 
A number of ways have been suggested to combine neuroimaging and 
sequential sampling models. For example, studies have fitted models to RT 
data and compared the resulting parameter values to specific properties in the 
signal (Gluth et al., 2013; Kelly & O’Connell, 2013). An arguably more 
informative approach is to use the estimated parameters to simulate the 
corresponding mean accumulation profile and directly compare its shape to the 
trajectory of the neural signal (Hadar et al., 2015; Twomey et al., 2015). 
Although this approach has been implemented in only a small number of 
studies to date, it allows for a direct comparison of the whole waveform with 
model predictions, without requiring speculations about the decision variable, 
and allows for a better evaluation of neural correlates of accumulation.  
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1.4. Current Project 
 
In the light of this research, we set out to explore human perceptual decision-
making and improve our understanding of sequential sampling in the human 
brain. Although perceptual decision-making has been researched for decades 
and in several disciplines, a number of questions remain unanswered, and a 
consensus regarding the neural mechanism underlying, particularly human, 
decision-making is yet to be reached. We therefore aimed to explore human 
brain activity during sensorimotor choices, shed light on some of the remaining 
questions, and improve our understanding of decision-making mechanisms. 
 
Firstly, we aim to address the basic question of whether the accumulation 
process described by sequential sampling models (a mathematical abstraction) 
occurs concretely in the human brain. Sequential sampling models make no 
claims regarding neural processes and are instead designed to account only for 
behavioural data. Nevertheless, a large body of research has confirmed that 
accumulation-like processes can be tracked using firing rates of neurons in 
oculomotor structures in non-human primates. However, a similar consensus 
has not been reached regarding the human brain. Although we can speculate 
that neural processes in non-human primates are similar to those in the human 
brain, this speculation is questionable as monkeys require prolonged training to 
complete decisions which humans perform after simple instructions, which may 
lead to differences in sensorimotor mappings between humans and monkeys. 
 
Nevertheless, neural correlates of the decision variable in the human brain have 
only recently become a topic of interest, not least because researchers are 
limited by the methodologies available for human research, and cannot track 
neural firing rates the way researchers can in non-human primates. Given the 
most commonly used methods of neuroimaging in humans, namely fMRI and 
M/EEG, researchers have to choose between good spatial and temporal 
resolution. While a high spatial resolution is important to identify structures 
involved in decision-making, a high temporal resolution is crucial to track the 
very fast evolving decision-variable, making M/EEG methods the most suitable 
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approach to study accumulation in the human brain. However, although this 
method has been used in this context for several years, and a number of 
signals have been proposed to be relevant, there is no consensus regarding 
which signal best reflects decision-related accumulation.  
 
Overall, human research appears to lag behind research in non-human 
primates, in which a link between sequential sampling models and neural 
activity has already been established. We therefore aim to answer the primary 
question whether sequential sampling occurs in the human brain. We 
hypothesised that accumulation-to-bound dynamics like those predicted by 
sequential sampling models occur in the human brain and can be observed 
using EEG and TMS methods. 
 
Secondly, given that decision-related accumulation can be tracked in the human 
brain we addressed the question of which signal best describes this process. In 
particular, we tested two signals which we deemed most promising, namely 1) 
the CPP and 2) the MEP signal reflecting excitability of motor areas. The CPP is 
of particular interest as claims have been made that it tracks the decision-
related accumulation process directly and independently of sensory or motor 
processes (O’Connell et al., 2012). However, to date, it is not well-established 
and has not been tested under a large variety of manipulations. Additionally, it 
tracks accumulation as a whole and is not able to distinguish between response 
alternatives. 
 
For the MEP signal, on the other hand, the claim is not that it displays 
accumulation directly, but instead, that it reflects a down-stream representation 
in the form of response preparation. We used a TMS method to generate 
smoothed MEP signals to track accumulation in the motor system, following the 
same approach as Hadar et al. (2015). This signal is not well-established but 
may be a promising tool, as its high temporal resolution implies that it can track 
the decision variable, without being limited in its spatial resolution like M/EEG 
signals. This implies that, to our knowledge, it is the only signal which allows us 
to track the evolution of individual responses in humans with more than two 
alternatives (there are EEG signals which reflect motor preparation and can be 
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used to track individual responses, but the very low spatial resolution of this 
method limits this to binary decisions).  
 
Therefore, by exploring the question of which signals in the human brain track 
the decision-related accumulation of evidence, we not only tested the 
usefulness of different EEG signals, and in particular the CPP, but also explored 
whether accumulation is fed forward into motor systems. We hypothesised on 
the one hand, that the CPP can be used to track the decision variable, 
suggesting a parietal locus of accumulation, but on the other hand, that down-
stream accumulation can also be observed in motor areas which are related to 
the preparation of the response and can be tracked using MEP signals. 
 
Thirdly, having established the validity of the chosen neural substrates of the 
decision variable, we explored the question of how the accumulation process 
reacts to a number of manipulations. Specifically, in the following chapters we 
tested the effect of the speed-accuracy trade-off, difficulty, non-stationary 
evidence, decision biases, and multiple alternatives on the neural accumulation 
profile. Each of these manipulations represents a step towards ecological 
validity as in everyday decisions we rarely choose between two well-defined 
and opposite alternatives the way decision-making is commonly operationalised 
in the lab. Some of these manipulations, such as the speed-accuracy trade-off 
have previously been explored but conclusions remain controversial (Hawkins, 
Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, & Brown, 2015; Heitz, 2014), while others, such as 
multi-alternative decision-making, have, to our knowledge, not yet been 
explored in the human brain. We hypothesised that the neural correlates of the 
decision variable are sensitive to these manipulations and display changes in 
their profile which are consistent with sequential sampling model parameter 
changes which explain the associated behavioural differences. 
 
Fourthly, intertwined with these previous questions but perhaps of greatest 
importance, we address the question of exactly how similar the neural 
substrates of accumulation are to the accumulation predicted by sequential 
sampling models. As discussed in section 1.3, the evaluation of neural 
accumulation signals based on conceptual reasoning can only be informative 
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for basic paradigms. In order to understand the underlying mechanisms of 
perceptual decision-making, we need to make use of both neuroimaging and 
sequential sampling models. We therefore combined these approaches by 
fitting sequential sampling models to behavioural data and using the resulting 
parameter values to simulate accumulation profiles and directly compare them 
to the associated neural signals. In this way we set out to not only evaluate 
neural signals, but also, in return, to inform sequential sampling models, and 
gain a more holistic understanding of decision-making mechanisms. We 
hypothesised that the waveforms of both the CPP and the MEP signal would 
display strong qualitative similarities to the simulated accumulation profile 
predicted by sequential sampling models. 
 
Overall, we explored human perceptual decision-making using both neurometric 
measures and sequential sampling modelling of behavioural data. We report 
our findings using the following structure. In Chapter 2, we explored the impact 
of the speed-accuracy trade-off on perceptual decision-making. In two 
experiments, we compared the predictions made by a race model to both the 
CPP, and an MEP signal. Since both neurometric signals contradicted model 
predictions in the same way, we proposed a novel implementation of the speed-
accuracy trade-off in sequential sampling models which is able to account for 
both behavioural and neural findings. Since the shape of the CPP in Chapter 2 
did not support the traditional implementation of the speed-accuracy trade-off in 
sequential sampling models, in Chapter 3 we tested the CPP’s role as a 
correlate of accumulation using a more well-established manipulation, namely 
difficulty, and compared it to other EEG signals which have previously been 
suggested to reflect the decision variable. We concluded that the CPP does, in 
fact, reflect accumulation better than a number of other EEG signals. To further 
test the role of the CPP in decision-making, and test the effects of a range of 
conditions, in Chapter 4, we explored its shape using less commonly used 
manipulations, namely decisions with non-stationary evidence and biased 
decisions, and directly compared the resulting waveforms to simulated mean 
accumulation paths. Finally, in Chapter 5, we explored decision-making with 
multiple alternatives. To this end, we chose a TMS method due to its greater 
spatial selectivity compared to EEG measures. Using this method, we were able 
41 
 
to track the evolution of each of four response alternatives, which displayed 
great similarities with decision variable simulations made using the LCA model. 
We conclude in Chapter 6 and discuss the role of both of the neural correlates 
of the decision variable used here. We emphasise the importance of combining 
approaches from different disciplines in order to gain insights into human 
decision-making. 
  
42 
 
2. Exploring Neural Correlates of Decision-
Making under Speed/Accuracy Instructions 
 
Every day, we are faced with countless decisions, each requiring an appropriate 
compromise between speed and accuracy. Striving for accuracy necessitates 
lengthy deliberation, but environmental time pressures may force us to make 
quick, more error-prone decisions. This relationship, referred to as the speed-
accuracy trade-off (SAT, Garrett, 1922; Hick, 1952; Wickelgren, 1977), has 
been demonstrated in a number of settings and appears to be a ubiquitous 
finding across experimental tasks and even species (Chittka, Dyer, Bock, & 
Dornhaus, 2003; Heitz & Schall, 2012; Ivanoff, Branning, & Marois, 2008).  
 
The majority of research investigating the SAT has done so in the context of 
perceptual decision-making, partly because these comparatively simple, quick 
decisions allow for a great level of control in experimental settings, but 
importantly also because mathematical models of perceptual decision-making 
offer useful explanations for behavioural findings associated with the SAT. 
Perceptual decisions describe choices that are relatively fast (usually < 1000 
ms) and based on sensory evidence (Newsome et al., 1989). According to a 
group of models called sequential sampling models, we make these decisions 
by accumulating sensory evidence over time, until a set decision threshold is 
reached. Once the threshold is reached, we make the decision and initiate the 
motor response associated with it.  
 
Importantly, these accumulation-to-bound models are able to explain the shifts 
in behavioural data that are associated with the SAT, by simply adjusting the 
threshold parameter. A low threshold implies that less evidence needs to be 
accumulated to make a decision, which leads to faster, but also more error-
prone decisions, as less evidence is accumulated and therefore less noise is 
averaged out. A high threshold, on the other hand, means that more evidence 
needs to be accumulated to reach a decision, which leads to longer reaction 
times (RTs) and fewer errors. With this simple threshold adjustment, sequential 
sampling models are able to account for accuracy rates and RT distributions for 
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correct and incorrect decisions in SAT tasks (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, 
& Cohen, 2006; Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Usher & 
McClelland, 2001).  
  
Although sequential sampling models were designed to explain behavioural 
decision-making data and do so successfully, there is now substantial evidence 
from neural data to support their validity. Signals which display characteristics of 
the accumulation process predicted by sequential sampling models have been 
identified in electrophysiological data from non-human primates (Gold & 
Shadlen, 2000; Shadlen & Newsome, 1996, 2001) as well as 
electroencephalographic (EEG) /magnetoencephalographic (MEG) and 
functional resonance imaging (fMRI) recordings of human decision-making 
(Donner et al., 2009; Forstmann et al., 2008; O’Connell et al., 2012). The 
observation that the processes described by sequential sampling models 
closely resemble neural signals led to the testable prediction that threshold 
differences should be observable in neuroimaging data of SAT tasks.  
 
A number of studies have attempted to explore the neural mechanisms of the 
SAT and test this hypothesis. The results have been mixed. There is, in fact, 
some evidence to support the role of the decision threshold as the neural 
mechanism to control the SAT. For example, van Veen, Krug, and Carter (2008) 
used fMRI to measure their participants’ brain activity while they performed a 
Simon task (i.e. a task in which participants are presented with a square 
appearing left or right of the fixation cross and asked to respond to its colour, 
while ignoring its location) under instructions to emphasise either response 
speed or accuracy. They found an increase in baseline activity under speed 
instructions compared to accuracy instructions in a network of brain areas 
associated with decision-making, including premotor areas, the basal ganglia, 
the thalamus, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex.  
 
It is important to note that although sequential sampling models generally speak 
of a modulation of the threshold to explain SAT findings, the modulation of the 
baseline level of activity is mathematically equivalent to this claim. In fact, while, 
by convention, these models mention a threshold difference, sequential 
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sampling models are only able to predict a modulation in the baseline-threshold 
distance, but cannot give insight into whether this modulation is caused by a 
difference in baseline, threshold, or an interaction of the two, based on 
behavioural data alone. Therefore, van Veen et al. (2008) interpreted their 
findings of an increased baseline under speed instructions to support 
predictions of sequential sampling models.  
 
Two further fMRI studies showed these increased levels of baseline activity in a 
number of areas, including the pre-supplementary motor area, for decisions 
under time pressure (Forstmann et al., 2008; Ivanoff et al., 2008; see Bogacz et 
al., 2010 for a review). Similarly, Wenzlaff, Bauer, Maess, and Heekeren (2011) 
found that speed stress led to higher activity in supplementary motor areas, as 
well as lower activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, using MEG. 
Together, these studies support sequential sampling models, not only by 
showing a modulation of baseline-threshold difference in the context of SAT, but 
also by identifying pre-motor areas, rather than sensory or primary motor areas, 
as the source of this modulation, supporting the claim that SAT mechanisms 
work at the level of the decision-making, not the level of encoding or motor 
execution (Bogacz et al., 2010). 
  
Although initial fMRI findings are promising, other studies were not able to show 
a clear modulation of the baseline-threshold distance. Heitz and Schall (2012) 
trained macaque monkeys to perform a visual search task under either speed or 
accuracy pressure and recorded activity from frontal eye field (FEF) neurons, 
the firing rates of which have previously been associated with sequential 
sampling models (e.g. Gold & Shadlen, 2003). Their results suggest that the 
description of the SAT provided by sequential sampling models is incomplete as 
they identified several widespread changes associated with an emphasis on 
speed or accuracy. Specifically, they found that FEF activity during speed trials 
was not only raised during the baseline but also at the time of response, a 
finding which is inconsistent with traditional sequential sampling models. In a 
follow-up study, these results were strengthened, demonstrating that the SAT is 
a multifaceted phenomenon, associated with extensive and widespread 
modulations in activity (Heitz & Schall, 2013).  
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Similar studies were conducted with a focus on neurons in the lateral 
intraparietal area (LIP). Like FEF activity, firing rates of LIP neurons have 
previously been shown to display characteristics of the decision variable, i.e. the 
accumulation profile predicted by sequential sampling models, and may 
therefore be expected to show threshold differences (Paré & Wurtz, 2001; 
Shadlen & Newsome, 1996, 2001). However, a comparison of LIP activity in 
speed and accuracy regimes during a random dot motion task revealed no 
modulation in threshold levels (Hanks et al., 2014). Instead, additional 
evidence-independent activity was observed in the speed regime compared to 
the accuracy regime. This stronger activity was present from the beginning of 
the decision formation, thereby supporting previous fMRI findings (Forstmann et 
al., 2008; Ivanoff et al., 2008; van Veen et al., 2008). However, Hanks et al. 
(2014) showed that this stronger, speed-related, evidence-independent activity 
persisted throughout the decision-making process, suggesting that the initial 
difference in activation between the two regimes is not indicative of a pure 
modulation of the baseline-threshold distance, but rather due to an added 
urgency signal. A model with an urgency signal was also used by Thura and 
Cisek (2016) to explain their findings which indicated higher baseline activity as 
well as higher gain, but similar threshold levels in decision-related cells in speed 
compared to accuracy conditions. 
  
In fact, the concept of an evidence-independent urgency signal has been a 
recurring theme throughout the SAT and sequential sampling model literature 
(Cisek, Puskas, & El-Murr, 2009; Hawkins, Forstmann, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, 
& Brown, 2015; Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Thura, Beauregard-Racine, Fradet, & 
Cisek, 2012). It describes the idea that the accumulation of evidence is inflated 
by the addition of a signal which increases over time and ensures that a 
decision is made, even when no evidence is available. This urgency signal may 
increase faster under speed instructions compared to accuracy instructions, 
leading to faster, more error-prone responses, as the decision threshold is 
reached with less evidence. Note that this urgency signal is equivalent to the 
concept of collapsing bounds, which assumes that accumulation remains 
dependent on evidence alone throughout, but the decision thresholds are 
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dynamic and decrease towards the baseline over time, to ensure decision 
formation. However, it is important to note that standard sequential sampling 
models, without the addition of an urgency signal, have been supported across 
a large variety of paradigms, while there is only limited evidence to support 
models that do include this dynamic feature (see Hawkins et al., 2015 for a 
review). In fact, several studies were unable to support the concept of an 
urgency signal, suggesting instead that standard sequential sampling models 
can fully account for all behavioural data, including SAT data (Balci et al., 2011; 
Karsilar, Simen, Papadakis, & Balci, 2014).  
  
Nevertheless, a recent study found support for an urgency signal as the driving 
force behind the SAT, by using EEG to record human brain activity during a 
random dot motion task under free response and deadline conditions (Murphy, 
Boonstra, & Nieuwenhuis, 2016). In this study, desynchronisation in the mu 
frequency band (8-14 Hz) was explored as a decision-related motor signal and 
results showed that, in the deadline condition, this signal was elevated towards 
the threshold (i.e. towards activity levels at response). While they showed that 
contralateral mu power at the time of the response remained the same across 
both conditions, indicating a common threshold, they found lower bilateral mu 
power prior to the stimulus onset, as well as lower ipsilateral power at the 
response in the deadline condition, suggesting the influence of an urgency 
signal. Further, Murphy et al. (2016) used measurements of pupil diameter to 
show that this urgency may be caused by a modulation of neural gain. 
 
Together, these findings question the idea that the adjustment of the threshold 
in a sequential sampling process underlies the SAT on a neural level. While 
there is an overwhelming amount of evidence suggesting that the behavioural 
effects associated with the SAT are best accounted for by a change in threshold 
(Balci et al., 2011; Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Karsilar et al., 2014; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Usher & McClelland, 2001), neural data 
suggest that less specific changes are associated with the SAT, with most 
studies reporting a change in both baseline activation and gain.  
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In the light of this literature, and in particular the paucity of studies addressing 
the time-varying neurometric correlates of the SAT in humans, we set out to 
explore the neural mechanisms underlying the SAT in the context of sequential 
sampling models. In two experiments, we asked human subjects to complete a 
random dot motion task, while we recorded decision-related neural activity by 
either using EEG to record a centroparietal component which has previously 
been suggested to reflect accumulation, or transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) to record motor preparation. During the task, we manipulated the 
decision strategies by using ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ instructions, to explore their 
effects on the neural data. In addition, we manipulated the difficulty of the task 
as the impact of this manipulation has been researched extensively and it is 
well-established that both accumulation profiles predicted by sequential 
sampling models and neural correlates of decision-making vary in build-up rate 
as a result of varying difficulty. By fitting a sequential sampling model to the 
behavioural decision-making data and directly comparing the resulting model 
predictions to these neural signals, we aimed to gain new insights into the 
underlying mechanisms of the SAT.  
 
In order to address the inconsistencies between the modelling and 
neuroimaging literature, we used two types of models, one of which used the 
typically reported variation in parameters to account for the SAT (i.e. varying 
threshold parameters across SAT conditions), and one in which we 
implemented a global modulation in activity. Specifically, we used the 
parameters estimated using varying thresholds as they have been shown to 
account well for behavioural data, and, without affecting the model fit, rescaled 
them to transfer the difference in thresholds over speed and accuracy regimes 
to all other parameters, modelling a widespread change in activity which has 
previously been reported in neural data (Heitz & Schall, 2012, 2013; Murphy et 
al., 2016). By directly comparing the predicted accumulation profiles of both 
models with two neural correlates of decision-making, we explored the 
mechanisms underlying decision-making in the context of the SAT and found 
evidence suggesting that the SAT is implemented in the human brain via a form 
of global gain modulation. 
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2.1. Experiment 1: EEG 
 
EEG is a particularly suitable method to track perceptual decision-making in 
humans, since its high temporal resolution allows us to track the dynamically 
changing decision variable. To date, studies which used human EEG to directly 
test SAT mechanisms in the context of sequential sampling models are sparse. 
There are however, a number of EEG studies using human scalp potentials to 
explore the mechanisms of the SAT in a serial processing framework, where the 
locus of the SAT is placed on sensory, decision, or motor processes, which are 
thought of as non-overlapping intervals (Donders, 1969; Sternberg, 1969).  
 
For example, studies focussing on the lateralised readiness potential (LRP), an 
event-related potential (ERP) indicating preparation of motor activity, measured 
the stimulus-LRP onset, and the LRP onset-response intervals separately in 
order to identify differences in sensory and motor processes respectively. These 
studies found that both LRP stages decrease in duration under speed 
instructions, suggesting both a sensory and motor locus of the SAT (Osman et 
al., 2000; Rinkenauer et al., 2004). Interestingly, by suggesting that post-
decisional motor stages are affected by the SAT, these studies questioned the 
claim that the SAT is explained by a baseline-threshold difference alone. 
However, the notion of serial processing has since been rejected (Hadar, et al., 
2015; see Experiment 2). Additionally, note that the LRP has previously been 
suggested to display characteristics of the accumulation profile predicted by 
sequential sampling models (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013) and, although not directly 
tested, does not seem to show an amplitude difference between SAT regimes 
at the time of response, further questioning the threshold effect (Osman et al., 
2000; Rinkenauer et al., 2004).  
 
Similarly, Osman et al. (2000) explored the ERP component P300, which may 
be equivalent to the centroparietal positivity (CPP), a component that has been 
shown to reflect the accumulation of evidence as suggested by sequential 
sampling models (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 2012; Twomey et 
al., 2015). In fact, like LIP firing rates in non-human primates, the CPP in the 
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human EEG has been shown to display accumulation-to-bound characteristics 
and described as the decision variable. For example, it has been demonstrated 
that the slope of the CPP scales with the strength of sensory evidence and 
predicts RT, and that its amplitude reaches a stereotyped level at response 
time, suggesting a fixed decision threshold (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell 
et al., 2012). Although Osman et al. (2000) explored the P300 under SAT 
conditions and found similar patterns as those observed in the LRP, they only 
tested peak latencies, to explore sensory and motor parts of the decision-
making process and did not explore the P300 as a potential neural substrate of 
a decision variable. The effects of the SAT on the P300 were also explored by 
Perri, Berchicci, Spinelli, and Di Russo (2014), who found that fast compared to 
slow decisions led to an earlier and larger P300. However, in this study, no SAT 
instructions were given, and trials were divided into four different speed and 
accuracy conditions post hoc, which makes it difficult to compare findings. To 
our knowledge, the CPP has not been directly used to explore the effects of 
SAT on the decision variable. 
 
In Experiment 1, we therefore set out to test the impact of SAT instructions on 
the CPP. As described above, we compared the resulting waveforms to two 
different models, one which makes use of a variation in the threshold parameter 
to model the SAT, and one which assumes a more global change in activity. We 
evaluated the resulting decision variables in the light of the CPP.  
 
2.1.1. Methods  
2.1.1.1. Participants 
We recruited a total of 26 participants (nine males), with a mean age of 29.81 
(SD = 7.24). According to criteria that were established prior to the experiment, 
participants were excluded if they were unable to reach a calibrated coherence 
level of less than 90% for either of the difficulty conditions (see section 
2.1.1.2.2). On this basis, we excluded three participants prior to the main 
experiment. The remaining sample consisted of 23 participants (eight males) 
with a mean age of 29.39 (SD = 7.47), each of which participated in a single 
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two-hour session, completing 800 trials. Participants were recruited using poster 
advertisements and word of mouth, resulting in a sample which was primarily 
made up of students and staff at City, University of London. All participants 
were paid £8 per hour and an additional reward for task performance (up to £4 
per session). The experiment was approved by the City, University of London 
Psychology Department Ethics Committee. 
2.1.1.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
2.1.1.2.1. Stimuli and Experiment Setup 
Participants completed a random dot motion task, in which they were presented 
with an array of moving dots. In each trial, a proportion of the dots moved 
coherently in one direction (either up or down) while the rest of the dots moved 
in random directions. Participants were asked to indicate the direction of the 
coherent motion. Trial difficulty was manipulated by varying the proportion of 
dots moving coherently, with larger coherence levels leading to easier 
decisions. 
 
The task was displayed on a cathode ray tube screen (size: 41 cm x 30 cm), 
operating at a refresh rate of 85 Hz and a resolution of 1240 x 786 pixels. 
Participants were seated at a distance of 100 cm from the screen. In order to 
indicate their decision, participants held a digital response button interfaced via 
a 16 bit A/D card (National Instruments X-series PCIe-6323, sample rate 
100,000 Hz) in each hand, and were instructed to press the right button to 
indicate the ‘up’ response, and the left button to indicate the ‘down’ response. 
 
In each trial, a total of 300 white dots, 0.04 x 0.04 degrees visual angle (dva) in 
size, were displayed within a 5 dva circular aperture on a black background. A 
fixation cross (size: 0.33 x 0.33 dva) was located in the centre of the stimulus. 
All dots moved at a speed of 3.3 dva per second. While coherent dots moved 
either up or down, depending on the trial, the direction in which random dots 
moved was randomly selected for each dot and each frame. The position of all 
dots was randomised every five frames. 
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The trial procedure is displayed in Figure 2.1. Initially, participants were 
presented with a fixation cross for 500 ms (plus a jitter of up to 1000 ms, drawn 
from a uniform distribution). Then, 100% of the dots moved randomly for 1000 
ms (plus a jitter of up to 1500 ms, drawn from a truncated gamma distribution 
with shape parameter 1 and scaling parameter 150)1. Since the onset of moving 
dots on the screen is likely to induce visual evoked potentials (VEPs) in the 
EEG, which may interfere with the recording of the CPP, this interval of random 
motion was introduced so that any VEPs occur before the stimulus onset (i.e. 
onset of coherent motion). This random motion was followed by the onset of 
coherent motion, when a proportion of dots started moving coherently either 
upwards or downwards, for up to 2000 ms, or until the response. Feedback was 
provided after each trial (see section 2.1.1.2.3). All stimuli were written in Matlab 
(The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), using the Psychtoolbox extension (Brainard, 
1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997) and run on a PC.  
  
In this experiment, difficulty (easy, hard), direction (up, down), and instructions 
(speed, accuracy) were manipulated. The ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ conditions 
were blocked, while all other conditions were randomly intermixed. The order of 
the SAT blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Each participant 
completed a minimum of 100 practice trials. Practice trials started with a 
coherence level of 90%, i.e. 90% of dots moved in one direction while only 10% 
moved randomly, and became progressively more difficult.  
2.1.1.2.2. Difficulty Calibration 
Once participants felt comfortable with the task, they completed a total of 
200 staircase trials to calibrate the level of difficulty appropriate for the ‘easy’ 
and ‘hard’ conditions for each participant individually. To this end, we used the 
QUEST staircase procedure, implemented in Psychtoolbox, which estimated 
the coherence levels at which each participant responded correctly in 75% and 
95% of trials (Watson & Pelli, 1983). These coherence levels were then used for 
the ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ conditions respectively. The stimulus presentation time 
                                               
1 A gamma distributed fore period with a shape parameter of 1 was chosen as it is associated 
with a uniform hazard function (Luce, 1986). 
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was reduced from 2000 ms to 1300 ms, and no feedback was provided during 
staircase trials. If a participant’s performance led to estimated ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
coherence levels of more than 90%, the participant was excluded from the 
experiment. This procedure resulted in a mean coherence of 30.63% (SD = 
18.69) for ‘hard’ trials, and 67.67% (SD = 28.23) for ‘easy’ trials.  
2.1.1.2.3.  SAT Instructions 
In order to enforce the SAT manipulations, participants were instructed to react 
as fast/accurately as possible in half of the trials. Additionally, feedback was 
provided after each trial to either reward participants (display of the word 
‘Correct’ and a small monetary reward, adding up to a maximum of £4 per 
participant) for fast and correct/correct responses in ‘speed’/ ‘accuracy’ trials, or 
provide negative feedback with the words ‘TOO SLOW’ or ‘INCORRECT’ in 
green letters on a red screen when the instructions were not followed. The inter-
trial interval was increased by 1000 ms after each trial with negative feedback. 
Neutral feedback (no monetary reward, but a neutral screen with the words 
‘incorrect’ or ‘too slow’) was shown when participants responded fast but 
incorrectly in the ‘speed’ condition or accurately but very slowly in the ‘accuracy’ 
condition. Whether a response was too slow or not was determined by a 
variable deadline which was initially set to 600 ms for the ‘speed’ and 1000 ms 
for the ‘accuracy’ condition. To optimise performance, the deadlines varied 
between 450 and 750 ms (‘speed’) and between 700 and 1300 ms (‘accuracy’) 
and were adjusted using separate QUEST staircase procedures, targeting 
accuracy levels of 75% for ‘speed’, and 90% for ‘accuracy’ conditions. 
Feedback was also provided when participants responded before the onset of 
the coherent motion (‘too fast’). 
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Figure 2.1: Random dot motion task trial procedure: after the presentation of a fixation cross, randomly 
moving dots were displayed on the screen for a minimum of 1000 ms. Then, a proportion of dots (defined 
by the level of coherence) moved coherently either up or down (here: up) and remained in this motion for 
up to 2000 ms or until the response. Each trial was followed by feedback after a short delay. Note that the 
size and number of dots have been adjusted for illustration. 
 
2.1.1.3.  EEG Recording and Pre-processing 
Continuous EEG was recorded using 64 active electrodes, placed equidistantly 
on the scalp (EasyCap, M10 Montage) and referenced to the right mastoid. 
Using a BrainAmp amplifier (BrainProducts), data were recorded at a sampling 
rate of 1000 Hz and band-pass filtered from 0.016 – 1000 Hz. The data were 
then pre-processed and analysed using custom scripts in Matlab (The 
Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), drawing on functions from the EEGLAB 
toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). 
 
EEG data were re-referenced to the average reference and filtered at 0.1 (low 
cut-off) and 45 Hz (high cut-off), using a Hamming windowed finite impulse 
response filter. To improve the signal-to-noise ratio, we initially visually 
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inspected the data to remove large muscle artifacts before applying 
independent component analysis to remove eye blink components. Any 
remaining artifacts were removed manually during a second visual inspection. 
Afterwards, spherical spline interpolation was used to reconstruct noisy 
channels, which were identified and rejected during the first visual inspection.  
 
In line with the procedures used in previous CPP studies (Kelly & O’Connell, 
2013; O’Connell et al., 2012), the data were converted to current source density 
(CSD) estimates to increase spatial selectivity. The CSD transformation was 
applied using the CSD toolbox, which uses a spherical spline algorithm, with the 
spline interpolation constant m set to its default value (m = 4; Kayser & Tenke, 
2006). 
 
2.1.1.4. ERP Analysis 
For the ERP analysis, we extracted both stimulus-locked (-200 to 2000 ms, 
relative to motion onset) and response-locked (-1000 to 100 ms, relative to the 
button press) epochs. All epochs were baseline corrected to the average over a 
200 ms period preceding the motion onset. In order to collapse over ‘up’ and 
‘down’ trials, the ERP topography of correct ‘up’ trials and incorrect ‘down’ trials 
(right button presses) was mirrored along the midline (i.e. activity recorded in 
electrodes on the left hemisphere was now associated with electrodes on the 
right hemisphere), so that all motor preparation appeared in the right 
hemisphere. Although this step was not strictly necessary to analyse the CPP, 
which is recorded from the midline, this mirroring allows for a better visualisation 
of activation across the scalp. The appropriate electrode to generate the CPP 
waveform was chosen individually, by visually inspecting each participant’s 
averaged ERP topography to identify the centroparietal region of maximum 
amplitude (chosen electrodes: 1, 5, or 14, roughly equivalent to electrodes Cz, 
CPz, and Pz in the 10-20 system; see Figure 2.4). The activity in the selected 
electrodes was averaged for each condition and for stimulus and response-
locked signals separately. Only correct trials were used in the ERP analysis. 
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In line with Kelly and O’Connell (2013), we measured the slope of the CPP for 
each participant, by fitting a straight line to the waveform from 200 to 350 ms in 
the stimulus-locked, and -250 to -100 ms in the response-locked data. 
Additionally, we compared the amplitudes of the ERP across different 
conditions at each time point between 0 and 1000 ms in the stimulus-locked 
and between -1000 and 0 ms in the response-locked data, using false discovery 
rate (FDR) controlled ANOVAs (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). In this 
procedure, the uncorrected p-values are sorted from lowest to highest (pi refers 
to the ith lowest value out of m total p-values). The largest i for which 𝑝𝑖 <
(
𝑖
𝑚
) ∝ is identified and all p-values associated with is smaller or equal to the 
identified i are considered significant. 
2.1.1.5. Model 
We chose a race model to account for the behavioural data (Brown & 
Heathcote, 2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001). This model makes few 
assumptions about the decision-making process (e.g. it does not assume 
inhibition between accumulators) while still remaining somewhat physiologically 
plausible (e.g. it assumes noisy, positive accumulation; Brown & Heathcote, 
2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001). According to this model (see Figure 2.2), a 
binary choice like the one used here is simulated using two accumulators, one 
associated with the correct, and one associated with the incorrect alternative. 
Both accumulators race towards a common decision threshold A and whichever 
accumulator reaches the threshold first determines the response.  
 
Each accumulation process begins at a starting point z, drawn from a uniform 
distribution between 0 and the starting point parameter Sz. The profile of the 
accumulation process is determined by the drift rate v which determines the 
input I and the mean slope of the accumulation, as well as random noise N, 
drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ, so that 
the quantity accumulated at each time point in accumulator m is described by: 
 𝑑𝑥𝑚 =  𝐼𝑚 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) (2.1.) 
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Additionally, the accumulation process is restricted to positive values in order to 
remain physiologically plausible:  
 𝑥𝑚(𝑡 + 1) = max (0, 𝑥𝑚(𝑡) +  𝑑𝑥𝑚)  (2.2.) 
The response time is defined as the time taken for the first accumulator to reach 
the threshold A plus a non-decision time which accounts for the duration of 
sensory and motor processing before and after the accumulation process 
respectively and is drawn from a uniform distribution with the width STer and the 
centre Ter.  
 
In a standard race model for a binary decision, this leads to a total of seven 
parameters (A, Sz, vcorrect, vincorrect, Ter, STer, σ2). One parameter is chosen as a 
scaling parameter and fixed to an arbitrary value, resulting in a total of six free 
parameters. 
 
  
Figure 2.2: Race model: in a choice between two alternatives, two accumulators (one associated with the 
correct and one with the incorrect alternative) race towards a common threshold A. Each accumulation 
profile begins at a point randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and Sz and increases at a 
rate defined by the associated drift rate parameter (vcorrect/vincorrect for the correct/incorrect accumulator 
respectively), as well as noise. The modelled reaction time consists of the time taken for the first 
accumulator to reach A, as well as a non-decision time Ter, which accounts for sensory and motor 
processes. 
2.1.1.5.1. Standard Model 
To apply this model to the data set in this experiment, we added drift rate 
parameters to account for the different difficulty conditions (v-easycorrect, v-
easyincorrect, v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect). This implementation of difficulty is well-
established and has been validated using both behavioural and neural data 
(Mulder et al., 2014; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Roitman 
& Shadlen, 2002; Twomey et al., 2015). In order to explain differences due to 
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SAT instructions, we added a threshold parameter. The threshold for ‘accuracy’ 
trials Aaccuracy acted as a scaling parameter and was fixed to 1, while the 
threshold for the ‘speed’ condition, Aspeed, was free to vary. We tested a total of 
three different models: one in which all remaining parameters were fixed across 
conditions (Model 1), one in which the starting point parameter Sz was free to 
vary across SAT conditions (Model 2), and one in which the non-decision time 
parameter Ter was free to vary across SAT conditions (Model 3; see Table 2.1). 
 
Each model was fitted to the pooled RT data2 (RTs faster than 180 ms or slower 
than 2000 ms (6.08%) were discarded). For each condition, RTs were simulated 
(in 10 ms time steps) based on the equations (2.1.) and (2.2.) and compared to 
RT data using Quantile Maximum Probability Estimation (Heathcote, Brown, & 
Mewhort, 2002). Parameter values were adjusted using a differential evolution 
algorithm implemented in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.; Price, Storn, 
& Jouni, 2005). 
 
In order to compare the three models, we calculated the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) as well as the Akaike information criterion (AIC; 
Akaike, 1977). These measures describe the goodness of fit by considering 
both the likelihood of the model and the number of parameters, penalising 
complex models to resolve the problem of overfitting. The model with the best fit 
was then used to predict accumulation profiles. 
 
2.1.1.5.2. Rescaled Model 
Although the SAT is typically implemented through a change in threshold as 
described above, more recent evidence suggests that behavioural changes due 
to SAT instructions are in fact caused by a more global change in activity (Heitz 
& Schall, 2012; Lo, Wang, & Wang, 2015; Murphy et al., 2016; Perri et al., 
2014). We implemented this global gain modulation using a ‘rescaled’ model. 
For this, we used the best-fitting model described above and computed a new 
                                               
2 Note that the same analysis was repeated with normalised RT and EEG data and led to 
qualitatively identical results (see Appendix 7.1). 
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set of parameters for the ‘speed’ condition by simply dividing all parameters 
(apart from Ter and STer) by Aspeed. This results in a model in which the threshold 
for both SAT conditions is 1 and the original difference between conditions is 
transferred onto all other parameters, modelling a global gain modulation. This 
rescaled model is mathematically equivalent to the standard model, but 
assumes different underlying processes and predicts a different accumulation 
path.  
2.1.1.5.3. Model Prediction  
EEG is recorded from the scalp, and can therefore only measure the sum of all 
electrical brain activity underneath each electrode. Since we assume that each 
accumulation process occurs in a population of neurons in spatial proximity, we 
argue that an ERP recorded from the scalp above these neural populations, like 
the CPP, reflects the sum of both accumulators.  
 
We chose the best-fitting model based on the BIC value and simulated 20,000 
accumulation paths in 10 ms time steps. In order to create a signal similar to the 
CPP, accumulation profiles from the correct and incorrect accumulator 
associated with correct responses were summed and baseline corrected by 
subtracting the first data point from the entire accumulation profile. The resulting 
profiles were averaged for each condition separately and locked once to the 
stimulus and once to the response. Since the stimulus-locked signal includes 
varying time spans of post-decision stages, and we can only speculate about 
the behaviour of the accumulator after the response, we removed simulated 
trials from averaging after the response (i.e. after the crossing of the threshold 
plus Tr; see below).  
 
Since we averaged over all simulated accumulation traces per condition, we re-
computed the CPP as an average rather than a grand average to compare the 
simulated accumulation profiles to the EEG signal. We also downsampled the 
CPP to 10 ms time steps and removed trials from the average once they 
reached their corresponding RT, to match the simulations. 
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In order to simulate the non-decision time in the model predictions, we added a 
brief sensory delay before the onset of the accumulation as well as a motor 
delay in which accumulation continued after the threshold was reached. We 
assume that this continuation of accumulation after the threshold is necessary 
as the participants continue to see the stimulus, and arguably continue to 
accumulate, during the brief period of time in which the threshold is reached but 
the button is not yet press. Since we fitted the non-decision time parameter Ter 
which contains the time interval for both sensory and motor processes, we 
divided it into Te and Tr. The optimal division of Ter into these components was 
determined by calculating the mean squared error between the (re-computed) 
CPP and the simulated mean accumulation per condition, and using a 
differential evolution algorithm (Price et al., 2005) to minimise the mean squared 
error. The same procedure was used to match the arbitrary scale of the 
accumulation profile to the CPP’s. Note that this optimisation of the scale and 
non-decision time division was performed separately for the standard and the 
rescaled model. 
2.1.1.5.4. Bootstrap Comparison 
We then used a bootstrap procedure to compare the similarity of the neural 
signal and the model prediction between the standard and the rescaled model. 
In each of 1999 iterations, RT data were resampled with replacement within 
each condition (‘speed easy’, ‘speed hard’, ‘accuracy easy’, ‘accuracy hard’). 
The resampled RT data sets were then used to fit the standard race model (the 
best-fitting model identified in section 2.1.1.5.1). To estimate the best-fitting 
parameters, a simplex algorithm (Lagarias, Reeds, Wright, & Wright, 1998), with 
the parameters obtained using the original data set as starting values, was used 
due to its relatively short computation time. The resulting parameters were then 
‘rescaled’ in the same way as described in section 2.1.1.5.2. We then generated 
simulated accumulation profiles for both the standard and the rescaled model 
(as described in section 2.1.1.5.3). The predictions of each of the models were 
compared to the corresponding CPP (i.e. to the CPP generated using the same 
trials which were resampled to generate the resampled RT distribution) and the 
mean squared error was computed for each model. As for the original data (see 
section 2.1.1.5.3), the simulation of each iteration was adjusted to match the 
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corresponding CPP by fitting the scale and the proportion of sensory and motor 
delay using a differential evolution algorithm. The difference in mean squared 
error between the rescaled and the standard model of each iteration was then 
used to form a distribution around the difference in mean squared error between 
the models associated with the original data. We estimated the bias-corrected 
and accelerated (BCa) confidence interval and rejected the null hypothesis that 
both models resemble the CPP equally well if this interval did not include 0. 
2.1.2. Results 
2.1.2.1. Behavioural Results 
In order to test the effects of difficulty and SAT instructions, data were collapsed 
over ‘up’ and ‘down’ trials. Trials with very short (< 180 ms) and very long (>= 
2000 ms) RTs were excluded from the analysis (6.08% of trials). The remaining 
data are displayed in Figure 2.3. 
 
To explore differences in correct RT, a ‘Difficulty’ (‘easy’/ ‘hard’) x ‘Instruction’ 
(‘speed’/ ‘accuracy’) ANOVA was conducted, and revealed a significant main 
effect of ‘Difficulty’, F(1, 22) = 120.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .85, a significant main 
effect of ‘Instruction’, F(1, 22) = 102.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .82, as well a significant 
interaction effect, F(1, 22) = 36.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .62. As expected, RTs were 
faster in the ‘speed’ condition (M = 522 ms) compared to the ‘accuracy’ 
condition (M = 673 ms) in both ‘easy’, t(22) = -8.72, p < .001, and ‘hard’, t(22) = 
-9.74, p < .001, trials. RTs were also faster in ‘easy’ (M = 527 ms) compared to 
‘hard’ (M = 668 ms) trials, an effect which was seen more strongly in the 
‘accuracy’ condition, t(22) = 10.02, p = < .001, than in the ‘speed’ condition, 
t(22) = 9.85, p < .001. 
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Figure 2.3: Behavioural results: reaction time (left) and accuracy scores (right) for each condition. Error 
bars indicate 95% Confidence Interval. ** indicates p < .001. 
 
To explore these effects in the accuracy data, a generalised linear mixed-effects 
model with a logistic link function and binomial data model was used to account 
for the non-normal distribution. Using the ‘fitglme’ function in Matlab (The 
Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), parameter estimates were based on a maximum 
likelihood method using Laplace approximation. In this model, we used the 
‘maximal’ random effects structure (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2014), i.e. 
both manipulations, ‘Instruction’ and ‘Difficulty’, and their interaction were 
included as fixed effects, and both manipulations and their interactions within 
each participant were included as random effects (Wilkinson notation: 
Accuracy ~ 1 + Instruction*Difficulty + (1 + 
Instruction*Difficulty | Participant))3. Both ‘Difficulty’, t(88) = 
4.68, p < .001, and ‘Instruction’, t(88) = 7.76, p < .001, were significant 
predictors, with higher accuracies observed in ‘easy’ (M = 85%) compared to 
                                               
3 The dispersion parameter of the model, φ = .44, was calculated by dividing the sum of squared 
Pearson residuals by the residual degrees of freedom (Venables & Ripley, 2002), and indicates 
that there was no issue with overdispersion. 
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‘hard’ (M = 78%) trials and in ‘accuracy’ (M = 86%) compared to ‘speed’ (M = 
77%) trials. The interaction between ‘Difficulty’ and ‘Instruction’ was not 
significant (p > .05). 
 
2.1.2.2. ERP Results 
The CPP is displayed in Figure 2.4. ‘Difficulty’ (‘easy’/ ‘hard’) x ‘Instruction’ 
(‘speed’/ ‘accuracy’) ANOVAs were conducted to explore the effects of the 
manipulations on the build-up rate of the CPP. We found that, in both the 
stimulus-locked, and the response-locked waveforms, there was a significant 
main effect of ‘Difficulty’ F(1, 22) = 14.70, p = .001, ηp2 = .40, F(1, 22) = 9.06, p 
= .006, ηp2 = .29, with a higher slope in ‘easy’ compared to ‘hard’ trials. There 
was no main effect of ‘Instruction’, and no interaction effect in either of the time 
alignments (p > .26).  
 
Similarly, we used FDR-controlled ANOVAs to explore the CPP amplitude at 
each time step and found a main effect of ‘Difficulty’, with higher amplitudes in 
the ‘easy’ compared to the ‘hard’ conditions between 263 and 640 ms in the 
stimulus-locked CPP (corrected p < .049). Again, we found no main effect of 
‘Instruction’ and no interaction effect in the stimulus-locked CPP, and no effects 
were seen in the response-locked data (corrected p > .09). 
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Figure 2.4: CPP results: stimulus-locked (left) and response-locked (right) CPP waveform for each 
condition. Vertical lines indicate mean RT for each condition. Note that mean RTs may differ slightly from 
those displayed in Figure 2.3, as only trials which were used to generate the waveform were included to 
calculate mean RTs. Grey dots at the bottom of the waveform indicate a significant main effect of 
‘Difficulty’. The bottom right panel shows the topography of the ERP, averaged over the stimulus-locked 
time interval of 0 to 1000 ms. Electrodes used to generate CPP waveforms are highlighted. 
 
2.1.2.3. Model Results 
We fitted three different race models to the RT data and compared their 
goodness of fit using the BIC (Schwarz, 1978; see Table 2.1). The best (lowest) 
BIC was associated with Model 2, a model in which drift rate varied across 
difficulty conditions, and both the threshold and the starting point distribution 
varied across SAT conditions. The parameters for this model, as well as its 
rescaled version are displayed in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.1: Model Comparison: BIC and AIC values for each model and each experiment (best BIC and 
AIC values in bold). 
  
Model
  
  
Number of 
parameters 
Parameters 
Experiment 1  Experiment 2  
BIC AIC BIC AIC 
Model 
1 
9 
v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect,  
v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect,  
Aspeed, 
Sz, Ter, STer, σ2 
62,466 62,398 44,933 44,868 
Model 
2 
10 
v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect,  
v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect, 
Aspeed, 
Sz-speed, Sz-accuracy, 
Ter, STer, σ2 
62,464 62,389 44,932 44,859 
Model 
3 
10 
v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect,  
v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect, 
Aspeed, 
Ter-speed, Ter-accuracy, 
Sz, STer, σ2 
62,479 62,404 44,937 44,865 
 
 
Table 2.2: Estimated parameter values for the chosen model (Model 2) and its rescaled version: note that 
the response threshold A in the ‘accuracy’ condition was set to 1 as a scaling parameter. 
Parameters 
Standard Model: 
parameter values per 
SAT Instruction 
Rescaled Model: 
parameter values per 
 SAT Instruction 
 accuracy speed accuracy speed 
Starting point variability (SZ) 0.319 0.541 0.319 0.664 
Response threshold (A) 1 0.815 1 
Non-decision time (Ter) 0.257 0.257 
Non-decision time variability 
(STer) 
0.229 0.229 
Diffusion constant (σ2) 0.785 0.785 0.964 
Drift rate  
(v) 
correct 
easy 2.475 2.475 3.038 
hard 1.350 1.350 1.656 
incorrect 
easy 0.253 0.253 0.310 
hard 0.054 0.054 0.066 
 
The estimated parameters of the standard model show that, as expected, 
higher drift rates were associated with ‘easy’ compared to ‘hard’ conditions, and 
lower thresholds were associated with ‘speed’ rather than ‘accuracy’ conditions. 
Additionally, higher starting point variability was estimated for the ‘speed’ 
condition, further decreasing the average baseline-threshold distance. In the 
rescaled parameters on the other hand, the threshold is equal in both 
conditions, while the difference between SAT conditions is passed on to all 
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other parameters (see Table 2.2). Note that the two models are nevertheless 
mathematically equivalent and produce the same fit to the RT data. 
 
Figure 2.5 displays the quality of the model fit, which is identical for both the 
standard and rescaled model. The RT distribution is summarised by five 
quantile estimates (from left to right: 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, 90%) for each 
condition separately, and the RT (x-axis) and proportion of data (y-axis) for 
each quantile is shown for both the empirical (circles) and simulated (lines and 
crosses) data. The overlap between empirical and modelled quantiles indicates 
that the model fitted the data well. The mean difference between predicted and 
recorded RT quantiles was approximately 15 ms for correct responses, 
confirming that the model was able to account for the RT data.  
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Figure 2.5: Model fit: quantiles estimated from behavioural data (circles) and Model 2 simulations (crosses 
and lines) for easy (top) and hard (bottom) decisions. For each condition, correct (thick) and incorrect (thin) 
quantiles are displayed separately. Note that the model fit is identical for the standard and the rescaled 
race model. 
 
The simulated accumulation profile associated with the standard and the 
rescaled model parameters are displayed in Figure 2.6 b) and c) respectively. In 
both models, ‘hard’ profiles accumulate to a lower amplitude than ‘easy’ ones. 
However, there are marked differences between the standard and rescaled 
model in the way they predict the profiles associated with different SAT 
instructions. The standard race model predicts ‘accuracy’ profiles that 
accumulate much higher than ‘speed’ profiles in both stimulus-locked and 
response-locked signals. In the rescaled profiles on the other hand, like in the 
CPP waveforms (Figure 2.6 a), this difference is smaller in the response-locked 
signal and absent in the stimulus-locked profiles. The similarity of the rescaled 
model with the CPP was confirmed by a bootstrap procedure which showed that 
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the mean squared errors between the ERP and the simulation were significantly 
lower for the rescaled model than the standard model (p < .05). 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Decision variable (empirical and simulated): a) stimulus-locked (left) and response-locked 
(right) CPP for each condition. Note that the CPP here is a pooled average rather than a grand average 
and therefore differs from Figure 2.4. Additionally, the waveform has been low-pass filtered with a cut-off of 
5 Hz for display only. b) stimulus-locked (left) and response-locked (right) accumulation profiles (correct 
and incorrect accumulator summed) per condition as predicted by the standard race model. c) stimulus-
locked (left) and response-locked (right) accumulation profiles (correct and incorrect accumulator summed) 
per condition as predicted by the rescaled race model. 
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2.1.3. Discussion Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we set out to test the CPP under SAT instructions, as well as 
test its similarity to two sequential sampling models representing two different 
implementations of the SAT. To this end, we recorded human EEG during a 
motion discrimination task with two levels of difficulty, and two different 
instructions, one emphasising response speed (‘speed’), and one emphasising 
accuracy (‘accuracy’). We found that these manipulations had the expected 
behavioural effects, with faster and more accurate decisions in ‘easy’ compared 
to ‘hard’ trials, and faster and less accurate decisions in ‘speed’ compared to 
‘accuracy’ trials. 
 
We chose to explore the CPP, as it has previously been suggested as a neural 
correlate of the decision variable (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 
2012). In line with this notion, we found that the CPP built up over the course of 
the decision, before peaking at the response. Additionally, we found that the 
build-up had a steeper slope in ‘easy’, compared to ‘hard’ decisions, a typical 
finding for decision variables (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Kelly & O’Connell, 
2013; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002), supporting the role 
of the CPP as a neural correlate of decision-making. However, we observed no 
difference between waveforms associated with ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ trials. 
Since a difference in threshold would arguably translate into a difference in 
peak amplitudes in a neural substrate of the decision variable, this finding 
questions either the validity of the CPP as a neural correlate of the decision 
variable, or the validity of a variation in threshold as an explanation for the SAT. 
 
To resolve this issue, two models with different implementations of the SAT 
were tested. A standard model which implemented a variation in threshold was 
associated with simulated accumulation profiles which displayed an amplitude 
difference between ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ conditions, and did not replicate the 
pattern observed in the CPP. The second model was a rescaled model which 
was mathematically identical to the standard model but transferred the 
difference in threshold onto other parameters, modelling a global change in 
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activity. The accumulation profiles predicted by this model were markedly more 
similar to the patterns shown in the CPP. 
 
These findings suggest that the rescaled model provided a better account of the 
neural data than the standard model, indicating that the SAT may be 
implemented in the brain by a global change in activity (i.e. a change in both 
signal and noise). However, an alternative interpretation of these findings is that 
the SAT is in fact implemented in the brain via a specific change in the decision 
threshold, and that the CPP is not a valid neural substrate of the decision 
variable. Since there is relatively little research supporting the CPP’s role as a 
decision-related signal, we additionally explored a different neural correlate of 
the decision variable to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of the SAT. 
2.2. Experiment 2: TMS 
Experiment 1 indicated that sequential sampling models which vary in threshold 
in order to account for the SAT may paint an oversimplified picture of the neural 
mechanisms underlying this phenomenon. However, this finding is based on the 
validity of the CPP as a neural substrate of decision-making. In Experiment 2, 
we therefore set out to test the same paradigm using a different neural correlate 
of the decision variable. 
 
One neurometric signal which has been suggested to display a decision-
relevant accumulation of evidence is activity in the primary motor cortex (M1). 
Contrary to the assumption of serial processing (Donders, 1969; Sternberg, 
1969), researchers have now suggested that response preparation occurs 
throughout the decision-making process, with the status of the accumulation 
process being continuously fed forward into the motor system (Coles et al., 
1985; Gluth et al., 2013; Michelet et al., 2010). This implies that the progress of 
the accumulation of evidence can be tracked via the level of response 
preparation, reflected in the level of M1 activity. This concept has been used to 
track the decision variable using motor-related EEG signals, such as the LRP 
and event-related desynchronisation in the beta frequency band over motor 
areas (Donner et al., 2009; Kelly & O’Connell, 2013). A different approach to 
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track the excitability of M1 and adjacent premotor areas is the use of TMS 
(Bestmann et al., 2008; Hadar et al., 2012; Hadar et al., 2015; Kiers et al., 
1997). When TMS is applied over the motor cortex, electrical responses called 
motor evoked potentials (MEPs), the amplitudes of which scale with the level of 
corticospinal excitability, can be observed in the muscle corresponding to the 
stimulated brain area (Barker et al., 1985; Merton & Morton, 1980; Merton et al., 
1982). Like accumulation signals, MEP amplitudes recorded in the responding 
muscle have been shown to increase over the course of perceptual decisions 
before reaching a threshold-like maximum at the time of response (Michelet et 
al., 2010). 
 
Importantly, Hadar et al. (2015) used a Gaussian smoothing kernel to generate 
a continuous MEP signal to track corticospinal excitability during a decision-
making task, and suggested that this signal resembles a neural correlate of the 
decision variable. They found that effector-specific motoric activation built up 
during the decision-making process, and reported marked similarities between 
predictions made by a sequential sampling model and the MEP signal, 
supporting its validity as a correlate of decision-making. Specifically, they found 
that motoric activation was longer in hard compared to easy decisions. This is 
based on the notion that, if the MEP signal is purely motor-related, and the 
response preparation and execution follows the decision-making process 
serially (Donders, 1969; Sternberg, 1969), the stimulus-locked signal should 
show a difference in amplitude between the responding muscle and the non-
responding muscle earlier in easy than in hard trials (due to longer decision-
making processes in hard trials), while the response-locked signal should show 
this difference at the same latency regardless of task difficulty. Instead however, 
the findings were reversed relative to this prediction, with hard decisions 
onsetting earlier in the response-locked but not the stimulus-locked signal (i.e. 
the latency at which the responding muscle first displayed higher amplitudes 
than the non-responding muscle was similar across difficulty conditions in the 
stimulus-locked signal, but different in the response-locked signal, with hard 
trials displaying the divergence for longer). This indicated that the decision-
making process began at a similar time but took longer in hard than in easy 
conditions (Hadar et al., 2015). Although these findings suggest that the MEP 
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signal is a promising candidate as a neural substrate of the decision variable, 
this signal has, to our knowledge, only been tested in the context of a difficulty 
manipulation and has not been used to explore the SAT. 
 
Experiment 2 therefore set out to test the MEP signal under SAT instructions. 
Like in Experiment 1, we asked participants to complete a random dot motion 
task with varying difficulties and SAT instructions while recording their MEPs. 
Again, we used two models, a standard model with a variation in threshold and 
a rescaled model implementing a global change, to account for the behavioural 
data. We compared their accumulation profiles to the MEP signal in order to 
explore the neural mechanisms underlying the SAT. 
 
2.2.1. Methods 
2.2.1.1. Participants 
An opportunity sample of 22 participants (nine males), primarily students and 
staff at City, University of London were recruited for the TMS study. Four 
participants were unable to successfully complete the practice task (like in 
Experiment 1, an unsuccessful performance was defined as reaching a 
calibrated coherence level of > 90% for both ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ conditions; see 
section 2.1.1.2.2)4, and did not complete the experiment. The remaining 18 
participants (11 female), with a mean age of 29.82 (SD = 8.38), each took part 
in three sessions, each lasting between 2 and 2.5 hours, with the exception of 
one participant who withdrew from the study after two sessions. Three of the 
participants were researchers in the current project. All other participants were 
paid £8 per hour and an additional reward for task performance (up to £4 per 
session). In line with ethics procedures at City, University of London each 
participant received an email describing the potential risks associated with TMS 
at least 24 hours prior to the experiment, and completed a medical screening 
questionnaire to ensure their safety. 
  
                                               
4 The remaining participants reached average calibrated coherence levels of 23.81% (SD = 
19.08) in the ‘hard’ condition and 65.41% (SD = 30.91) in the ‘easy’ condition. 
72 
 
2.2.1.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
In this experiment, we used a random dot motion task, identical to the one 
described in Experiment 1 (see section 2.1.1.2). However, instead of holding a 
response button in each hand in order to indicate their decision, participants 
held two digital response buttons in their right hand. One button was placed 
between the thumb and index finger and required a ‘pinch’ response, 
contracting the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle. The second button was 
placed on a plastic cylinder in the palm of the hand and required a ‘grasp’ 
response, contracting the abductor digiti minimi (ADM) muscle (see Figure 2.7). 
The pinch and grasp buttons indicated ‘up’ and ‘down’ responses respectively. 
 
In each session, a total of 432 planned trials were completed. To ensure the 
required frequency of TMS pulses (< .2 Hz), TMS-free trials were added during 
the session, leading to an average of 500 trials per session (see section 
2.2.1.3). 
 
2.2.1.3. Stimulation and Recording 
Participants’ muscle activity was recorded using surface electromyography 
(EMG), sampled at 1000 Hz via a 13 bit A/D Biometrics Datalink system 
(version 7.5, Biometrics Ltd., Ladysmith, VA, U.S.A., 2008). We placed 22 mm x 
28 mm surface Ag/AgCL electrodes on the skin above the FDI and the ADM of 
the right hand, as they contribute to the ‘pinch’ and ‘grasp’ responses 
respectively. Reference electrodes were placed at distances of approximately 2 
cm to each of the two active electrodes (see Figure 2.7). Participants were 
instructed to relax their hand muscles in between responses, and the EMG 
signals were passed to two speakers to provide auditory feedback, informing 
participants of any unwanted muscle activation. 
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Figure 2.7: EMG recording setup: Left: palm facing up; Right: palm facing down. Participants held a ‘pinch’ 
response button between their thumb and index finger (1), as well as a response button placed on a plastic 
cylinder in the palm of their hand, requiring a ‘grasp’ response (2). To record the muscle activity associated 
with button presses, EMG electrodes were placed over the FDI (3) and ADM (5). Reference electrodes 
were placed approximately 2 cm away from the active electrodes (4 & 6).  
 
During the experiment, single-pulse TMS was applied using a MagstimRapid2 
biphasic stimulator (Magstim Co. Ltd., Whitland, UK). To induce MEPs in both 
the ADM and the FDI of the right hand, a figure-of-eight coil was positioned on 
the scalp over the left primary motor cortex. The exact location was adjusted for 
each participant individually and the stimulation intensity was set at 
approximately 110% of the resting motor threshold. The resting motor threshold 
was defined as the minimal intensity necessary to elicit an MEP with a peak-to-
peak amplitude of approximately 50 μV in 50% of stimulations.  
  
TMS pulses were planned in 66% of trials, but cancelled if a response had 
already been detected by the time of planned stimulation. In order to ensure a 
good distribution of TMS pulses over the course of the reaction time, TMS trials 
were divided into four equally sized, equiprobable time bins between 5 ms and 
500 ms relative to the onset of the coherent motion in the ‘speed’ condition, and 
between 5 ms and 600 ms in the ‘accuracy’ condition. Within a given bin, the 
exact stimulation time was drawn uniform randomly. Since the experiment 
followed a single-pulse TMS protocol, the stimulation pulses were required to 
occur at a maximal frequency of .2 Hz. If, by chance, a planned pulse followed a 
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previous one after less than 5000 ms, the task was adjusted in several ways. If 
the timespan between the previous and the planned pulse was less than 5000 
ms but more than 4000 ms, the inter-trial interval was increased in order to 
decrease the pulse frequency to < .2 Hz. For scheduled intervals of less than 
4000 ms, the planned trial was replaced with the next planned stimulation free 
trial. If no stimulation free trial remained, random stimulation free trials were 
generated in order to increase the interval between TMS pulses. Due to this 
method, an average of 68.67 (SD = 15.79) trials were added per session. 
 
2.2.1.4. EMG/MEP Pre-processing 
In order to eliminate potential differences in the time required to execute ‘pinch’ 
and ‘grasp’ responses, we recorded the onset of movement (i.e. the onset of 
visible muscular activity in the EMG recording) as a measure of response time 
(EMG RT). To this end, EMG data from both channels, aligned to the onset of 
the coherent motion (stimulus onset) were displayed for each trial and visually 
inspected to manually select the onset of response-related EMG bursts. Visual 
inspection provided no information about the experimental condition of a given 
trial. In TMS trials, MEP amplitudes in both channels (FDI and ADM) of the right 
hand were defined as the difference between the minimal and maximal EMG 
values in a time window of 10 to 40 ms relative to stimulation time. An algorithm 
was used to detect EMG activity prior to the stimulation, in order to discard any 
trials in which there was activity greater than 50 μV peak to peak in a period of 
200 ms preceding the stimulation. These trials, as well as trials in which there 
was partial activation in more than one channel, or trials in which a clear EMG 
onset could not be detected, were excluded from further analysis (23.39% of 
trials). Additionally, trials with very fast (< 100 ms) or very slow (> 1800 ms) 
response onsets (5.12% of trials), trials in which no MEP was visible or in which 
the MEP amplitude could not be accurately detected due to saturation (1.05%), 
and trials in which the response preceded the planned TMS pulse (6.09%) were 
excluded. In total, 35.65% of all trials were discarded, with a total of 17,067 
trials remaining, including 6535 usable TMS trials (57.15% of all planned TMS 
trials were excluded).  
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2.2.1.5. MEP Smoothing 
For each condition, the remaining MEPs from correct trials were pooled across 
sessions and participants. To do this, MEP amplitudes were z-scored 
separately for each session, participant, and muscle, in order to normalise the 
magnitudes of evoked responses. Additionally, TMS latencies as well as EMG 
RTs were expressed as a percentage of their median EMG RT (since TMS 
pulses can affect the response, only EMG RTs of non-TMS trials were used to 
generate the median EMG RT).  
 
The MEPs of each condition were then sorted in time and aligned once to the 
stimulus and once to the response, and smoothed using a Gaussian kernel: 
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(2.3.) 
Where N is the number of MEPs, each of which being associated with a 
magnitude Yi and a normalised time ti. The smoothed signal was calculated in 
time steps of 1% median EMG RT, using a smoothing kernel with a full-width 
half maximum of 5% median EMG RT. 
 
Smoothed signals were generated for stimulus and response-locked data, for 
each condition separately. Additionally, a smoothed MEP signal was generated 
for each condition for the difference between the MEP amplitudes associated 
with the responding and the non-responding muscle, as this signal cancels any 
non-specific spinal influences in the MEP data (see Figure 2.8). Note that since 
only correct trials were used, the responding muscle always refers to the 
muscle making the correct response. 
2.2.1.6. Statistical Analysis 
Two sets of statistical analyses were run on the MEP signal to assess its 
potential role as a correlate of the decision variable. Specifically, we tested 
slope and amplitude differences in the MEP signal between different conditions. 
Using a permutation approach, we compared ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials (per SAT 
instruction) as well as ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ trials (per difficulty level). In each 
of 1999 iterations, we resampled MEP difference values (responding minus 
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non-responding muscle) across conditions without replacement and randomly 
re-assigned them to new ‘easy’ and ‘hard’, as well as ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ 
conditions, and smoothed them to create a new set of waveforms with 90% 
bootstrap BCa confidence intervals for each condition. We then measured the 
slope difference by fitting a straight line to a time interval from 50% to 90% 
median EMG RT in the stimulus-locked, and -50% to -10% in the response-
locked signal of each condition and taking the difference. Adapting established 
cluster permutation approaches for brain-imaging statistical inference (Blair & 
Karniski, 1993; Groppe, Urbach, & Kutas, 2011; Nichols & Holmes, 2001), we 
also measured the amplitude differences between conditions by summing 
across (i.e. forming a cluster statistic for) the adjacent MEP difference values at 
which the confidence interval between the two conditions to be compared 
(either ‘easy’ vs ‘hard’ or ‘speed’ vs ‘accuracy’) did not overlap. 
 
This resulted in a permutation null distribution of slope differences and an 
equivalent distribution of cluster-thresholded amplitude differences (expressed 
in sums of MEP difference values), against which we compared the slope 
difference and amplitude differences (measured in the same way) of the original 
waveforms. If the original values were smaller or larger than 97.5% of the 
values in the relevant null distribution, the difference was considered significant 
at an alpha level of .05. This analysis was conducted separately for ‘easy’ 
compared to ‘hard’ data (once per SAT instruction), for ‘speed’ compared to 
‘accuracy’ data (once per difficulty level), and for stimulus-locked and response-
locked data. 
 
2.2.1.7. Model 
We used three different race models to fit the behavioural data. Since TMS 
pulses can affect the response, only stimulation-free trials were used to analyse 
behavioural data. Unless otherwise specified, the same procedure as described 
in Experiment 1 was used (see section 2.1.1.5). The models were fitted to 
normalised EMG RTs on a group level by pooling across participants. Modelled 
EMG RTs were simulated in 1% median RT based on equations (2.1.) and 
(2.2.). 
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The best-fitting model was rescaled to simulate a global gain modulation and 
both the standard and the rescaled model were used to simulate accumulation 
profiles. For a direct comparison between the simulated accumulation paths and 
the neurometric signal (MEP signal reflecting the difference in amplitude 
associated with responding and non-responding muscles), the simulated 
accumulation was subjected to similar processing as the MEP signal. Based on 
the estimated parameters, we simulated 20,000 accumulation paths for each 
condition and each model (standard and rescaled). Simulated MEP differences 
were computed by subtracting the amplitudes of the incorrect accumulator at 
simulated MEP latencies, which were generated in the same way as stimulation 
latencies during the data collection (see section 2.2.1.3), from the amplitudes of 
the correct accumulator at the same time points. Like in the empirical data set, 
simulated MEP differences were discarded if the decision formation preceded 
the simulated latency. To generate a continuous signal, these simulated data 
points were smoothed in the same way as the empirical MEP values (see 
section 2.2.1.5). This procedure is displayed in Figure 2.8. 
 
Since in this experiment, all analyses are based on EMG RT, rather than the 
time of a button press, we assumed that virtually all of the estimated non-
decision time described sensory processes. We therefore started the 
accumulation profile after a sensory delay given by Ter5. As in Experiment 1 
(see section 2.1.1.5.3), the arbitrary amplitude of the simulated profile was 
matched to the amplitude of the MEP signal by multiplying its scale by a 
parameter which was estimated using the same differential evolution algorithm 
as described above. 
 
                                               
5 Although a very small proportion of the non-decision time may be categorised as motor 
processing time to account for the brief interval in which the motor signal travels through the 
corticospinal tract, we estimated that this interval lasts only approximately 30 ms (based on 
timings of TMS pulses and MEPs), and argue that this is negligible. 
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Figure 2.8: MEP processing and simulation: MEP amplitudes are recorded from both responding and non-
responding muscles (a). The amplitudes are then z-scored per muscle, participant, and session, pooled, 
and sorted by latency (normalised by individual median EMG RT). A continuous signal is then created for 
each muscle, using a Gaussian smoothing kernel (c). To remove non-specific spinal signals, the same 
smoothing is applied to the difference between simultaneously recorded MEPs (responding minus non-
responding); d). To create model predictions which are comparable to the continuous MEP signal, 
accumulation values from both the correct accumulator (corresponding to the responding muscle) and the 
incorrect accumulator (corresponding to the non-responding muscle) are sampled at simulated TMS times 
(b), and processed in the same way as recorded MEP amplitudes (c & d). 
 
2.2.1.7.1. Model Comparison 
Like in Experiment 1, we then compared the standard and rescaled models 
based on the similarity of their respective accumulation profiles to the neural 
signal using the same bootstrap procedure as described in section 2.1.1.5.4. In 
each iteration, RTs were resampled with replacement within each condition and 
a new set of parameters for the standard race model was estimated and then 
rescaled. Accumulation profiles were then generated for the two new sets of 
parameters (standard and rescaled) and compared to the MEP signals which 
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were re-computed based on similarly resampled MEP differences (MEP signals 
were generated in the same way as described in section 2.2.1.5). Note that, 
while in Experiment 1, the model fit and CPP of each iteration was based on the 
same resampled trials, this was not the case here. Since only TMS trials were 
used to generate the MEP signal, and only stimulation free trials were included 
in the model fit, both sets of trials were resampled independently during the 
bootstrap procedure. 
 
In each iteration, mean squared errors were generated for each prediction 
(standard and rescaled) relative to the MEP signal (note that the amplitude of 
the predictions was scaled to fit the MEP signal in the same way as described in 
section 2.1.1.5.3). The difference in mean squared errors between the standard 
and the rescaled model in each iteration was then used to form a bootstrap 
distribution, and, in combination with the mean squared error difference 
between the models of the original data, the BCa confidence interval was 
estimated. The null hypothesis that both the standard and the rescaled model 
resemble the MEP signal to the same extent was rejected if the BCa confidence 
interval did not include 0. 
 
2.2.2. Results 
2.2.2.1. Behavioural Results 
Like in Experiment 1, trials remaining after EMG pre-processing were collapsed 
over ‘up’ and ‘down’ trials (see Figure 2.9). A 2 x 2 ANOVA, with the factors 
‘Instruction’ (‘speed’/’accuracy’) and ‘Difficulty’ (‘easy’/’hard’) was used in order 
to explore behavioural differences in correct reaction times. There was a 
significant main effect of ‘Instruction’, F(1, 17) = 26.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, with 
faster responses in the ‘speed’ (M = 406 ms) than in the ‘accuracy’ (M = 469 
ms) condition. There was also a significant main effect of ‘Difficulty’, F(1, 17) = 
62.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .79, with faster responses in the ‘easy’ (M = 367.75 ms) 
than in the ‘hard’ (M = 507 ms) condition. Additionally, there was a significant 
interaction effect, F(1, 17) = 10.80, p = .004, ηp2= .39. Follow-up t-tests, to 
explore this interaction, revealed that the difference between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
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RTs was larger in the ‘accuracy’ condition, t(17) = 7.87, p < .001, than in the 
‘speed’ condition, t(17) = 6.83, p < .001. All reported effects are based on EMG 
RTs (time of EMG onset), but results based on response button RTs were not 
qualitatively different (main effect of ‘Instruction’: p < .001, main effect of 
‘Difficulty’: p < .001, interaction effect: p = .011). 
 
Figure 2.9: Behavioural results: reaction time (left) and accuracy scores (right) for each condition. Left 
panel shows both EMG RT (bars) and button RT (dashed lines). Error bars indicate 95% Confidence 
Interval. ** indicates p < .001. 
In order to analyse the non-normally distributed accuracy data, we used a 
generalised linear mixed model (see section 2.1.2.1). Both ‘Instruction’ and 
‘Difficulty’, and the ‘Instruction * Difficulty’ interaction were entered as fixed 
effects, and both manipulations and their interaction within each participant and 
session were included as random effects (Wilkinson notation: Accuracy ~ 1 
+ Instruction*Difficulty + (1 + Instruction*Difficulty | 
Participant) + (1 + Instruction*Difficulty | Session))6. The 
model revealed that ‘Instruction’ was a significant predictor, t(208) = 4.81, p < 
                                               
6 The dispersion parameter of the model, φ = 1.42, was calculated by dividing the sum of 
squared Pearson residuals by the residual degrees of freedom (Venables & Ripley, 2002). 
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.001, with ‘accuracy’ instructions (M = 87%) associated with higher accuracy 
scores than ‘speed’ instructions (M = 81%). Additionally, ‘Difficulty’ was a 
significant predictor, t(208) = 4.57, p < .001, with ‘easy’ trials (M = 88%) 
associated with higher accuracy scores than ‘hard’ trials (M = 79%). The 
‘Instruction * Difficulty’ interaction was not a significant predictor of accuracy, 
t(208) = 1.66, p = .098. 
2.2.2.2.  MEP Results 
MEP signals are displayed in Figure 2.10, which shows that the MEP signal 
associated with the responding (correct) muscle built up over the course of the 
decision in each of the conditions. In line with the hypothesis that these signals 
reflect decision-related accumulation processes, we hypothesised that these 
build-up profiles should differ across conditions. In particular, we expected that 
difficulty would have an impact on the slope of the build-up of the responding 
MEP (relative to the non-responding MEP). 
 
We tested the slope and amplitude of the MEP signal reflecting the difference 
between activation in responding and non-responding muscles. In line with our 
hypotheses, we found that, in the stimulus-locked MEP signal, the build-up 
occurred at a higher slope in ‘easy’ compared to ‘hard’ trials (p < .05 in both the 
‘speed’ and the ‘accuracy’ condition). No difference was observed in the 
response-locked signal (p > .05). We also found a significant difference in MEP 
amplitude between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ conditions, with the stimulus-locked signal 
displaying higher amplitudes in the ‘easy’ than in the ‘hard’ condition, visible 
from 74% and 81% median EMG RT in the ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ conditions 
respectively (p < .05). Again, this difference was not observed in the response-
locked signal. Additionally, we found no significant differences between ‘speed’ 
and ‘accuracy’ conditions in either slope or amplitude of either the stimulus or 
the response-locked MEP signal (all p > .1). 
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Figure 2.10: MEP results: a) stimulus-locked MEP signals for ‘easy’ (left) and ‘hard’ (right), as well as 
‘speed’ (top) and ‘accuracy’ (bottom) trials. Each panel shows both the MEP signal associated with the 
responding muscle (dark) and the non-responding muscle (light). Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence 
interval. b) response-locked MEP signals associated with the responding (dark) and non-responding (light) 
muscle for each condition separately. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence interval. c) stimulus-locked 
(left) and response-locked (right) MEP signals reflecting the difference between the MEPs associated with 
the responding and non-responding muscles for each condition. 
2.2.2.3. Model Results 
We fitted three race models to our data and compared their fit using BIC values. 
Just like in Experiment 1, we found that Model 2, in which drift rates varied 
across difficulty levels and both thresholds and starting points varied across 
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SAT instructions, provided the best account of the data (see Table 2.1). The 
estimated parameter values, as well as the rescaled parameter values, are 
displayed in Table 2.3. Again, like in Experiment 1, the estimated parameters of 
the standard model indicate higher thresholds and lower starting point variability 
in ‘accuracy’ compared to ‘speed’ conditions, and higher drift rates in ‘easy’ 
compared to ‘hard’ decisions. The rescaled model on the other hand, although 
mathematically equivalent (see Figure 2.11) indicates the same threshold 
across SAT instructions. 
 
Table 2.3: Estimated parameter values for the chosen model (Model 2) and its rescaled version: note that 
the response threshold A in the ‘accuracy’ condition was set to 1 as a scaling parameter. 
Parameters 
Standard Model: 
parameter values per 
SAT Instruction 
Rescaled Model: 
parameter values per 
 SAT Instruction 
 accuracy speed accuracy speed 
Starting point variability (SZ) 0.447 0.523 0.447 0.586 
Response threshold (A) 1 0.893 1 
Non-decision time (Ter) 0.382 0.382 
Non-decision time variability 
(STer) 
0.374 0.374 
Diffusion constant (σ2) 0.499 0.499 0.558 
Drift rate  
(v) 
correct 
easy 1.28 1.28 1.433 
hard 0.634 0.634 0.710 
incorrect 
easy 0.098 0.098 0.109 
hard 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 
  
The quality of the model fit is shown in Figure 2.11. The RT distribution of both 
the empirical (circles) and the simulated (lines and crosses) data are 
summarised by five quantile estimates for each condition separately. The 
overlap between empirical and modelled quantiles indicates that the model 
fitted the data well. The mean difference between predicted and recorded RT 
quantiles was approximately 3.4% median EMG RT for correct responses, 
confirming that the model was able to account for the RT data.  
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Figure 2.11: Model fit: quantiles estimated from behavioural data (circles) and Model 2 simulations 
(crosses and lines) for easy (top) and hard (bottom) decisions. For each condition, correct (thick) and 
incorrect (thin) quantiles are displayed separately. Note that the model fit is identical for the standard and 
the rescaled race model.  
The estimated parameters were then used to simulate accumulation profiles for 
each condition, once for the standard model and once for the rescaled model. 
The resulting profiles are presented in Figure 2.12 b) and c). The accumulation 
profiles show similar patterns as those described in Experiment 1. In both the 
standard and the rescaled model (as well as in the MEP signal), ‘hard’ profiles 
show a slower build-up and lower amplitude than ‘easy’ profiles. The main 
difference between the two sets of predictions, as the rescaling would suggest, 
is the amplitude of the SAT conditions, with ‘accuracy’ profiles showing higher 
amplitudes in both stimulus-locked and response-locked profiles in the 
standard, but not in the rescaled model. This makes the rescaled model visibly 
more similar to the MEP signal than the standard model. 
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This similarity was confirmed by a bootstrap procedure which demonstrated that 
the mean squared error between the model prediction and the MEP signal was 
lower for the rescaled compared to the standard model (p < .05). 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Decision variable (empirical and simulated): a) stimulus-locked (left) and response-locked 
(right) MEP signal (difference between MEPs associated with responding and non-responding muscles) for 
each condition. b) accumulation profile (difference between accumulation profiles predicted by the correct 
and incorrect accumulator) per condition as predicted by the standard race model. c) accumulation profile 
(difference between accumulation profiles predicted by the correct and incorrect accumulator) per 
condition as predicted by the rescaled race model. 
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2.2.3. Discussion Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we set out to test the effects of difficulty (‘easy’, ‘hard’) and 
SAT instructions (‘speed’, ‘accuracy’) on an MEP signal and use the resulting 
waveforms to evaluate two models with different implementations of the SAT. 
Overall, we replicated the findings reported in Experiment 1. We found that 
faster responses were associated with ‘easy’ and ‘speed’ decisions, and more 
accurate responses were associated with ‘easy’ and ‘accuracy’ trials.  
 
Importantly, we found that the MEP signal representing the difference between 
the responding and the non-responding muscle built up over the course of the 
decision, and peaked at the time of response, supporting previous findings 
which suggested this signal as a neural correlate of decision-making (Hadar et 
al., 2015). We further found that the rate at which this build-up occurred 
depended on the difficulty of the decision, with easier decisions associated with 
higher slopes than hard decisions. This pattern was observed in the stimulus-
locked, but not the response-locked data. Although slope differences might be 
expected in both stimulus and response-locked data, due to the different 
alignment of the trials, they are typically more visible in the stimulus-locked 
data, while amplitude differences are more visible in the response-locked data. 
Our findings suggest that ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials build up at different rates but 
peak at similar amplitudes. These findings are consistent with evidence-
dependent accumulation-to-bound dynamics and support the role of the MEP 
signal as a correlate of the decision variable. However, like in Experiment 1, we 
found no difference in slope or amplitude between ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ 
conditions. 
 
We used the same two models as in Experiment 1 to describe the data, one 
with a threshold variation to explain the SAT, and one rescaled model which 
assumes a global variation in activity. Again, we found that the standard model 
predicted amplitude differences between ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ conditions, not 
observed in the MEP signal. The accumulation profile predicted by the rescaled 
model on the other hand, was similar to the pattern observed in the MEP signal. 
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Experiment 2 therefore not only supported the MEP signal as a neural correlate 
of decision-making, but also replicated the findings reported in Experiment 1. 
These findings suggest that the SAT is implemented by a global change in 
activity, rather than a specific modulation of the decision threshold. 
2.3. General Discussion 
 
In this study, we set out to explore the effects of the SAT, as well as difficulty, 
on decision-making, using both human neural data and behavioural modelling. 
In two separate experiments, we recorded participants’ EEG activity and MEP 
amplitudes while they completed a binary motion discrimination task with two 
difficulty levels and under the instructions to either focus on the speed of the 
decision or on its accuracy.  
 
In both experiments, the behavioural data showed the expected patterns, with 
easy decisions leading to faster, more accurate responses than hard trials 
(Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002). Additionally, in line with 
previous research (Heitz, 2014; Murphy et al., 2016), we found that decisions 
made under ‘speed’ instructions were associated with faster and more error-
prone responses than those under ‘accuracy’ instructions.  
 
Both manipulations (difficulty and SAT instructions) have previously been 
shown to affect behavioural decision-making in these ways and, importantly, 
have each been explained in the context of sequential sampling models by 
variations in a single parameter. The manipulation of difficulty in particular has 
been researched extensively and explained by the drift rate parameter, with 
easier decisions associated with higher drift rates (i.e. faster build-up rates) than 
hard decisions (Donkin et al., 2009; Mulder et al., 2014; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). This suggested slope difference has been 
supported by neural evidence, showing that neurometric signals which have 
previously been found to reflect decision-related accumulation processes 
display steeper slopes in easy compared to hard decisions (Gold & Shadlen, 
2000; Palmer et al., 2005; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002). This pattern has also 
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been observed in the CPP (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 2012), 
and in continuous MEP signals (Hadar et al., 2015). The current study 
supported these findings. We found that easy decisions were associated with 
higher build-up rates than hard decisions in both the CPP and the MEP signal, 
supporting the notion that these signals represent neural correlates of the 
decision variable. 
 
While the impact of difficulty on the slope of the accumulation process has been 
demonstrated extensively in both sequential sampling models and neural 
correlates of the accumulation process (Donkin et al., 2009; Ho et al., 2009; 
Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Mulder et al., 2014; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Roitman 
& Shadlen, 2002), the impact of the SAT is less clear. Originally, sequential 
sampling models explained the behavioural differences caused by this trade-off 
by adjusting the threshold parameter, with decisions under speed stress being 
associated with a lower threshold (i.e. decision formation with less evidence), 
leading to fast but more error-prone decisions (Bogacz et al., 2006; Brown & 
Heathcote, 2008; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Usher & McClelland, 2001). However, 
more recently, this mechanism has been questioned by research exploring 
neural correlates of decision-making. We would expect a threshold difference 
between the conditions to lead to an amplitude difference in any neural 
correlate of the decision variable, with decisions under speed stress displaying 
a lower peak amplitude. However, a number of studies have failed to 
demonstrate this difference, and instead found more widespread changes 
across SAT conditions (Hanks et al., 2014; Heitz & Schall, 2012, 2013). 
 
In line with these more recent findings, the difference in amplitude between SAT 
conditions was not observed in either of the data sets in this study. In fact, we 
found no evidence for any difference between ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ conditions 
in either the CPP or the MEP signal, despite large behavioural differences 
between the conditions. It could be argued that in the stimulus-locked signal, 
any amplitude difference induced by threshold differences would be reduced or 
even cancelled out by the increase in amplitude for ‘speed’ trials due to their 
shorter and less variable RTs (given that the amplitude of a single trial peaks at 
the same value at each response, averaging over waveforms with similar RTs 
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will lead to a higher average peak amplitude than averaging over trials with 
more variable RTs). However, this effect should be absent in the response-
locked signal, where each profile is time-locked to the peak, and any threshold 
differences should be clearly visible. In our data, we found no differences in 
either the stimulus or the response-locked profiles, contradicting the notion of a 
difference in the amount of evidence accumulated across SAT conditions.  
 
In order to directly compare the EEG and MEP data to accumulation profiles 
predicted by sequential sampling models, we fitted a race model to the 
behavioural data of each of the experiments. We tested three models, in each 
of which we let the drift rate vary across difficulty levels, and, in line with original 
assumptions of the underlying mechanisms of the SAT, we let the threshold 
vary across SAT conditions. In addition to these parameter variations, we found 
that the best model included a variation of starting point variability across SAT 
conditions in both experiments. This starting point difference, with higher 
starting points in ‘speed’ than in ‘accuracy’ conditions further exaggerated the 
difference in baseline-threshold distance between the conditions. In line with 
previous findings, the model with slope differences across difficulty conditions 
and differences in the baseline-threshold distance across SAT conditions 
accounted well for the behavioural data (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Smith & 
Ratcliff, 2004). Contrary to the patterns observed in the CPP and MEP data, the 
resulting simulated accumulation profiles showed higher amplitudes for 
‘accuracy’ compared to ‘speed’ profiles in both stimulus-locked and response-
locked simulations of both experiments. 
 
Since similar discrepancies between the notion of a difference in baseline-
threshold distance to account for the SAT and neural correlates of the decision 
variable have been reported previously (Hanks et al., 2014; Heitz & Schall, 
2013; Murphy et al., 2016), we implemented a second type of model to simulate 
accumulation profiles and explain the SAT in a slightly different way. In line with 
a previously suggested alternative explanation to the difference in the baseline-
threshold difference, we suggest that the difference between ‘speed’ and 
‘accuracy’ conditions is induced by a more global gain modulation (Heitz & 
Schall, 2012; Lo et al., 2015; Murphy et al., 2016; Perri et al., 2014; Thura & 
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Cisek, 2016). To implement this global change in activity, we ‘rescaled’ the 
standard race model and adjusted all parameters so that the thresholds for 
‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ conditions were equal, transferring the estimated 
difference between thresholds onto all other parameters (apart from the non-
decision time parameters), while remaining mathematically equivalent to the 
estimated parameters of the standard model (see section 2.1.1.5.2.). This 
resulted in a model which provides the same fit to the RT data as the original 
model, but assumes different underlying mechanisms, with changes between 
SAT conditions not explained by a threshold difference, but by differences 
between virtually all other parameters, including drift rate and noise parameters, 
modelling a global shift in decision-related brain activity. 
 
Unlike the predictions made by the standard model, simulated accumulation 
profiles of this rescaled model displayed qualitatively similar patterns to those 
observed in both the CPP and the MEP signals. The stimulus-locked profiles of 
all four signals (CPP, MEP signal, and the rescaled model prediction for each 
data set) displayed a slope difference between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials and little 
difference between ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ trials. In the response-locked model 
simulations, the amplitude differences between SAT conditions are also 
reduced compared to the predictions of the standard model, showing a closer 
resemblance to the neural signals. Statistical comparisons confirmed the 
greater similarity between the accumulation profiles of the rescaled models and 
the CPP and the MEP signals, demonstrating that the simulations based on the 
rescaled models correspond to the neural signals better than the standard 
model predictions7. These findings support our hypothesis that differences 
induced by SAT instructions may be explained by a global modulation of 
activity, rather than by a shift in a single specific mechanism. 
 
An alternative account for the SAT which does not assume a global modulation 
suggests that an urgency signal is added to the accumulation of evidence, 
                                               
7 However, note that the statistical comparison used here did not involve summary statistics for 
each participant and therefore generated findings which are generalisable only to the population 
from which we sampled. Our inferences therefore only apply to the general population to the 
extent that the observed processes in our sample are shared by the general population. 
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which pushes the accumulation towards the threshold independent of sensory 
evidence and may do so to a greater extent in decisions under speed stress 
(Cisek et al., 2009; Hawkins et al., 2015; Thura et al., 2012). This addition of a 
stronger urgency signal in speeded decisions is not dissimilar to our suggestion 
of a rescaled accumulation process, as the largest impact of the rescaling on 
the accumulation profile arguably stems from the increase in the ‘speed’ drift 
rate. This implies that, though different conceptually, both approaches avoid a 
difference in threshold, primarily by adjusting the slope of the accumulation 
across SAT conditions and may therefore make similar predictions. However, 
the implementation of an urgency signal often requires the addition of several 
parameters to the model to account for the same data. Since large numbers of 
parameters are undesirable, primarily due to the rising risk of overfitting with 
increasing numbers of parameters, we suggest that the rescaled model 
introduced here is a more appropriate account of the SAT. Additionally, it is 
important to note that the concept of urgency is an alternative to the standard 
model which used threshold variations to explain the SAT. The rescaled model 
suggested here on the other hand, is mathematically equivalent to the original 
model which has been confirmed to account for behavioural data in a large 
number of studies, but assumes different underlying mechanisms without 
affecting its robust fit. Nevertheless, the notion of an urgency signal and the 
rescaling suggested here differ primarily conceptually as they assume different 
neural mechanisms, but are likely to provide similar accounts of the data. 
 
Although we argue that the simulated accumulation profiles of the rescaled 
models closely resemble both the MEP signal and the CPP profiles, supporting 
the notion of a global modulation of activity as the underlying mechanism 
explaining the SAT, there are nevertheless small differences between the 
empirical and simulated profiles. There are a number of reasons for these 
differences. Firstly, it is important to note that any model is a simplified 
approximation of a neural mechanism and is unlikely to perfectly simulate any 
given process. This is particularly the case in neural signals which inherently 
have a low signal-to-noise ratio. An ERP such as the CPP is based on the 
recording of the sum of all brain activity in the proximity of a given electrode, 
and although the data are processed and averaged to remove as much noise 
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as possible, a proportion of decision-unrelated activity is likely to remain in the 
data. The quality of the signal is also an issue for the generation of the MEP 
signal. Since we can only sample MEPs from a single time point during each 
trial and discard a large proportion of trials during the pre-processing stages, it 
is difficult to produce enough data to compare the resulting MEP signals with 
model predictions, which can be based on any number of simulations. However, 
it is important to note that these limitations associated with the quality of the 
signal are typical for experiments of this nature (Hadar et al., 2015; O’Connell et 
al., 2012), and we used large numbers of trials in both experiments in order to 
produce interpretable neural signals. 
 
Additionally, the relevance as a decision-related signal of both the CPP and in 
particular the MEP signal has been supported by only a limited number of 
studies. Our interpretation could therefore be criticised as we are suggesting an 
alteration of a well-established model by rescaling its parameters based on a 
less researched neural signal. However, we came to our conclusions primarily 
for two reasons. Firstly, we obtained converging evidence from two 
fundamentally different signals, as both a parietal ERP and a signal of 
corticospinal excitability displayed qualitatively similar findings. Additionally, 
both signals displayed the previously reported modulations for the difficulty 
manipulation, supporting their roles as decision-related signals. Secondly, 
previous research using more established neural correlates of the decision 
variable in non-human primates has shown similar findings, with no threshold 
difference between SAT conditions and has instead found several widespread 
changes in activity (Hanks et al., 2014; Heitz & Schall, 2012, 2013). 
 
Overall, the current study explored the impact of the SAT on two neural 
correlates of the decision variable, one parietal ERP and one MEP signal 
reflecting corticospinal excitability. Although a race model accounted well for the 
behavioural data by varying the threshold across SAT conditions, neither of the 
neural signals displayed the associated amplitude differences. We showed that 
the SAT can instead be explained by a rescaled model which transfers the 
threshold differences onto all other parameters, thereby modelling a global 
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modulation of activity between conditions under ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ 
instructions. 
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3. Testing Different Neural Correlates of the 
Decision Variable 
 
Perceptual decision-making has been the focus of a large body of research for 
several decades, receiving attention from a number of fields, including cognitive 
psychology (Ratcliff, 1978) and neuroscience (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). There is 
now a consensus that the way in which we make these quick sensorimotor 
choices can be explained by a family of computational models labelled 
sequential sampling models. These models assume that, in order to make a 
decision, we continuously accumulate sensory evidence towards a fixed 
decision boundary, and execute the appropriate response when the boundary is 
reached (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Usher & 
McClelland, 2001). Although there are a number of models within this 
framework which differ in a range of aspects, such as the number of 
accumulators (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Smith & 
Ratcliff, 2004), and the assumption of leakage (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; 
Usher & McClelland, 2001), all sequential sampling models share the 
assumption of an accumulation-to-bound process and therefore share a number 
of predictions. 
 
Increasingly, this mathematical modelling of behavioural data is combined with 
neuroimaging approaches to provide converging evidence for sequential 
sampling processes. Although sequential sampling models were originally 
designed to account for behavioural decision-making data and made no claims 
regarding the neural underpinnings of decision-making, a number of neural 
signals have now been found to display the accumulation-to-bound profile 
predicted by these models (Donner et al., 2009; Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Platt & 
Glimcher, 1999). This suggests that sequential sampling models not only 
explain reaction time (RT) data, but may also predict neural processes reflecting 
the accumulation of evidence for decision-making. Therefore, to gain further 
insight into how we make decisions, recent research has been dedicated to 
exploring the potential neural correlates of the decision variable, i.e. the 
accumulation-to-bound dynamics of decision-making.  
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Particular progress regarding neural correlates of decision-making comes from 
research with non-human primates. Single-cell recordings, which are rarely 
used in humans, allow us to measure brain activity with great spatial resolution, 
as well as a very high temporal resolution, crucial in order to track how activity 
evolves over the course of short perceptual decisions. In a typical study, 
monkeys are presented with a binary perceptual decision task and indicate their 
decisions using saccades, while the firing rates of neurons involved in the 
oculomotor decision are recorded (Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Shadlen & Newsome, 
1996, 2001). In this context, it has been shown that firing rates of neurons in the 
lateral intraparietal area (LIP) show characteristics of a neural substrate of 
decision-making, building up in a ramp-like fashion over the course of a 
decision, before reaching a stereotyped level at response time. The slope of the 
build-up depends on the strength of the sensory evidence, with stronger 
evidence leading to a steeper rise, and predicts the monkey’s decision time 
(Roitman & Shadlen, 2002). Similarly, activity in the frontal eye field (Gold & 
Shadlen, 2000; Thompson, Bichot, & Schall, 1997) and superior colliculus 
(Horwitz, Batista, & Newsome, 2004; Paré & Wurtz, 2001) have been shown to 
display characteristics of accumulation-to-bound signals associated with 
sequential sampling models.  
 
While a large amount of research has been dedicated to identifying neural 
correlates of the decision variable in monkeys, and there is now convincing 
evidence that single-cell firing rates, particularly in the LIP, display the same 
profile that is predicted by sequential sampling models (Huk & Shadlen, 2005; 
Paré & Wurtz, 2001; Platt & Glimcher, 1999; Shadlen & Newsome, 1996, 2001), 
research in human decision-making has been progressing more slowly.  
 
Neuroimaging research of human perceptual decision-making has often made 
use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which has led to some 
insights into which brain areas are primarily involved in decision-making, such 
as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Heekeren et al., 2004), the posterior 
parietal cortex (Tosoni et al., 2008), and the intraparietal sulcus (Kayser, 
Buchsbaum, Erickson, & Esposito, 2010). However, due to their low temporal 
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resolution, fMRI techniques do not lend themselves to the tracking of a dynamic 
signal within the course of a decision which takes no longer than 1000 ms. 
Magnetoencephalographic (MEG) and electroencephalographic (EEG) 
approaches on the other hand, have a high temporal resolution, and although 
they give little insight into the structural underpinnings of decision-making, are 
an appropriate method to identify neural substrates of the decision variable in 
the human brain. 
 
A range of studies have made use of these techniques to identify decision-
related signals. For example, in a series of studies, Philiastides and colleagues 
recorded EEG while participants performed a face-car discrimination task and 
used a machine learning approach to identify signals which were able to 
discriminate between the two stimulus categories (Philiastides et al., 2006; 
Philiastides & Sajda, 2006). However, this putatively decision-related signal, 
disappeared when the task switched from a face-car discrimination to a colour 
discrimination, questioning its role as a general-purpose decision variable. The 
component was later interpreted as a post-sensory signal feeding into the 
accumulation process (Philiastides et al., 2006; Ratcliff et al., 2009). In a similar 
study Philiastides, Heekeren, and Sajda (2014) identified an EEG signal which, 
like a decision variable, builds up over the course of the decision, at a rate that 
depends on the signal strength. However, the findings did not suggest that the 
build-ups which differed with the amount of sensory evidence converged to a 
stereotyped level to suggest the reaching of a decision boundary. 
 
Van Vugt et al. (2012) used a regressor-based EEG approach which allowed 
them to search for a correlate of the accumulation profile predicted by a 
sequential sampling model while participants performed a random dot motion 
task. With this approach, they were able to identify oscillatory theta band (4-9 
Hz) power over the parietal lobe as a neural correlate of the accumulation 
process. A similar approach was used by Wyart et al. (2012), who presented 
participants with a series of Gabor patterns and asked them to report the 
average tilt of the patterns. They found that the encoding of evidence fluctuated 
in accordance with delta band (1-3 Hz) oscillations. 
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A different approach to tracking decision-related M/EEG activity, which is 
comparable to the tracking of oculomotor neurons in monkeys, focuses on 
signals which are known to be indicators of motor preparation. Traditional 
theories of decision-making assume serial processing, in which sensory 
encoding, decision formation, and motor execution are separate stages, and 
response selection only occurs after the decision is made (Donders, 1969; 
Sternberg, 1969). However, more recent evidence does not support this 
assumption, indicating instead that motor preparation occurs throughout the 
decision-making process (Coles et al., 1985; Gluth et al., 2013; Hadar et al., 
2012; Selen, Shadlen, & Wolpert, 2012). Therefore, researchers have 
measured effector-specific motor signals to track the decision variable, 
assuming that the evidence accumulation process is constantly fed forward into 
motor areas, so that, as evidence for a given alternative accumulates to a 
certain level, the response associated with the alternative is prepared to the 
same extent. 
 
One signal which is known to be related to motor preparation and has been 
used to track evidence accumulation is the lateralised readiness potential 
(LRP). The LRP is the lateralised portion of a slow, negative potential over 
frontal and central electrodes which precedes voluntary movements of distal 
limbs, called the readiness potential (RP, or Bereitschaftspotential; Kornhuber & 
Deecke, 1965; Vaughan, Costa, & Ritter, 1968). Crucially, this negativity is 
larger in the hemisphere contralateral to the movement, and has been shown to 
arise from the supplementary motor area (Ikeda & Shibasaki, 1992; Lang et al., 
1991). To measure the LRP, a typical study requires participants to respond to 
stimuli with a hand movement on the left or the right side, while EEG activity is 
recorded from electrodes over the left and right motor cortex (usually C3 and 
C4). The resulting EEG signals are then locked to a given event (either stimulus 
onset or response), averaged across trials, and the activity recorded from the 
ipsilateral hemisphere is subtracted from activity of the contralateral 
hemisphere, to generate the LRP waveform.  
 
A number of studies have linked the LRP to decision-making, showing 
differences in the waveform with varying speed/accuracy decision strategies 
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(Rinkenauer et al., 2004) and decision bias (Noorbaloochi et al., 2015), or 
linking it to mechanisms of response caution (van Vugt et al., 2014). However, 
there is also some evidence to suggest that the LRP is a neural correlate of the 
decision variable itself. Polanía et al. (2014) found that the LRP waveform 
closely followed the accumulation profile predicted by sequential sampling 
models in both perceptual and value-based decisions. Kelly and O’Connell 
(2013) also investigated the role of the LRP in decision-making and found that it 
builds up over the course of the decision (although with negative polarity) and 
that its slope depends on the difficulty of the decision. However, these authors 
noted that although the LRP shows characteristics of the decision variable, it 
temporally lags behind a centroparietal component, which they identified to be 
the true neural correlate of the decision variable (see below). Similarly, 
Dmochowski and Norcia (2015) found that the LRP captures some, but not all 
characteristics of a decision variable, as it does not allow for a discrimination 
between fast and slow responses as well as other decision-related components. 
Similar findings have been reported for the RP (Gluth et al., 2013; Schurger, 
Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012). 
 
Another motor-related EEG signal which has commonly been used to study 
perceptual decision-making is the power of beta-band oscillations. It has been 
shown that oscillations in this frequency (typically between 15 and 30 Hz) 
display a clear desynchronisation over the premotor cortex, contralateral to a 
manual response when the response is prepared (Doyle et al., 2005; Jasper & 
Penfield, 1949; Pfurtscheller, 1981; Zaepffel et al., 2013). While there is some 
methodological variation in the way event-related desynchronisation (ERD) 
profiles in the beta band are generated, and in particular which frequency range 
is chosen, a typical study requires participants to make one of two possible 
hand movements (left/right) and records EEG activity from electrodes over the 
contralateral motor cortex. One way in which to assess beta band activity is the 
band power method, in which the EEG signal is band-pass filtered, to remove 
all frequencies that do not fall within the chosen beta range. The resulting signal 
is then locked to a given event (e.g. stimulus onset) and squared to obtain 
power samples, as well as averaged over trials (Pfurtscheller & Lopes, 1999). 
Like the LRP, the decrease in beta power is interpreted as a response 
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preparation signal and, assuming that processing is not serial and motor 
preparation closely follows evidence accumulation, may therefore be used to 
track the decision-making process.  
 
A number of studies have explored the role of beta ERD in decision-making. It 
has been found that desynchronisation increases as decision uncertainty 
reduces (Tzagarakis et al., 2010), and that the latency of the desynchronisation 
is shorter in easy compared to hard decisions, suggesting that the duration of 
motor preparation increases with the duration of the decision formation (Kaiser, 
Lennert, & Lutzenberger, 2007). In line with this finding, Donner et al. (2009) 
suggested that oscillations in the beta frequency may be a neural correlate of 
the decision variable. Using MEG during a human random dot motion task, it 
was found that beta power corresponds to the integral of the sensory evidence 
provided by the visual cortical area MT, and displays integration-to-bound 
dynamics (Donner et al., 2009; Siegel, Engel, & Donner, 2011). This was also 
supported by EEG studies which found that oscillations in the beta band show 
the same accumulation-like profile as expected for a decision variable (i.e. a 
ramp-like profile during a perceptual decision) and reach a stereotyped peak 
before the hand movement that indicates the decision (Kubanek et al., 2013; 
O’Connell et al., 2012). Additionally, unlike sensory signals which show a more 
linear change with increasing stimulus strength, the slope of the change in beta 
power was found to increase over time, indicating that it reflects the temporal 
integration of evidence (O’Connell et al., 2012). De Lange et al. (2013) used 
effector-specific activity in the beta band to explore the effects of prior 
expectations and found that decision bias results in a baseline shift in 
lateralised beta ERD. Since sequential sampling models predict a shift in the 
starting point of the accumulation process to account for biased decisions, this 
finding is in line with the claim that beta ERD may reflect the decision variable.  
 
However, O’Connell et al. (2012) also noted that accumulation-like 
characteristics in beta ERD were only present in decisions involving hand 
movements. Similarly, if a decision is made without advanced knowledge of the 
stimulus-response mapping, no change in motor-related beta activity can be 
observed during the decision (Twomey et al., 2016).  
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This dependence on the response may seem to be an obvious limitation of 
motor-related signals as a read-out of accumulation. Since both the LRP and 
beta ERD are primarily correlates of hand-movement preparation, they are not 
expected to show accumulation-like profiles during decisions which do not 
require these responses, or decisions which are made without knowing which 
response is associated with each alternative. This finding demonstrates that 
what can be observed in these motor-related signals during decisions with 
known stimulus-hand mappings (e.g. Donner et al., 2009) is not a decision-
making process, but is instead likely to occur down-stream from decision areas 
(Wyart et al., 2012). Nevertheless, response-preparation signals may still give 
insight into the accumulation process as evidence suggests that the decision 
state flows continuously to the motor areas (Donner et al., 2009; O’Connell et 
al., 2012). Note also that some of the most useful neural correlates of the 
decision variable in non-human primates track firing rates in oculomotor 
neurons during saccadic decisions, which are arguably equivalent to lateralised 
motor preparation signals in human decision-making requiring hand movements 
(Gold & Shadlen, 2000, 2003). 
 
A different EEG signal which does not have the same limitations as motor-
related activity was proposed by O’Connell et al. (2012). In a series of 
experiments, they recorded human EEG during a visual target-detection task, 
and identified the centroparietal positivity (CPP) as an accumulation-to-bound 
signal. The CPP is a large, positive ERP component recorded over 
centroparietal regions, which displays a number of characteristics of the 
decision variable. It shows a ramp-like increase over the course of the decision 
formation and peaks at a stereotyped level immediately prior to the response. 
By varying the difficulty of the gradual detection task both between and within 
trials, it was also demonstrated that the slope of the decision-related build-up is 
sensitive to the strength of the evidence, with easier decisions (stronger 
evidence) leading to steeper build-up rates, and changes in difficulty within a 
decision leading to changes in slope within the build-up.  
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Importantly, O’Connell et al. (2012) were able to dissociate the CPP from 
signals of both sensory encoding and motor processing. In a task in which the 
evidence increased over time, it was shown that, unlike correlates of sensory 
processing which display a linear build-up as stimulus strength increases, the 
CPP builds up at a rate which increases over the course of the decision, 
indexing the temporal integration of sensory evidence. Additionally, the build-up 
seen in sensory-related signals was shown to remain the same regardless of 
whether the sensory information was task-relevant or not, while the CPP only 
displayed a build-up when the sensory input was attended to make a decision. 
Further, the CPP was shown to display the same accumulation-to bound profile, 
regardless of whether or not the response required hand movements. In a 
follow-up study, it was also shown that, unlike motor signals, the CPP does not 
depend on foreknowledge of the stimulus-response mapping (Twomey et al., 
2016). These findings suggest that the CPP provides a read-out of the decision-
related accumulation of evidence. This notion was also supported by the finding 
that it is unaffected by modality, as auditory decisions were associated with the 
same CPP profiles as decisions based on visual evidence (O’Connell et al., 
2012; Twomey et al., 2015). 
 
However, as reported in Chapter 2, we were not able to demonstrate a 
difference in CPP waveforms between decisions that are made under speed 
stress (i.e. quick and error-prone decisions), and decisions which are made 
following instructions to be as accurate as possible (i.e. slow, accurate 
decisions). Sequential sampling models typically account for the behavioural 
differences of the speed-accuracy trade-off by adjusting the response caution 
parameter (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Heitz, 2014; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). 
This threshold difference between ‘speed’ and ‘accuracy’ trials should be visible 
in the profile of a neural substrate of the decision variable as a difference in 
amplitude. We were not able to support this hypothesis in Chapter 2. Although 
this finding can be accommodated by sequential sampling models and may not 
question the role of the CPP as a neural substrate of the decision variable but 
rather be used to inform the neural implementation of sequential sampling 
models (see Chapter 2), it does raise questions about the CPP and its role. 
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Another limitation of the CPP was raised by Urai and Pfeffer (2014). They note 
that unlike motor-related signals of decision-making, the CPP is not able to 
predict the specific choice a participant is making. The CPP is not effector-
specific and instead, builds up to a threshold in the same way for any response, 
while more established accumulation signals recorded in non-human primates 
display choice-selectivity (e.g. Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). This lack of 
selectivity led to the suggestion that the CPP may in fact display a build-up of 
choice confidence, rather than evidence accumulation (Urai & Pfeffer, 2014). 
Note however, that the comparatively poor spatial resolution of EEG allows for a 
discrimination between choices in motor signals due to the clear lateralisation of 
the motor cortices (i.e. right/left-hand responses can be tracked over the 
left/right hemisphere), but does not allow for a discrimination between 
neighbouring neural populations. It is therefore possible that evidence for 
different alternatives is in fact accumulated in separate neural populations, but 
that what is recorded on the scalp is a summation of activity.  
 
In the light of this research, it becomes apparent that many questions regarding 
neural substrates of decision-making in the human brain, and in particular the 
CPP, are yet to be answered conclusively. In this study, we therefore set out to 
explore potential accumulation-to-bound signals in the human EEG. To do this, 
we explored decisions with differing levels of difficulty. We chose the difficulty 
manipulation not only because it is one of the most commonly used 
manipulations in the field of perceptual decision-making (de Lafuente, Jazayeri, 
& Shadlen, 2015; Ho et al., 2009; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Roitman & Shadlen, 
2002), but also because it is one of the only manipulations that has only one 
possible implementation in sequential sampling models. The behavioural effects 
of many standard manipulations in decision-making research can be explained 
by sequential sampling models in a number of different ways. This is not the 
case for the manipulation of difficulty. Difficulty has strong effects on the 
behavioural data, but, to our knowledge, these changes are explained by a 
difference in drift rate (i.e. the rate at which evidence is accumulated) in virtually 
all approaches using sequential sampling models (Donkin et al., 2009; Mulder 
et al., 2014; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Voss, 
Rothermund, & Voss, 2004; but see Goldfarb, Leonard, Simen, Caicedo-Nunez, 
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& Holmes, 2014; Teodorescu & Usher, 2013). The drift rate uniquely accounts 
for behavioural differences induced by difficulty changes as it is the only 
parameter which simultaneously influences accuracy and RT in opposing 
directions (i.e. as drift rate increases, accuracy increases while RT decreases; 
see Figure 3.1). Since there is a consensus that the drift rate of the 
accumulation process, at least in part, accounts for behavioural differences due 
to different levels of difficulty, we assume that any neural correlate of the 
decision variable should display a different profile in easy and hard decisions. 
Specifically, we expect a higher slope in the build-up associated with easy 
decisions than with hard decisions (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Roitman & 
Shadlen, 2002). In this study, we made use of the data collected in Chapter 2 
(Experiment 1) and tested whether this assumption holds true in the most 
commonly suggested decision-related human EEG signals, namely the CPP, 
the LRP, and beta ERD.  
 
Additionally, we used a bottom-up approach to identify other potential signals 
which may display differences between easy and hard decisions and reflect 
accumulation. Bottom-up approaches which aim to identify signals which 
display characteristics of the decision variable have been used before, for 
example by van Vugt et al. (2012), who used a regressor-based analysis. This 
method has the advantage of being able to identify signals with specific 
characteristics, but identifies such signals regardless of their recording sites, 
which can make their interpretation difficult. Here, we therefore chose a method 
which, to our knowledge, has not previously been used to identify decision 
variable signals, namely cluster-based permutation tests (Maris & Oostenveld, 
2007). This method identifies differences between conditions in the whole brain 
rather than just specific waveforms, and can be applied here since we have 
clear predictions about the effects of difficulty on an accumulation signal. 
Importantly, this method uses biophysically motivated constraints, which not 
only increase its sensitivity, but also make it more interpretable. By combining 
this approach with the exploration of established EEG signals, we aimed to 
identify the most suitable neural correlate of the decision variable. 
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Figure 3.1: Simplified illustration of an accumulation process in a sequential sampling model framework: 
evidence accumulates from a starting point towards the threshold. The slope of the accumulation is 
defined by the drift rate, which varies with task difficulty. The easier the decision, the higher the slope of 
the accumulation.  
3.1. Methods  
 
Since this study uses data collected in Chapter 2, the data collection methods 
are only described briefly (please see Chapter 2 for more details). 
 
3.1.1. Participants 
A total of 26 participants (nine males) were recruited using poster 
advertisements and word of mouth. Three participants were excluded from the 
experiment as they were unable to perform the task as required by criteria 
established prior to the experiment (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.1.2.2). The 
remaining sample was made up of 23 participants (eight males) with a mean 
age of 29.39 (SD = 7.47). Each participant took part in a two-hour session, 
completing 800 trials, and was paid £8 per hour, as well as an additional 
performance-based reward of up to £4. All procedures were approved by the 
City, University of London Psychology Department Ethical Committee. 
3.1.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants were asked to complete a random dot motion task, in which they 
viewed an array of moving dots, a proportion of which moved coherently either 
up or down, while the rest of the dots moved in random directions. Participants 
were asked to indicate the direction of the coherent motion. The difficulty of the 
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task was determined by the coherence level, i.e. the ratio between coherently 
and randomly moving dots. Each participant was presented with ‘easy’ and 
‘hard’ trials, the coherence levels of which were calibrated individually using the 
QUEST staircase procedure, implemented in Psychtoolbox (Watson & Pelli, 
1983). The QUEST procedure estimated the coherence levels at which a given 
participant was able to respond correctly in 75% of trials for the ‘hard’ condition, 
and 95% for the ‘easy’ condition. Overall, the appropriate difficulty levels 
estimated for the final sample resulted in a mean of 30.63% (SD = 18.69) 
coherence for ‘hard’, and 67.67% (SD = 28.23) for ‘easy’ trials. ‘Easy’ and ‘hard’ 
trials, as well as trials with upward and downward motion were randomly 
intermixed. The original experiment also included a manipulation of speed and 
accuracy instructions (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.1.2.3). However, this 
manipulation is ignored here and all analyses are performed to compare only 
difficulty conditions, collapsed over speed and accuracy conditions. 
 
The trial procedure is displayed in Figure 3.2. To start each trial, participants 
were presented with a fixation cross for 500 ms (plus a jitter of up to 1000 ms, 
drawn from a uniform distribution). Then, 100% of the dots moved randomly for 
1000 ms (plus a jitter of up to 1500 ms, drawn from a gamma distribution with 
shape parameter 1 and scaling parameter 150). This period of random motion 
was introduced as the onset of the moving dots is likely to produce a visual 
evoked potential (VEP). By allowing this VEP to occur before the onset of 
coherent motion, we were able to clearly track decision-related potentials from 
the onset of the accumulation process (i.e. the onset of coherent motion). The 
random motion was followed by the onset of coherent motion, when a 
proportion of dots started moving coherently either up or down, for up to 2000 
ms, or until the response. Feedback was provided after each trial. All stimuli 
were written in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), using the Psychtoolbox 
extension (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997) and run on a PC.  
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Figure 3.2: Random dot motion task trial procedure: in each trial, a fixation cross was followed by a period 
of random motion (coherence: 0%). Then, the coherent motion (up/down) was presented according to 
each participant’s difficulty level (here: coherence: 70%, direction: up). The coherent motion continued for 
2000 ms or until a response was given. Feedback was provided after each trial. Note that the size and 
number of dots have been adjusted for illustration. 
 
3.1.3. EEG Recording and Analysis 
Continuous EEG was recorded using 64 active electrodes, placed equidistantly 
on the scalp (EasyCap, M10 Montage) and referenced to the right mastoid. 
Using a BrainAmp amplifier (BrainProducts), data were recorded at a sampling 
rate of 1000 Hz and band-pass filtered from 0.016 – 1000 Hz. The data were 
then pre-processed using custom scripts in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, 
U.S.A.), drawing on functions from the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 
2004). 
 
EEG data were re-referenced to the average reference and filtered at 0.1 (low 
cut-off) and 45 Hz (high cut-off), using a Hamming windowed finite impulse 
response filter. To improve the signal-to-noise ratio, we initially visually 
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inspected the data to remove large muscle artifacts before applying 
independent component analysis to remove eye blink components. Any 
remaining artifacts were removed manually during a second visual inspection. 
Afterwards, spherical spline interpolation was used to reconstruct noisy 
channels, which were identified and rejected during the first visual inspection.  
 
3.1.3.1. Event-related Potentials 
To generate ERP waveforms, matched stimulus-locked (-200 to 2000 ms 
relative to the onset of coherent motion) and response-locked (-1000 to 100 ms 
relative to button press) epochs were extracted from the continuous data. All 
epochs were baselined to the average over a 200 ms period preceding the 
onset of coherent motion. Epochs were then separated into ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
conditions. Since we assume equivalent decision processes for trials with 
upward and downward motion, we collapsed trials over motion direction. 
However, since trials with upward and downward motion were associated with 
right and left-hand responses, leading to stronger changes in the left and right 
hemisphere respectively, simply averaging over both motion directions would 
distort the lateralisation of motor processes. Therefore, the topography of all 
trials with a right-hand response (correct ‘up’ trials and incorrect ‘down’ trials) 
was mirrored along the midline, so that all contralateral activity was projected 
onto the right hemisphere (i.e. activity recorded in electrodes on the left 
hemisphere was now associated with electrodes on the right hemisphere). 
Finally, in line with previously suggested procedures (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; 
O’Connell et al., 2012), the data were converted to current source density 
(CSD) estimates to increase spatial selectivity. The CSD transformation was 
applied using the CSD toolbox, which uses a spherical spline algorithm, with the 
spline interpolation constant m set to its default value (m = 4; Kayser & Tenke, 
2006).  
3.1.3.1.1. Centroparietal Positivity (CPP) 
To generate the CPP waveform, centroparietal electrodes were chosen for each 
participant individually by inspecting the averaged ERP topography and 
identifying the electrode associated with the maximum amplitude (chosen 
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electrodes: 1, 5, or 14, roughly equivalent to electrodes Cz, CPz, and Pz in the 
10-20 system; see Figure 3.4 a). The activity in the selected electrodes was 
averaged over correct trials and participants for each difficulty condition and for 
stimulus and response-locked signals separately. 
3.1.3.1.2. Lateralised Readiness Potential (LRP) 
Similarly, ERP topographies, as well as waveforms at different electrodes were 
visually inspected to identify appropriate frontocentral electrodes for the LRP 
waveform per participant (chosen contralateral electrodes: 18 or 31, ipsilateral 
electrodes: 10 or 22, roughly equivalent to electrodes FC3, C5, FC4, C6 in the 
10-20 system)8. Activity recorded from the chosen ipsilateral electrode was 
subtracted from the recordings from the corresponding contralateral electrode. 
The resulting activity was averaged over correct trials and participants to 
generate the LRP waveform. 
3.1.3.2. Time-Frequency Analysis 
To estimate the time-varying spectral content of the data, longer epochs than 
those required for the ERP analysis were extracted (-2000 to 2000 ms relative 
to the onset of coherent motion for stimulus-locked, and -2000 to 1000 ms 
relative to the response for response-locked data). Segments were separated 
into ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ conditions, collapsed over ‘up’ and ‘down’ trials, mirrored, 
and CSD-transformed in the same way as described above for the ERP 
analysis. Error trials were discarded from the analysis. The time-frequency 
analysis was performed using the wavelet decomposition method, in which the 
data is convolved with a Morlet wavelet. We used wavelets with four cycles on a 
single trial basis before averaging the resulting transforms. Frequencies from 2 
to 40 Hz were analysed in steps of 1 Hz. The resulting time-frequency 
representation (TFR) was normalised by dividing the power in each frequency 
by its mean during a baseline interval of -500 to -100 ms relative to the onset of 
coherent motion. 
 
                                               
8 Note that we repeated all analyses based on an LRP which was generated using the standard 
electrodes 17 and 11 (roughly equivalent to C3 and C4 in the 10-20 system) and found 
qualitatively identical results. 
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3.1.3.2.1. Event-Related Beta Desynchronisation 
In order to explore event-related desynchronisation, we visually inspected each 
participant’s time-frequency plot and identified the 15 to 25 Hz frequency range 
to be suitable for all participants. We used the band-power method 
(Pfurtscheller & Lopes, 1999) to analyse the time-varying power of this beta 
band. Each participant’s temporospatial signal was filtered between 15 and 25 
Hz, using a Butterworth band-pass filter (order = 4). The resulting signal was 
squared, averaged, and then smoothed using a moving average with a 50 ms 
window. Lastly, the power was expressed in percentage of change from the 
baseline interval of -200 to 0 ms relative to the onset of the coherent motion, by 
subtracting the mean baseline power from the waveform, dividing the resulting 
signal by the mean baseline power and multiplying it by 100. In line with 
standard procedures (Doyle et al., 2005; O’Connell et al., 2012; Pfurtscheller, 
1981), we chose electrode 17 (roughly equivalent to C3 in the 10-20 system) to 
test contralateral beta power. In order to test lateralised beta ERD, we 
subtracted signals recorded from the ipsilateral electrode 11 (roughly equivalent 
to C4 in the 10-20 system), from activity in electrode 17. 
 
3.1.3.3. Statistical Analysis 
In order to test for characteristics of the decision variable in the generated ERP 
and ERD waveforms, we compared the slope of the build-up between ‘easy’ 
and ‘hard’ conditions. To do so, we fitted a straight line and measured its slope 
for each participant’s signal. In line with Kelly and O’Connell (2013), the chosen 
time intervals to which we fitted a line were 200 to 350 ms for the stimulus-
locked CPP, -250 to -100 ms for the response-locked CPP, 300 to 450 ms for 
the stimulus-locked LRP and ERD, and -300 to -150 ms for the response-locked 
LRP and ERD. 
 
Additionally, we analysed the impact of difficulty on the amplitude of the 
waveform. Using t-tests, we compared the values in ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ ERPs and 
ERDs in each time sample between 0 and 1000 ms for the stimulus-locked, and 
-1000 to 0 ms in the response-locked signal. The results were controlled for 
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multiple comparisons using the false discovery rate (FDR) approach (Benjamini 
& Hochberg, 1995). In this procedure, the uncorrected p-values are sorted from 
lowest to highest (pi refers to the ith lowest value out of m total p-values). The 
largest i for which 𝑝𝑖 < (
𝑖
𝑚
) ∝ is identified and all p-values associated with is 
smaller or equal to the identified i are considered significant.  
 
3.1.3.4. Exploratory Approach 
Since there is no single signal in the human EEG which has been conclusively 
proven to be a correlate of decision-related evidence accumulation, we set out 
to not only test those signals which have previously been suggested to play this 
role, but also to explore the data using a bottom-up approach. Since sequential 
sampling models make strong predictions about differences in accumulation 
due to different difficulty levels, we used a data-driven method to search the 
data for differences between signals associated with ‘easy’ decisions and those 
associated with ‘hard’ decisions. To this end, we employed a non-parametric 
cluster permutation approach to evaluate both ERP data (temporal and spatial 
dimensions) and TFR data (temporal, spatial, and spectral dimensions; Maris & 
Oostenveld, 2007). This method not only allows for a less conservative solution 
to the multiple comparison problem than, for example, Bonferroni corrections, 
but is also built on biological concepts and makes use of the assumption that, if 
a difference between conditions is meaningful, it ought to be visible across a 
multidimensional cluster (i.e. across time and space, or across time, space, and 
frequency if TFR data are used).  
 
Following this method, we first generated dependent-measures t-statistics for 
the comparison between ’easy’ and ‘hard’ trials for each of the samples (one 
sample corresponds to one time-electrode pair for ERP comparisons and one 
time-electrode-frequency pair for TFR comparisons), to identify all samples at 
which a given cut-off (defined here as p < .05) was exceeded. These t-tests 
were run across all electrodes, and all time points in the time interval of 0 to 
1000 ms relative to the onset of coherent motion in the stimulus-locked data, as 
well as for each frequency between 2 and 40 Hz for TFR comparisons. If 
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neighbouring samples exceeded the threshold and shared the same sign, they 
were grouped into a cluster. The cluster statistic is defined as the sum of all t-
values in a cluster. Each cluster is then assigned a p-value by comparing it 
against the permutation distribution of the maximum cluster-level statistic. The 
permutation distribution is approximated using a Monte-Carlo estimate after 
performing 500 random partitions of the data (i.e. data is shuffled across 
conditions and randomly assigned into two new conditions) and re-calculating 
the statistic of interest on the shuffled data.  
 
The analysis was run in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), using custom 
scripts drawing on functions of the fieldtrip extension (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, 
& Schoffelen, 2011). Cluster permutation tests were only performed on 
stimulus-locked data, as we expected a neural correlate of the decision variable 
to display differences between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials in the stimulus-locked, but 
not in the response-locked amplitude, as according to sequential sampling 
models, response-locked signals should converge to a common bound. 
Although slope differences are expected in both the stimulus and the respond-
locked data, these differences are often less visible in response-locked data, 
and do not necessarily translate into a clear difference in amplitude. To explore 
any clusters identified in the stimulus-locked signal in the response-locked data, 
we generated the response-locked signal of the electrodes (and frequencies for 
TFR clusters) defined by the cluster and performed the same FDR controlled t-
tests as defined above to evaluate the signal. 
 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Behavioural Results 
In order to test the effects of the difficulty manipulation on the behavioural data, 
data were collapsed over ‘up’ and ‘down’ trials. Trials with very short (< 180 ms) 
and very long (>= 2000 ms) RTs were excluded from the analysis (6.08% of 
trials). The remaining data are displayed in Figure 3.3. A paired-samples t-test 
revealed that response times in correct trials were significantly different 
112 
 
between difficulty levels, t(22) = 11.19, p < .001, d = 2.33, with ‘easy’ decisions 
being associated with shorter RTs (M = 533 ms) than ‘hard’ decisions (M = 679 
ms). 
 
To explore this effect in the accuracy data, a generalised linear mixed-effects 
model with a logistic link function and binomial data model was used, which, 
unlike a t-test, appropriately models the non-normal distribution of the data. 
Using the ‘fitglme’ function in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), 
parameter estimates were based on a maximum likelihood method using the 
Laplace approximation. In this model, ‘Difficulty’ was included as a fixed effect 
and ‘Participant’ was included as a random effect (Wilkinson notation: 
Accuracy ~ 1 + Difficulty + (1 + Difficulty | 
Participant))9. It was found that ‘Difficulty’ was a significant predictor, t(44) 
= 4.69, p < .001, with higher accuracies observed in easy (M = 86%) compared 
to hard trials (M = 79%). 
 
Figure 3.3: Behavioural results: reaction time in seconds (left) and accuracy in proportion correct (right). 
Error bars indicate 95% confidence interval. ** indicates p < .001. 
 
                                               
9 The dispersion parameter of the model, φ = .80, was calculated by dividing the sum of squared 
Pearson residuals by the residual degrees of freedom (Venables & Ripley, 2002). 
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3.2.2. Neural Results 
3.2.2.1. Centroparietal Positivity (CPP) 
We generated the CPP (see Figure 3.4 a) and conducted a t-test to investigate 
the difference in slope between signals associated with ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
decisions. In the CPP waveform, we found a significant difference in slopes in 
both stimulus-locked, t(22) = 3.67, p = .001, d = .77, and response-locked t(22) 
= 3.60, p = .002, d = .75, waveforms. In accordance with sequential sampling 
models which assume a higher drift rate (i.e. a steeper slope of accumulation) in 
‘easy’ compared to ‘hard’ choices, we found that slopes in trials with high 
motion coherence (Mstimulus-lock= .07, Mresponse-lock= .06) were significantly 
higher than those in trials with lower motion coherence (Mstimulus-lock= .06, 
Mresponse-lock= .04).  
 
Additionally, an FDR-corrected series of t-tests revealed statistically significantly 
higher amplitudes in ‘easy’ compared to ‘hard’ trials in all time samples between 
265 and 632 ms in the stimulus-locked CPP (corrected p < .05). The response-
locked CPP showed no significant difference in amplitude between ‘easy’ and 
‘hard’ trials after FDR correction (see Figure 3.4 a). 
 
3.2.2.2. Lateralised Readiness Potential (LRP) 
Further, we generated the LRP waveform (see Figure 3.4 b) and found a 
significant difference in slopes between difficulty conditions in the stimulus-
locked data, t(22) = -5.00, p < .001, d = -1.04, with a steeper slope associated 
with ‘easy’ (Mstimulus-lock= -.07) compared to ’hard’ (Mstimulus-lock= -.04) trials. 
However, there was no significant difference in slope in the response-locked 
LRP t(22) = -.31, p = .076, d = -.06 (Mresponse-lock= -.03 for both difficulty levels).  
 
FDR-corrected t-tests showed significant differences in the stimulus-locked 
LRP, with higher amplitudes in ‘easy’ compared to ‘hard’ trials, between 8 and 
12 ms relative to stimulus onset (corrected p < .049), as well as in 212 out of 
278 time samples between 318 and 596 ms relative to stimulus onset (corrected 
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p < .05). There was no significant difference in amplitude between the 
difficulties in the response-locked LRP (corrected p > .58; see Figure 3.4 b). 
 
3.2.2.3. Event-Related Beta Desynchronisation 
For contralateral beta power (see Figure 3.4 c), we first tested differences 
between difficulty levels. We found that the slope of the ERD did not differ 
significantly between ‘easy’ (Mstimulus-lock = -.05, Mresponse-lock = -.03) and ’hard’ 
(Mstimulus-lock = -.04, Mresponse-lock = -.04) conditions in either the stimulus-locked, 
t(22) = .42, p = .68, d = .09, or the response-locked data, t(22) = .38, p = .71, d 
= .08. We further tested the amplitude difference between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
conditions throughout the decision-making process. After FDR correction for 
multiple comparisons, we found no difference in either the stimulus-locked 
(corrected p > .07), or the response-locked data (corrected p > .9). 
 
We then performed the same test on the lateralised spectral power in the beta 
frequency (see Figure 3.4 d). Again, we found no significant difference in slope 
between the ‘easy’ (Mstimulus-lock = -.02, Mresponse-lock = -.003) and the ‘hard’ 
(Mstimulus-lock = -.02, Mresponse-lock = -.005) conditions in either the stimulus-locked, 
t(22) = -1.06, p = .30, d = -.22, or the response-locked data, t(22) = .09, p = .93, 
d = .02. Similarly, we found no significant differences between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
waveforms in amplitude in either the stimulus-locked (corrected p > .38) or the 
response-locked data (corrected p > .26). 
 
Overall, these findings are explained by the fact that we did not observe any 
desynchronisation in the lateralised part of beta ERD. To quantify this lack of 
lateralisation, we used t-tests to test the null hypothesis that each time sample 
(like all other analyses, time samples were taken at an interval of 0 to 1000 ms 
relative to stimulus onset and -1000 to 0 ms relative to response) of each 
condition stems from a distribution with a mean of zero, and corrected for 
multiple comparisons using FDR corrections. We found no time sample at which 
the null hypothesis was rejected (minimum corrected p-value across stimulus 
and response-locked data .06). This indicates that the same patterns were 
recorded on both contralateral and ipsilateral sites, and that the 
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desynchronisation observed in the contralateral signal was not effector-specific, 
but merely reflected a more general motor preparation.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Neural results: from left to right: stimulus-locked, and response-locked waveforms, and ERP 
topographies. Topoplots show the mean ERP activity between 0 and 1000 ms relative to the onset of 
coherent motion. The electrodes used to generate each waveform are highlighted. Shaded grey areas in 
the waveform panels indicate a significant difference in amplitude between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials. Vertical 
dashed lines indicate mean RT (note that these mean RTs only include RTs from trials which were 
116 
 
ultimately included to generate the waveform and therefore differ slightly from RTs displayed in Figure 3.3, 
as well as between ERP and spectral data). a) CPP; b) LRP; c) Beta ERD; d) lateralised Beta ERD. 
 
3.2.2.4. Exploratory Approach 
We further compared ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ decisions using a more exploratory 
analysis for both ERP and TFR data (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007). In the ERP 
data, a non-parametric cluster permutation test showed that there was a 
significant difference between the ERPs associated with ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
decisions. It revealed the presence of a cluster (p = .002) between 228 and 
1000 ms relative to the onset of coherent motion, in which the waveform 
associated with ‘easy’ trials built up faster and higher than the one associated 
with ‘hard’ trials. This cluster included a large range of electrodes, primarily over 
centroparietal regions (see Figure 3.5). We applied this cluster to response-
locked data by averaging over the ERPs of the identified electrodes. FDR-
corrected t-tests showed that ‘easy’ ERPs built up higher than ‘hard’ ERPs in 
238 out of 240 time samples between -239 and 0 ms relative to the response 
(corrected p < .05). 
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Figure 3.5: ERP cluster: Left: ERPs averaged over the identified electrodes (see topography) for stimulus-
locked (top) and response-locked (bottom) data (note that the cluster permutation test was only performed 
on stimulus-locked data). Vertical dashed lines indicate mean RT (like in Figure 3.4, mean RT is based 
only on trials used to generate the waveform and slightly differs from behavioural data displayed in Figure 
3.3). Shaded grey areas indicate a significant difference between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ conditions. In the 
stimulus-locked data, this is based on the time samples identified in the cluster, while in the response-
locked data, significance is based on a number of FDR-controlled t-tests. Right: ERP topography over 
time. Electrodes identified by the cluster are highlighted. 
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A second cluster-based permutation test was used to identify differences 
between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ decisions in TFR data. Again, the test showed that 
there was a significant difference in the TFR data between the two difficulty 
levels and revealed the presence of two clusters (both p = .002). One cluster 
was found between 700 and 1000 ms. Since this is a time interval in which most 
decisions have already been completed, we assumed that this cluster is not 
decision-related and discarded it from further investigation. The second cluster 
revealed higher power in delta and theta frequencies (2 to 7 Hz) in ‘easy’ 
compared to ‘hard’ trials, between 170 and 640 ms. This cluster was observed 
in a large range of mainly frontal and parietal electrodes (see Figure 3.6). We 
applied this cluster to response-locked TFR data by averaging over the 
frequencies and electrodes identified. FDR-corrected t-tests on this data 
revealed that ‘easy’ trials built up significantly higher than ‘hard’ trials during the 
interval of -280 to 0 ms relative to response (corrected p < .042). 
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Figure 3.6: TFR cluster: Left: Spectral power averaged over the identified frequency range (2 to 7 Hz) and 
electrodes (see topography) for stimulus-locked (top) and response-locked (bottom) data (note that the 
cluster permutation test was only performed on stimulus-locked data). Vertical dashed lines indicate mean 
RT (like in Figure 3.4, mean RT is based only on trials used to generate the waveform and differs slightly 
from behavioural data displayed in Figure 3.3). Shaded grey areas indicate a significant difference 
between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ conditions. In the stimulus-locked data, this is based on the time samples 
identified in the cluster, while in the response-locked data, significance is based on a number of FDR-
controlled t-tests. Right: Topography of spectral power in the identified frequency band (2 to 7 Hz) over 
time. Electrodes identified by the cluster are highlighted. 
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3.3. Discussion 
 
In this study, we set out to test different potential neural correlates of the 
decision variable in the human EEG. We tested the impact of a difficulty 
manipulation on a number of signals which have previously been suggested to 
display accumulation-to-bound characteristics, namely the CPP (Kelly & 
O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 2012), the LRP (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; 
Polanía et al., 2014), and beta ERD (Donner et al., 2009; Siegel et al., 2011). 
Additionally, we used an exploratory approach to identify other potential 
difficulty-related differences.  
 
We chose the manipulation of difficulty as it is has strong effects on behavioural 
data, which have been studied extensively in the sequential sampling model 
literature and are universally accounted for by a variation in just one parameter, 
namely the variation of drift rate, which makes strong predictions about the 
profile of the accumulation process (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Mulder et al., 
2014; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Voss, Nagler, & Lerche, 2013). Using two levels 
of difficulty (‘easy’, ’hard’), we expected strong behavioural differences, with 
‘easy’ decisions leading to shorter, and more accurate decisions than ‘hard’ 
decisions. The results support this hypothesis, showing that the ‘easy’ condition 
was associated with fewer errors and RTs which were on average 
approximately 150 ms shorter.  
 
Importantly, we further expected that a signal which reflects the decision 
variable would mirror these differences. An accumulation signal therefore has to 
not only build up over time and peak at the time of response, but also differ in 
slope between the conditions, with higher slopes (i.e. higher drift rates) in ‘easy’ 
compared to ‘hard’ decisions. Note that, due to the nature of EEG, we expect 
this difference in slope to be associated with a difference in amplitude in the 
stimulus-locked, but not in the response-locked data. We predict that the 
difference in difficulty is accounted for by a variation of only the drift rate (i.e. 
slope), while all other parameters are equal across conditions. This implies that 
the distance between the starting point of accumulation and the decision 
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threshold (i.e. the amplitude of the peak of each accumulation process) does 
not differ (given that the accumulation terminates immediately after reaching the 
threshold, but see below). However, in stimulus-locked EEG signals, the 
amplitude of the average peak is dependent on the variability of its latency 
across trials. Since ‘hard’ decisions are associated with longer, more variable 
RTs, the stimulus-locked average peak is necessarily smaller. This difference in 
amplitude should however disappear in the response-locked data, where, 
assuming a true decision variable signal, the signal is locked to the peak, 
removing any effects of variability in latency. In the following, we briefly re-
introduced each of the suggested signals and addressed to which extent they 
meet these slope and amplitude expectations. 
 
3.3.1. Centroparietal Positivity (CPP) 
The CPP is a centroparietal ERP component, which has been shown to display 
accumulation-like profiles, independently of sensory or motor processes 
(O’Connell et al., 2012). It has been found to display the same build-up over the 
course of the decision and peak at the response for both visual and auditory 
decisions, as well as for decisions with and without motor responses. However, 
its role has been questioned as it is not effector-specific, which means that it 
cannot predict which decision is being made (Urai & Pfeffer, 2014). The slope of 
the CPP has previously been shown to scale with task difficulty (Kelly & 
O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 2012). 
 
In the current study, we were able to confirm this finding. As predicted for a 
decision variable signal, the CPP displayed the expected gradual build-up over 
the course of the decision, the peak of which co-occurred with the response 
(see Figure 3.4 a). In line with Kelly and O’Connell (2013), we found that the 
slope of the build-up was higher for ‘easy’ compared to ‘hard’ decisions, in both 
the stimulus-locked and the response-locked data. This suggests that ‘easy’ 
decisions are associated with a faster integration of evidence and a steeper 
accumulation, supporting the role of the CPP as a neural substrate of decision-
making.  
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We further compared the amplitude of ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials and found that, in 
the stimulus-locked ERP, ‘easy’ trials had a larger amplitude for the majority of 
the decision-making process. Sequential sampling models do not predict a 
difference in peak amplitude, which is arguably equivalent to a difference in 
decision threshold and/or starting point. However, a difference in slope can, 
over time, lead to a separation of the signal amplitudes. Additionally, as 
described above, a difference in amplitude is likely to be caused by differences 
in RT variability between the difficulty conditions. If we assume that the build-up 
peaks at a stereotyped level at response, averaging waveforms over trials and 
participants will lead to higher means when said peaks are less variable in time. 
Therefore, a difference in amplitude in the stimulus-locked ERP signal is not 
necessarily indicative of a difference in accumulation amplitude. The response-
locked ERP signal on the other hand, provides a truer reflection of the ERP 
amplitude at response. As predicted for a decision variable signal, there was no 
significant difference in amplitude between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ conditions in the 
response-locked ERP. 
 
However, although the difference was not significant, visual inspection of the 
waveform and uncorrected p-values contradict previous CPP studies, which 
found that the amplitudes of response-locked peaks of ERPs associated with 
different difficulties were virtually identical (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell 
et al., 2012). We suggest two explanations for this difference. Firstly, it is 
important to note that accumulation may continue after the threshold is reached. 
Once enough evidence is accumulated and the boundary is reached, a decision 
is made and the response is initiated. However, the stimulus only turns off when 
the button is pressed. This implies that there is a brief time interval between the 
reaching of the threshold and the press of the response button in which 
evidence is still being observed and potentially accumulated. Since 
accumulation is shown to be faster for ‘easy’ than for ‘hard’ decisions, this 
means that, given the same time interval, ‘easy’ decisions will accumulate to a 
higher amplitude. Since the response-locked signal is locked to the press of the 
button, not the reaching of the threshold, we expect a small difference and are, 
in fact, surprised by Kelly and O’Connell's (2013) finding of virtually identical 
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amplitudes, which may be specific to their experimental setup. A second, not 
mutually exclusive, explanation for the small difference seen in the amplitude 
between conditions at response, was brought up by Philiastides et al. (2014). 
They suggested that the distributed nature of EEG recordings in combination 
with the spatial averaging due to volume conduction make it highly unlikely that 
we would observe different accumulation signals converging to the same 
boundary, as observed in single-unit recordings. 
 
Overall, the CPP displayed all of the characteristics of a decision variable 
outlined above. We observed a gradual build-up which peaks at the response, 
and is influenced by task difficulty, with ‘easy’ decisions leading to steeper build-
up rates. Therefore, we conclude that the CPP is a potential neural substrate of 
the decision variable. 
 
3.3.2. Lateralised Readiness Potential (LRP) 
The LRP is a motor-related ERP component associated with the lateralised part 
of motor preparation and is generated by subtracting ipsilateral motor cortex 
activity from contralateral signals. It has been suggested to correlate with 
decision-related accumulation (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Polanía et al., 2014). 
However, as an effector-specific motor preparation signal, it can only track 
accumulation for decisions associated with particular motor (usually left/right-
hand) responses. The LRP has been tested in the context of difficulty 
manipulations and it has been shown that, similar to the CPP’s, its slope is 
steeper (although negative) with easier decisions (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013). 
 
In the current study, we replicate this finding only in part. We observed a 
significant difference in slope in the stimulus-locked signal, with higher slopes 
for ‘easy’ compared to ‘hard’ decisions. There was no difference in slope in the 
response-locked signal. This finding questions the role of the LRP as a decision 
variable signal, as sequential sampling models predict difficulty-related 
differences in slope throughout the decision-making process. However, it is 
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important to note that difficulty-induced slope differences are typically observed 
in stimulus-locked data and less visible in response-locked data. 
 
Additionally, we tested the effects of difficulty on the amplitude of the LRP. 
Here, the results are similar to the CPP’s. Like for the CPP, although over a 
shorter time period and with more variable t-values, we found differences in 
amplitude in the stimulus-locked data, with ‘easy’ decisions showing a higher 
amplitude than ‘hard’ decisions. There was no difference in amplitude between 
‘easy’ and ‘hard’ conditions in the response-locked signals. Overall, the 
amplitude of the LRP, although somewhat noisier, is qualitatively similar to the 
CPP amplitudes reported above, supporting the similarities between the LRP 
and an accumulation signal. 
 
Overall, the statistical findings as well as the shapes of the LRP waveforms 
appear very similar to those found for the CPP. However, the results are less 
clear, and there was no significant difference in slope between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
trials in the response-locked data. We conclude that, although we do not rule 
out the possibility of the LRP displaying an accumulation-to-bound-like profile, 
the slight ambiguity of the findings as well as its response-dependent nature 
make the LRP a less appropriate neural correlate of the decision variable than 
the CPP. 
 
3.3.3. Event-related Beta Desynchronisation 
Event-related desynchronisation in the beta frequency band is, similarly to the 
LRP, a signal which has been linked to the preparation of hand movements 
(Jasper & Penfield, 1949; Pfurtscheller, 1981; Zaepffel et al., 2013). Although 
studies vary in the methods used to generate the beta waveform, changes in 
beta power have been suggested to display characteristics of decision-related 
accumulation both recorded from electrodes over the contralateral motor cortex 
(O’Connell et al., 2012), and lateralised by subtracting ipsilateral activity from 
the contralateral signal (Donner et al., 2009). However, both signals are, like the 
LRP, dependent on motor responses. Beta power has been tested under 
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different difficulty manipulations previously, but the findings have been mixed. 
De Lange et al. (2013) found that difficulty had an impact on the slope of beta 
power in the response-locked signal, but not in the stimulus-locked signal, while 
Twomey et al. (2016) found no difficulty-induced difference in the slope of beta 
power.  
 
In the current study, we found no evidence for a slope difference between ‘easy’ 
and ‘hard’ conditions in either the stimulus-locked or the response-locked 
spectral power in the beta-band, recorded contralateral to the response. We 
also found no slope difference in the lateralised beta power (but see below). 
Additionally, there was no difference in contralateral beta power amplitude 
between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ conditions in either the stimulus-locked or the 
response-locked data. Again, no amplitude difference was observed in the 
lateralised part of the beta power.  
 
In fact, we did not observe any lateralised desynchronisation in beta power. 
Subtracting ipsilateral activity from contralateral signals removed any change in 
power over time, indicating that desynchronisation recorded over the 
contralateral hemisphere reflects a general motor preparation, rather than an 
effector-specific build-up. The fact that previous research demonstrated 
lateralised beta desynchronisation while we only observed a general effector-
non-specific desynchronisation, may be explained by our comparatively short 
RTs. The typical approach to explore motor-related activity in the beta 
frequency makes use of delayed response paradigms, in which participants 
select a response based on a presented stimulus, and wait for a response cue 
before making the appropriate movement (Kaiser, Birbaumer, & Lutzenberger, 
2001; Kühn et al., 2004; Zaepffel et al., 2013). This gives participants more time 
(often several seconds) to prepare the response, which may be necessary to 
observe a clear lateralisation. Although this lateralisation has been observed in 
perceptual decision-making and reaction time tasks before, these studies tend 
to report much longer RTs than the ones we observed (de Lange et al., 2013; 
Twomey et al., 2016). Therefore, the duration of the motor preparation period in 
our experiment may be too short to observe a lateralisation of beta ERD.  
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Since we did not observe a lateralisation of desynchronisation in the beta 
frequency, we cannot comment on its characteristics as a neural correlate of a 
decision variable. However, it is in the nature of perceptual decisions to be 
quick, and sequential sampling models are designed to apply to fast decisions 
with RTs less than approximately 1000 ms. Therefore, the use of a neural 
correlate of the decision variable which can only be tracked for slow decisions is 
questionable.  
 
Overall, we found no evidence to suggest that changes in spectral power in the 
beta band show characteristics of the decision variable. Contralateral beta 
power showed no modulation in amplitude or slope with varying levels of 
difficulty, and we were unable to generate lateralised beta ERD. Although these 
findings do not rule out the possibility that beta power may display 
characteristics of accumulation in other experimental setups, we observed no 
evidence to support this role in our paradigm. 
 
3.3.4. Exploratory Approach 
Lastly, we employed a more exploratory approach in the form of a non-
parametric cluster permutation test, in order to identify any signals which differ 
between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ decisions and may reflect decision-related 
accumulation. In the first test, we explored temporospatial data and identified a 
cluster between approximately 200 ms and 1000 ms relative to the onset of 
coherent motion, in which both the ‘easy’ and the ‘hard’ waveform displayed a 
gradual build-up over the course of the decision, with ‘easy’ trials building up 
faster and higher than ‘hard’ trials. This cluster contained a large number of 
electrodes, most of which were centred around centroparietal regions. Based on 
the similarity in waveform and topography, it may be speculated that this cluster 
does in fact, at least in part, show the CPP, further supporting its role as a 
potential neural correlate of the decision variable. However, applying this cluster 
to response-locked data showed a significant difference in amplitude between 
‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials, with ‘easy’ trials building up to a higher peak at 
response. Although, as outlined above, we might expect a slight difference 
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between difficulty levels at response time, a large, significant difference is 
somewhat unexpected given that we assume the same baseline-to-threshold 
difference to underlie both types of decisions. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note the similarities between the ERP cluster and the CPP. 
 
In the second analysis, we tested time-frequency data to identify any clusters 
across temporal, spatial, and spectral dimensions. The test revealed one 
relevant cluster in the delta/theta frequency band. Again, power in these 
frequencies (2 to 7 Hz) displayed a gradual build-up over the course of the 
decision, which was steeper and higher for ‘easy’ compared to ‘hard’ decisions. 
This difference was seen between approximately 200 and 650 ms, and across a 
range of mainly parietal and frontal electrodes. This is particularly interesting as 
this frequency range has been associated with accumulation previously (van 
Vugt et al., 2012; Wyart et al., 2012). In particular, van Vugt et al. (2012) found 
theta power (4 to 9 Hz) to be correlated with evidence accumulation. However, 
applying the cluster to response-locked TFR data showed significantly higher 
amplitudes in ‘easy’ than ‘hard’ trials. As in the ERP cluster, this difference 
questions the validity of the signal as a potential neural correlate of the decision 
variable. Although it does not rule out the possibility that these oscillations do in 
fact reflect evidence accumulation, it is clear that more research is needed in 
order to comment on their role as a neural correlate of decision-making. 
 
3.3.5. Summary 
Overall, we tested a number of potentially decision-related signals by comparing 
their profiles for easy and hard decisions. Since sequential sampling models 
make clear predictions about accumulation to account for behavioural 
differences due to task difficulty, we expected a neural correlate of the decision 
variable to display a higher build-up rate in easy compared to hard decisions. 
We found no evidence for this in event-related beta desynchronisation. The 
LRP displayed mixed results with slope differences visible in the stimulus-
locked, but not in the response-locked data, although it seems to mirror the 
overall shape of the CPP.  
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However, both beta ERD and LRP are motor-related signals, which, although 
roughly equivalent to more established decision-related signals in monkeys’ 
oculomotor firing rates, is arguably a disadvantage as they can only be 
observed when a decision is associated with a specific hand movement. The 
CPP on the other hand, has been shown to be independent of the decision-
response mapping (O’Connell et al., 2012). Here, we were able to further 
support the role of the CPP as a neural correlate of accumulation as it showed 
the expected differences in slope and amplitude, with easy decisions leading to 
steeper accumulation. Exploratory analyses of the ERP data added further 
support to centroparietal signals. Additionally, exploratory tests of the TFR data 
identified power in delta/theta bands as a potentially decision-related signal. 
However, more research is needed to comment on its role in accumulation. 
 
In summary, we were not able to provide any conclusive evidence for either 
LRP or beta ERD to correlate with decision-related accumulation, and the 
evidence for motor-related signals remains mixed. However, we showed that 
the CPP displays the expected characteristics of the decision variable, with 
decision difficulty influencing the slope of the signal, supporting the notion that 
the CPP is a neural substrate of decision-making.  
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4. Testing the CPP as a Decision Variable Signal 
by Manipulating Evidence Dynamics and 
Biases 
 
Our ability to make perceptual decisions and quickly respond to sensory stimuli 
is a crucial aspect of human cognition, and a vast body of literature has been 
dedicated to the question of how we make these decisions. Although many 
questions are yet to be answered, there is a consensus that the way we make 
perceptual decisions can be described by sequential sampling models (Brown & 
Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001). 
Sequential sampling models are a group of computational models which 
assume that, to make a decision, we accumulate sensory evidence over time, 
until a set decision boundary is reached, at which point we initiate the 
corresponding motor response.  
 
There are several different models within this framework, which differ in a 
number of aspects, such as the number of accumulators, or the assumption of 
inhibition and leakage (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001), 
but all sequential sampling models share the fundamental assumption of 
accumulation-to-bound decision-making. Although sequential sampling models 
were developed to explain behavioural data, i.e. reaction time (RT) and 
accuracy data, and have done so successfully in a large variety of paradigms 
(Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Ratcliff, 2002; Ratcliff, Thapar, 
College, & Mckoon, 1992), more recently, several neural signals have been 
suggested to reflect the accumulation process described by these models.  
 
Research in non-human primates has identified firing rates of neurons in the 
lateral intraparietal area (LIP), frontal eye field (FEF), and superior colliculus 
(SC) as potential neural substrates of a decision variable, i.e. an accumulation-
to-bound profile as suggested by sequential sampling models (Gold & Shadlen, 
2000, 2003; Horwitz et al., 2004; Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Roitman & Shadlen, 
2002; Shadlen & Newsome, 1996, 2001; Thompson et al., 1997). Firing rates in 
neurons in these areas have been shown to undergo ramp-like changes over 
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the course of the decision, the slope of which depends on the strength of 
sensory evidence, and to peak at the time of response. 
 
While neurophysiological findings in non-human primates have been advancing 
quickly, the identification of a neural substrate of the decision variable in the 
human brain has been more difficult, primarily due to restrictions of the 
neuroimaging techniques available. A number of studies have used functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in order to shed light on human decision-
making (Heekeren et al., 2004; Kayser et al., 2010; Mulder et al., 2014; Tosoni 
et al., 2008). This technique has the advantage of a high spatial resolution in 
combination with system-level perspective, allowing it to identify whole 
networks. However, while fMRI designs can successfully identify areas involved 
in the decision-making process, the technique’s low temporal resolution does 
not lend itself to directly tracking the fast and dynamic build-up associated with 
a decision variable.  
 
Electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) on the 
other hand, have a very high temporal resolution and are therefore favourable in 
the identification of a neural substrate of the decision variable in the human 
brain. In fact, there are a number of M/EEG studies which have explored 
electrical brain activity during perceptual decision-making and a variety of 
different signals have been suggested as potentially decision-related, ranging 
from event-related potential (ERP) components (Philiastides et al., 2006; 
Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Ratcliff et al., 2009) to changes in theta band power 
(van Vugt et al., 2012), and motor-related lateralised desynchronisation in beta 
power (Donner et al., 2009; Siegel et al., 2011). 
 
A particularly promising approach was introduced by O’Connell et al. (2012). In 
a series of experiments, they identified the centroparietal positivity (CPP) as an 
ERP component that displays an accumulation-to-bound profile and described it 
as a decision variable signal. It was demonstrated that the CPP shows all 
properties of a decision variable that have previously been established in single-
cell recordings in monkeys. It displays a build-up over the course of the 
decision, reflecting a cumulative function of sensory evidence. Further, this 
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waveform builds up at a rate which varies with the quality of the sensory 
evidence, and its crossing of a stereotyped level was shown to predict reaction 
time (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 2012). 
 
Importantly, it was shown that the CPP is independent of sensory and motor 
signals. In a series of experiments, a rapidly flickering, continuous target 
detection task with a gradual target onset was used, allowing the authors to 
track steady-state visual evoked responses (SSVEPs) while avoiding visual 
evoked potentials at the onset of the stimulus, leading to clear view on decision-
related signals. By adjusting the task in these ways, O’Connell et al. (2012) 
were able to track three different signals during the decision-making process: 
the SSVEPs as a readout of sensory input, the CPP as a decision variable, and 
contralateral beta power as a motor signal. Importantly, they were able to fully 
dissociate these signals, showing that only the CPP is a valid decision-making 
signal, and demonstrating that it is independent of decision-unrelated sensory 
input or motor responses. In fact, in a later study which directly compared the 
CPP with motor-related beta power, it was shown that while both signals build 
up over the course of the decision, the CPP drops back to baseline levels after 
a given boundary is reached, while beta activity persisted until a delayed 
response. Importantly, the study also demonstrated that without foreknowledge 
of the stimulus-effector mapping, beta activity is eliminated while the CPP 
remains unchanged, further supporting the role of the CPP as an abstract 
decision signal, dissociated from response specific signals (Twomey et al., 
2016). Interestingly, the CPP was also observed in an auditory decision-making 
task, leading the authors to suggest that it is a supramodal decision variable 
signal (O’Connell et al., 2012). 
 
However, studies validating the CPP’s role as a decision variable remain 
scarce. In particular, its relation to sequential sampling models is not well-
established. Although the CPP has undergone several statistical tests to 
analyse whether it shows the conceptual characteristics of a decision variable, 
few attempts have been made to directly compare its profile to model 
predictions. Kelly and O’Connell (2013) used a sequential sampling model 
labelled the Diffusion model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) to account for 
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behavioural decision-making data, and found that, in an experiment with 
different levels of difficulty, RT data was accounted for by a model with a 
varying drift rate parameter. This means that just like the CPP, which shows an 
increased slope with decreased task difficulty, the model fits also indicate a 
varying slope (i.e. varying drift rate) across difficulty conditions. However, no 
further parallels between the model and the EEG data were drawn. Twomey et 
al. (2015) fitted the same model, a Diffusion model with varying drift rates for 
varying difficulty levels, to a separate data set, but added a further step to their 
analysis to allow for a comparison between the model and the CPP. After fitting 
the Diffusion model, Twomey and colleagues used the resulting parameters to 
simulate the mean accumulation, as predicted by the model. They found that 
the simulated accumulation profile and the CPP shared key characteristics, as 
in both profiles, the slope varied with task difficulty, and a stereotyped level was 
reached before the response. This finding is important as it goes beyond 
comparing a potential neural substrate of decision-making against a set of 
conceptual characteristics and instead allows for a direct comparison of the 
entire accumulation profile. This is particularly crucial as with increasing 
complexity of sequential sampling models (e.g. by introducing inhibition or 
leakage; Usher & McClelland, 2001), it becomes virtually impossible to make 
conceptual predictions about how accumulation profiles may change as a 
function of different manipulations.  
 
The current study therefore set out to further explore the CPP in the light of 
sequential sampling models. As outlined above, to date, the CPP has only been 
tested in the context of a limited number of manipulations, with most studies 
focusing on task difficulty (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Twomey et al., 2015), and 
only the manipulation of decision difficulty has been compared to simulations 
based on sequential sampling model fits. We therefore aimed to build on 
Twomey et al.'s (2015) approach to compare the CPP profile to model 
predictions under a variety of manipulations affecting the accumulation profile.  
 
To this end, we used two sets of manipulations which affect decision-making, 
namely decision biases, which, to our knowledge, have not been previously 
tested using the CPP, and non-stationary evidence, and fitted a sequential 
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sampling model to the resulting RT data. We then used the estimated 
parameter values to simulate the accumulation profiles as predicted by the 
model and compared them to the CPP, which was recorded during the decision-
making process. To do so, we chose an accumulator model to fit the 
behavioural data (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Heathcote & Love, 2012). There 
are two main groups of sequential sampling models, namely accumulator 
models with an absolute stopping rule and random walk models with a relative 
stopping rule (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). Random walk models assume that all 
evidence within a binary choice is integrated in a single accumulator. This 
accumulator has a decision boundary to either side of the starting point, each 
associated with a given response alternative, and the accumulation profile has a 
positive or negative mean slope (drift rate), depending on which alternative is 
receiving more evidence. Although random walk models have been shown to 
provide good fits to behavioural data in a number of paradigms (Ratcliff et al., 
2004; Ratcliff, Perea, Colangelo, & Buchanan, 2004; Thapar, Ratcliff, & 
McKoon, 2003), they have also received criticism as they are challenging to 
generalise to choices with more than two alternatives, and, importantly, are 
motivated more by mathematical optimality than neurobiological plausibility 
(Ratcliff et al., 2016; Usher & McClelland, 2001). Accumulator models, on the 
other hand, assume that evidence for each response alternative is integrated in 
separate accumulators, which race to reach a common threshold. It is 
conceivable that processes similar to these occur in the brain, with each 
accumulator being associated with a neural population, integrating information 
fed forward by sensory areas.  
 
Since we aim to compare model predictions to neural signals, we chose an 
accumulator model as a neurophysiologically plausible way to model our data. 
Specifically, we chose a race model, which, on one hand, requires a minimal 
number of assumptions (as compared to models which, for example, assume 
leakage over time; Usher & McClelland, 2001), while on the other hand, 
remaining biologically plausible (as compared to simplified models which, for 
example, assume integration without noise; Brown & Heathcote, 2008). Given 
the nature of EEG, which records the sum of all underlying electrical activity 
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from the scalp, we assume that the CPP is best predicted by the summed 
activity of all accumulators in a race model10. 
 
We fitted this model to behavioural data from two experiments and predicted the 
associated accumulation profile using the estimated parameters. The predicted 
accumulation was then used to evaluate the associated CPP waveform. 
This approach of directly comparing the CPP with the model prediction drawn 
from the behavioural decision-making data allowed us to evaluate the role of the 
CPP as a neural correlate of the decision variable. 
 
 
4.1. Experiment 1: Non-stationary Evidence 
 
The first experiment set out to explore the effects of non-stationary evidence on 
the CPP. Most research in the field of perceptual decision-making has focused 
on binary choices with stationary evidence, where a choice is based on fixed 
information which remains virtually unchanged in quality and intensity 
throughout the decision-making process (Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Kelly & 
O’Connell, 2013; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff et al., 2010). While these 
comparatively simple decisions are associated with a range of practical 
advantages and have led to numerous insights into decision-making, decisions 
we make every day typically occur in a dynamic environment, in which sensory 
evidence is continuously changing. Recently, studies have drawn attention to 
the fact that a comprehensive model of decision-making has to be able to 
account for decisions with non-stationary evidence. 
 
Researchers have hence started to use decisions in response to non-stationary 
evidence in order to distinguish between different sequential sampling models 
                                               
10 In the course of our research, we explored various models with a view to a model 
comparison. However, this work is ongoing. We therefore chose the model we deemed most 
suitable, i.e. the race model, as a representative of sequential sampling models overall and will 
discuss our findings in the context of this framework, rather than a specific model (but see 
section 4.3). 
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(Nunes & Gurney, 2016; Tsetsos et al., 2011; Zhou, Wong-Lin, & Philip, 2009), 
which often offer indistinguishable accounts of data from traditional decision-
making paradigms (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; 
Teodorescu & Usher, 2013). For example, Tsetsos et al. (2011) used a 
paradigm in which the evidence for a given alternative changed dynamically 
throughout a trial to compare accumulator (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Usher & 
McClelland, 2001) and random-walk models (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), 
supporting the accumulator model as a suitable account of the data. 
 
Similarly, Holmes, Trueblood, and Heathcote (2016) used dynamically changing 
evidence to explore different models. Participants were asked to discriminate 
between left and right motion in a random dot motion task, in which, halfway 
through the decision-making process, the motion direction switched. Findings 
showed that switch effects were only seen in trials with long RTs, suggesting 
that participants react to the switch in motion, but do so with a delay. In order to 
explore the underlying mechanisms of these behavioural findings, a number of 
variations of a simplified accumulator model labelled the linear ballistic 
accumulator (LBA) model, incorporating different assumptions regarding the 
implications of the switch in evidence, were compared. It was found that a 
version of the LBA, labelled ‘piecewise LBA’, provided the best account of the 
data. It was shown that the difference in accumulation rates between two 
accumulators (one for each alternative) was larger after the motion switch than 
before, indicating that the discrimination between motion directions improved 
after the switch. This was a surprising finding, as the switch in evidence led to 
motion in the opposite direction but equal in magnitude. The model also 
confirmed the presence of a delay between the switch in evidence and its 
integration, and found no evidence for increased response caution. 
 
Dynamically changing evidence also has implications for any neural signals 
which claim to reflect the accumulation of evidence towards a threshold. For a 
signal to be validated as a decision variable signal, a modification of sensory 
evidence must not only lead to a change in the signal’s profile to show that the 
signal is decision-related, but also continue to affect the signal for a prolonged 
period of time, to demonstrate that the signal is not a mere reflection of sensory 
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encoding. To date, there is little research to test the range of neural signals 
which have been suggested to reflect the decision variable under these 
conditions.  
 
An exception is the firing rate of LIP neurons in non-human primates. Huk and 
Shadlen (2005) recorded single-cell activity while monkeys performed a 
saccadic random dot motion task. In two thirds of the trials, 100 ms pulses of 
motion in either the same or the opposite direction of the overall trial motion 
were added. It was demonstrated that these added motion pulses had 
persistent effects not only on the behavioural choices, but also on LIP activity, 
which increased/decreased with positive/negative motion pulses and remained 
altered for several hundreds of milliseconds. The authors concluded that LIP 
neuronal firing rates represent the temporal integration of motion evidence. 
 
There is also some evidence to suggest that dynamic evidence influences the 
profile of neural correlates of decision-making in the human EEG, such as 
motor-related beta band power and the CPP (O’Connell et al., 2012). In a 
detection task, participants were presented with stimuli which gradually 
decreased in contrast and instructed to respond when the fading was perceived. 
When this gradual decrease was interrupted by a 450 ms increase towards the 
baseline, before continuing the reduction of contrast, participants demonstrated 
longer RTs, but no difference in accuracy (note that a free response task with 
no pressure to respond under uncertainty was used). Importantly, the CPP 
(and, to a lesser extent, beta power) was shown to be sensitive to this 
manipulation, as following the perturbation, the stereotypical build-up was 
interrupted and plateaued for several hundreds of milliseconds before 
continuing, further supporting its role as a decision variable.  
 
However, the data were not fitted using a sequential sampling model and no 
comparisons were made between potential accumulation profile simulations and 
the recorded CPP waveform. Although it is conceptually reasonable to assume 
that sequential sampling models would predict a dip in accumulation, similar to 
the one observed in the CPP, the complexity of these models makes it difficult 
to predict the timescale and shape of this perturbation. We therefore argue that 
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it is necessary to compare the CPP profile directly to simulations of sequential 
sampling in order to evaluate its role as a neural substrate of decision-making. 
 
To this end, we presented participants with a random dot motion task which 
required them to discriminate between motion to the left and right, while 
recording their EEG. Since difficulty is a more established manipulation (see 
Chapter 3), the task involved an ‘easy’ and a ‘hard’ condition. In one third of the 
trials, the motion remained unchanged throughout the trial (‘continuous’ 
condition), while in another third of the trials, the motion was interrupted by 
motion in the opposite direction for 200 ms before continuing in the original 
direction (‘reverse’ condition). Additionally, we added a third condition in which 
the motion in a given direction was interrupted by random motion without any 
directional evidence (‘stop’ condition). We hypothesised that these different 
perturbations would lead to different CPP waveforms, and that using sequential 
sampling models to simulate accumulation profiles would allow us to compare 
the signal patterns and thereby evaluate the role of the CPP as a decision-
variable signal. Specifically, we expected that a ‘stop’ in evidence would also 
lead to a stop in the build-up of the accumulation profile, and thereby a plateau 
in any neural signal which reflects the decision variable, which is clearly 
distinguishable from accumulation in ‘continuous’ trials. Although the prediction 
regarding the impact of a reversal of evidence on the accumulation profile is 
less clear, we hypothesised that it would differ from the profile observed in the 
‘stop’ condition. Since the true accumulation profiles of each condition are 
difficult to predict conceptually, we use a race model to directly compare 
modelled accumulation profiles with observed EEG patterns in order to evaluate 
the potential role of the CPP as a neural correlate of the decision variable. 
 
4.1.1. Methods  
4.1.1.1. Participants 
For this study, a total of 21 participants (eight males) with a mean age of 27.33 
(SD = 8.66) were recruited. To ensure a reasonable and distinguishable task 
performance at two different difficulty levels, each participant completed a 
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staircase procedure to establish the appropriate level of difficulty, i.e. level of 
coherence, for ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials (see section 4.1.1.2). In line with criteria 
defined prior to data collection, participants were excluded from the experiment 
if the calibrated level of coherence exceeded 98% for the ‘easy’ condition. 
Based on this criterion, one participant did not continue to the main experiment, 
leading to a sample of 20 participants (seven males) with a mean age of 27.55 
(SD = 8.83). Each remaining participant took part in a single two-hour session. 
Participants were recruited using poster advertisements and word of mouth. 
Two of the participants were researchers in the current study. All other 
participants were paid £8 per hour. The experiment was approved by the City, 
University of London Psychology Department Ethics Committee. 
 
4.1.1.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants were asked to complete a random dot motion task. The task was 
written in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), making use of Psychtoolbox 
functions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). In this task, an array 
of white dots was presented on a black screen. A proportion of dots moved 
coherently either to the left or to the right, while the rest of the dots moved in 
random directions. Participants were instructed to indicate the perceived motion 
direction by pressing a button in their right/left hand for movement to the 
right/left. For this, digital response buttons interfaced via a 16 bit A/D card 
(National Instruments X-series PCIe-6323, sample rate 100,000 Hz) were held 
between the thumb and index finger of each hand. Participants were seated 100 
cm away from a cathode ray tube screen (size: 41 x 30 cm), operating at a 
refresh rate of 85 Hz and a resolution of 1240 x 786. A total of 300 dots, 0.04 x 
0.04 degrees visual angle (dva) in size, were presented within a 5 dva circular 
aperture. All dot movement occurred at a speed of 3.3 dva per second. The 
proportion of dots determining the motion direction moved either to the left or to 
the right, depending on the trial, while the rest of the dots moved in a direction 
which was randomly selected for each dot and each frame. The position of all 
dots was randomised every five frames. Each trial began with a central fixation 
cross (size: 0.33 x 0.33 dva) for 500 ms (plus a jitter of up to 1000 ms, drawn 
from a uniform distribution), followed by a period of random motion (1000 ms 
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plus a jitter of up to 1500 ms, drawn from a gamma distribution with shape 
parameter 1 and scaling parameter 15011). Since the onset of moving dots on 
the screen is likely to produce a visual evoked potential which would interfere 
with the recording of the CPP, this period of random motion was introduced to 
allow for the evoked potential to occur before the onset of the decision-making 
process. The random motion was followed by the onset of coherent motion 
(left/right) which continued for up to 2000 ms or until the response (see Figure 
4.1). 
 
Participants completed a minimum of 100 practice trials at high levels of 
coherence (i.e. > 80% of dots moving in one direction) to familiarise themselves 
with the task. In order to calibrate suitable levels of difficulty for ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
trials for each participant individually, a further 100 trials were completed in 
which the QUEST (Watson & Pelli, 1983) staircase procedure, implemented in 
Psychtoolbox, estimated the coherence level at which each participant 
responded correctly in 80% of trials. This coherence level was then used for the 
‘hard’ condition. The ‘easy’ coherence level was set as 150% of the ‘hard’ 
coherence level. Participants had 1300 ms to respond, and no feedback was 
provided during staircase trials. Overall, the appropriate difficulty levels 
estimated for the remaining participants resulted in a mean of 27.70% (SD = 
14.74) coherence for ‘hard’, and 40.15% (SD = 22.15) for ‘easy’ trials.  
 
After the staircase procedure, participants were asked to complete a further 100 
practice trials which included all conditions of the main experiment, including the 
different difficulties and evidence interruptions (see below). During this training, 
participants were given feedback in the form of their mean accuracy and RT 
every 10 trials. Participants were instructed to aim for a mean accuracy of at 
least 80% and a mean RT of less than 1000 ms. 
 
In the main experiment, in addition to the manipulation of difficulty, we also 
manipulated the continuity of the evidence by introducing three motion 
                                               
11 A gamma distributed fore period with a shape parameter of 1 was chosen as it is associated 
with a uniform hazard function (Luce, 1986). 
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conditions (see Figure 4.1). One third of the trials, like the practice and staircase 
trials, were ‘continuous’ trials, i.e. the coherent motion began after a period of 
random motion and remained throughout the trial. In the ‘stop’ condition, the 
coherent motion was interrupted 200 ms after motion onset and replaced by a 
200 ms period of random motion, before being reinstated. Similarly, in the 
‘reverse’ condition, the coherent motion was interrupted for the same time, but 
replaced by coherent motion in the opposite direction (see Figure 4.1). Informal 
questioning of participants indicated that these interruptions were not perceived 
consciously. During the main task, the interruption condition (‘continuous’, 
‘stop’, or ‘reverse’), motion direction (left or right) and coherence level (‘easy’ or 
‘hard’) varied randomly from trial to trial. Each participant completed 16 blocks 
of 60 trials. After each block, participants were given feedback in the form of 
their mean accuracy and RT. No feedback was provided for individual trials. 
 
141 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Experiment 1 random dot motion task trial procedure: each trial began with a period of random 
motion, followed by coherent motion (here: direction: right; coherence: 70%, i.e. 70% of dots move to the 
right, while 30% of the dots move in random directions). a) In the ‘continuous’ condition, the motion 
continued unchanged; b) in the ‘stop’ condition, the coherent motion was interrupted after 200 ms, and 
replaced with random motion (coherence: 0%) for a further 200 ms, before continuing in the original 
direction; c) in the ‘reverse’ condition, the coherent motion was interrupted after 200 ms and replaced by 
motion of equal strength in the opposite direction (here: direction: left; coherence: 70%) for a further 200 
ms, before continuing in the original direction. Note that the size and number of dots have been adjusted 
for illustration. 
 
4.1.1.3. EEG Recording and Pre-processing 
During the task, we recorded participants’ EEG using 64 active electrodes, 
placed equidistantly on the scalp (EasyCap, M10 Montage) and referenced to 
the right mastoid. Data were recorded through a BrainAmp amplifier 
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(BrainProducts) and band-pass filtered from 0.016 to 1000 Hz (sampling rate: 
1000 Hz).  
 
The data were pre-processed in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), using 
custom scripts and implementing functions from the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme 
& Makeig, 2004). Data were re-referenced to the average reference and band-
pass filtered from 0.1 (low cut-off) to 45 Hz (high cut-off), using a Hamming 
windowed finite impulse response filter. We then visually inspected the data to 
remove noisy channels and reject large artifacts, before applying independent 
component analysis to correct for eye blinks. Afterwards, the data was visually 
inspected a second time in order to manually remove any remaining noise. 
Lastly, we used spherical spline interpolation to reconstruct any channels that 
were previously removed. In line with the procedures used in previous CPP 
studies (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 2012), the data were 
converted to current source density (CSD) estimates to increase spatial 
selectivity. The CSD transformation was applied using the CSD toolbox, which 
uses a spherical spline algorithm, with the spline interpolation constant m set to 
its default value (m = 4; Kayser & Tenke, 2006). 
 
4.1.1.3.1. ERP Analysis 
For the ERP analysis, we extracted both stimulus-locked (-200 to 2000 ms, 
relative to motion onset) and response-locked (-1000 to 100 ms, relative to the 
button press) epochs. All epochs were baseline corrected to the average over a 
200 ms period preceding the motion onset. Since we assumed no difference in 
decision-making depending on the direction of motion, we collapsed over ‘left’ 
and ‘right’ decisions. However, simply averaging over right/left-hand responses 
would remove any visible lateralisation of activity. Therefore, activity recorded in 
trials in which a right-hand response was given was mirrored along the midline, 
so that all contralateral activity was projected onto the right hemisphere (i.e. 
activity recorded in electrodes on the left hemisphere is now associated with 
electrodes on the right hemisphere). Although this step was not strictly 
necessary to analyse the CPP, which is recorded from the midline, this 
mirroring allows for a better visualisation of activation across the scalp.  
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The appropriate electrode to generate the CPP waveform was chosen 
individually, by visually inspecting each participant’s averaged ERP topography 
to identify the centroparietal region of maximum amplitude (chosen electrodes: 
1, 5, or 14, roughly equivalent to electrodes Cz, CPz, and Pz in the 10-20 
system; see Figure 4.5). The activity in the selected electrodes was averaged 
for each condition and for stimulus and response-locked signals separately. 
Lastly, error trials were removed from the ERPs. 
 
4.1.1.4. Statistical Analysis 
In order to test the effects of the difficulty and interruption manipulations on the 
ERP, we explored both the slopes and the amplitudes of the waveforms. First, 
we compared the slopes between the different conditions by fitting a straight 
line to the CPP for each participant and each condition and measuring its slope. 
The resulting slopes were then compared in an ‘Interruption’ (‘continuous’, 
‘stop’, ‘reverse’) x ‘Difficulty’ (‘easy’, ‘hard’) repeated-measures ANOVA.  
 
We compared slopes during two different time intervals in the stimulus-locked 
data: an early interval between 100 and 300 ms and a late interval between 300 
and 500 ms relative to the onset of coherent motion. Given the interruption 
interval of 200 to 400 ms and the assumption of a small lag between stimulus 
presentation and accumulation, we assume that the early interval reflects 
accumulation mainly before the interruption and the late interval reflects 
accumulation mainly during the interruption. In the response-locked data, it is 
not possible to make the distinction between interruption intervals, so we only 
explored one time interval and followed Kelly and O’Connell's (2013) 
recommendation of a -250 ms to -100 ms interval. 
 
Additionally, we analysed the impact of difficulty and interruption on the 
amplitude of the waveform. Between 0 and 1000 ms in the stimulus-locked 
data, and between -1000 to 0 ms in the response-locked data, we compared 
conditions using an ‘Interruption’ (‘continuous’, ‘stop’, ‘reverse’) x ‘Difficulty’ 
(‘easy’, ‘hard’) ANOVA at each time point. The results were controlled for 
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multiple comparisons using the false discovery rate (FDR) approach (Benjamini 
& Hochberg, 1995)12. 
 
4.1.1.5. Model Fit 
To model the behavioural data, we used a race model which is, at least 
conceptually, one of the simplest sequential sampling models (Brown & 
Heathcote, 2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001; see Figure 4.2). In this model, 
evidence for each response alternative is integrated in an independent 
accumulator. In a binary choice like the one in our experiment, evidence is 
integrated in two accumulators, which race towards the decision threshold. The 
evidence strength at which accumulation starts is drawn from a uniform 
distribution between 0 and Sz (to represent bias). At each point in time, a given 
accumulator m accumulates the input evidence Im supporting alternative ‘M’, as 
well as noise N, drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation σ, so that the quantity accumulated at each time point is described by  
  𝑑𝑥𝑚 =  𝐼𝑚 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)  (4.1.) 
To remain physiologically plausible, this accumulation process is restricted to 
positive values at each time step: 
  𝑥𝑚(𝑡 + 1) = max (0, 𝑥𝑚(𝑡) + 𝑑𝑥𝑚)  (4.2.) 
 
Once either of the accumulators reaches the threshold A, the decision is made 
and the corresponding response is initiated. The time taken to reach the 
threshold, in addition to a non-decision time which represents any time taken for 
sensory and motor processes before and after the accumulation process 
respectively, defines the modelled RT. The non-decision time is drawn from a 
uniform distribution with width STer, centred on Ter.  
 
This results in a standard race model for binary choices with seven parameters: 
the starting point distribution parameter Sz, mean drift rates for the correct and 
                                               
12 In this procedure, the uncorrected p-values are sorted from lowest to highest (pi refers to the 
ith lowest value out of m total p-values). The largest i for which 𝑝𝑖 < (
𝑖
𝑚
) ∝ is identified and all p-
values associated with is smaller or equal to the identified i are considered significant. 
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incorrect accumulators, vcorrect and vincorrect, the threshold A, the non-decision 
time Ter and its distribution STer, and the diffusion constant σ2. However, one 
parameter is chosen as a scaling parameter and fixed to an arbitrary value (i.e. 
changing its value will lead to a change in the value of all parameters but not in 
their relation to each other and therefore will not affect the model fits) leading to 
a standard model with only six free parameters. 
  
Figure 4.2: Race model: in a binary choice, there are two accumulators, each associated with one 
response alternative (correct/incorrect). In each accumulator, accumulation traces begin at a starting point 
drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and Sz and race towards the threshold A. The accumulation 
profile of each accumulator is defined by the associated drift rate v and added noise, defined by the 
diffusion constant σ2. The time taken for the first accumulator to reach the threshold, in addition to a non-
decision time Ter, defines the response time. 
 
To apply this model to the current experiment, we tested two models, both of 
which assume that with dynamically changing evidence, only drift rates change 
during the interruption interval (200 to 400 ms relative to the decision onset; see 
Figure 4.3). In both models, the response threshold A was chosen as the 
scaling parameter and fixed to 1. 
 
Model 1 consisted of a total of eight parameters and assumed that the given 
drift rates vcorrect and vincorrect begin to accumulate and continue throughout the 
trial in ‘continuous’ trials. In ‘stop’ trials, the evidence becomes random during 
the interruption interval and we assume that only noise is accumulated during 
this period, (i.e. v-stopcorrect = v-stopincorrect = vincorrect), before returning to the 
starting drift rates (vcorrect and vincorrect). In the ‘reverse’ condition, the evidence 
changes direction during the interruption interval, but remains at its original 
strength, which may lead to a reversal of drift rates, i.e. v-reversecorrect = vincorrect, 
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v-reverseincorrect = vcorrect, before returning to the starting drift rates (vcorrect and 
vincorrect). This describes a model with only four drift rates (vcorrect and vincorrect for 
both easy and hard decisions), as well as the parameters Sz, Ter, STer, and σ2 
which were fixed between conditions (see Table 4.1). 
 
Model 2 did not assume a symmetrical change in drift rates with changing 
evidence as described above (see Figure 4.3). Instead, we estimated a new set 
of drift rates for the ‘stop’ and ‘reverse’ intervals, leading to a total of 12 drift 
rates (for each difficulty condition: v-continuouscorrect, v-continuousincorrect, v- 
stopcorrect, v-stopincorrect, v-reversecorrect, v-reverseincorrect). All other parameters 
(Sz, Ter, STer, σ2) were fixed between conditions, resulting in a model with a total 
of 16 free parameters (see Table 4.1). 
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Figure 4.3: Race model applied to interruption and difficulty conditions: visualisation of the concepts used 
in Model 2 (Model 1 only differs in the slopes during the interruption periods). a) in the ‘continuous’ 
conditions, a single drift rate per accumulator is continuous throughout the trial; b) in the ‘stop’ condition, 
new drift rates are estimated for the interruption period, which will arguably lead to lower drift rates in the 
correct accumulator; c) in the ‘reverse’ condition, like in the ‘stop’ condition, new drift rates are estimated 
for the duration of the interruption, arguably leading to a decrease in the correct and an increase in the 
incorrect drift rate; d) the manipulation of difficulty is assumed to affect the slope of the accumulation 
throughout the trial, with ‘easy’ trials (solid lines) associated with higher drift rates than ‘hard’ ones (dashed 
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lines). The effects of difficulty, although displayed separately here, affect all interruption conditions. Note 
that, since the drift rates during the interruption periods in both ‘stop’ (b) and ‘reverse’ (c) conditions are 
free to vary, their slopes are set to arbitrary values for illustration only and should not be directly compared 
based on this figure. 
In line with approaches employed in previous studies (Dmochowski & Norcia, 
2015; Twomey et al., 2015), individual RTs were pooled across participants to 
determine the best-fitting model parameters at the group level to fit each model 
to our data. Trials with RTs faster than 180 ms or slower than 2000 ms (less 
than 3%) were discarded. Modelled RTs were simulated based on the 
equations described above and compared to RT data using Quantile Maximum 
Probability Estimation (Heathcote et al., 2002). Parameter values were adjusted 
using a differential evolution algorithm implemented in Matlab (The Mathworks, 
Natick, U.S.A.; Price et al., 2005). 
We compared the goodness of fit of the two models by calculating the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) as well as the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1977). These measures take into account the likelihood 
of the model but also penalise a model for the number of parameters used in 
order to resolve the problem of overfitting. The model which best fitted the data 
according to these measures was then used to generate predictions of the 
accumulation profile. 
 
4.1.1.6. Model Prediction 
Since EEG recordings reflect the summation of neural activity in a given area, 
we assumed that, if the CPP is a neural correlate of the decision variable, it 
represents the sum of all evidence accumulation. Although a binary choice may 
recruit separate neural populations to accumulate evidence, these neural 
populations would likely be in close proximity. An ERP component recorded at 
the scalp over these neural populations measures the summation of electrical 
activity and therefore the sum of both accumulation processes. In order to 
compare the model prediction to the CPP, we therefore considered the sum of 
the correct and incorrect accumulation profiles of correct choices. 
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Based on the model equations described above, a total of 20,000 accumulation 
paths (in 10 ms time steps) were computed for each condition. To account for 
sensory processes, accumulation started after a sensory delay (fixed to 50% of 
Ter). Evidence was then accumulated until the response threshold and 
continued to be accumulated for a short period after the boundary was reached 
to account for motor processes (50% of Ter; note that we assume that 
accumulation continues until the offset of the stimulus, i.e. during the time to 
reach the threshold plus the time taken to make the motor response and stop 
the stimulus).  
 
To match with EEG processing, the ‘sum of accumulations’ signal was baseline 
corrected by subtracting the first data point value from the whole trial. Finally, 
we averaged accumulation signals in each condition, once locked to the 
estimated onset of the decision process (stimulus-locked) and once locked to 
the response (response-locked). Since the stimulus-locked signal includes 
varying time spans of post-decision stages, and we can only speculate about 
the behaviour of the accumulator after the response, we removed simulated 
trials from averaging after the response (i.e. after the crossing of the threshold 
plus 50% Ter). 
 
To compare the EEG signal with these model predictions, we recomputed the 
CPP as an average over single-trial data pooled across participants, rather than 
a grand average. Additionally, to match the stimulus-locked CPP with the 
stimulus-locked model predictions, we removed trials from the average once 
they reached the associated RT. The resulting averages were then low-pass 
filtered with a cut-off of 5 Hz for better visualisation, and downsampled to match 
the 10 ms time steps used in the model predictions. 
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4.1.2. Results 
4.1.2.1. Behavioural Results 
Behavioural data were collapsed over ‘left’ and ‘right’ trials. All trials with very 
short (< 180 ms) or very long (>= 2000 ms) RTs were excluded from the 
analysis (2.99% of trials). The remaining data are displayed in Figure 4.4.  
 
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA to explore the effects of the 
factors ‘Interruption’ (‘continuous’, ‘stop’, ‘reverse’) and ‘Difficulty’ (‘easy’, ‘hard’) 
on correct RTs. The results showed a significant main effect of ‘Difficulty’, F(1, 
19) = 134.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .88, with ‘easy’ trials (M = 769 ms) associated with 
shorter RTs than ‘hard’ trials (M = 863 ms). For the main effect of ‘Interruption’, 
Mauchley’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, 
χ2(2) = 18.77, p < .001. We therefore corrected the degrees of freedom using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .61). There was a significant 
main effect of ‘Interruption’, F(1.21, 23.07) = 63.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .77. Since 
this factor has three levels, we used Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) 
for pairwise comparisons, which revealed that all three levels of ‘Interruption’ 
were significantly different from each other with 'continuous' trials (M = 735 ms) 
leading to shorter RTs than 'stop' (p = .001) and 'reverse' (p < .001) trials (M = 
870 ms), and 'stop' trials (M = 843 ms) showing shorter RTs than 'reverse' trials 
(p = .005). There was no significant interaction effect, F(2, 38) = 2.00, p = .15, 
ηp2 = .10. 
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Figure 4.4: Behavioural results: reaction time (left) and accuracy (right) averages for all conditions. Error 
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Since accuracy data do not meet the distributional assumptions necessary to 
conduct an ANOVA, we used a generalised linear mixed effects model to 
explore the effects of ‘Interruption’ and ‘Difficulty’ on participants’ accuracy. 
Using the ‘fitglme’ function in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), we used 
a model with a logistic link function and binomial data model. Parameter 
estimates were based on a maximum likelihood method using Laplace 
approximation. In line with recommendations by Barr et al. (2014) we used a 
‘maximal’ random effects structure, i.e. both manipulations, ‘Interruption’ and 
‘Difficulty’, and the ‘Interruption * Difficulty’ interaction were included as fixed 
effects, and both manipulations and their interactions within each participant 
were included as random effects (Wilkinson notation: Accuracy ~ 1 + 
Interruption*Difficulty + (1 + Interruption*Difficulty | 
Participant)13. The model showed that ‘Difficulty’ was a significant predictor, 
                                               
13 The dispersion parameter of the model, φ = .61, was calculated by dividing the sum of 
squared Pearson residuals by the residual degrees of freedom (Venables & Ripley, 2002), and 
indicates that there was no issue with overdispersion. 
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F(1, 114) = 7.19, p = .008, with ‘easy’ (M = 86%) conditions associated with 
higher accuracy scores than ‘hard’ (M = 83%) conditions. Additionally, 
‘Interruption’ was a significant predictor, F(2, 114) = 108.88, p < .001. The 
‘Interruption * Difficulty’ interaction was not a significant predictor, F(2, 114) = 
2.33, p = .10. 
 
In order to explore the differences between all three levels of ‘Interruption’ 
(‘continuous’, ‘stop’, ‘reverse’), we fitted the model a second time, but setting 
the reference level of ‘Interruption’ to ‘stop’, rather than ‘continuous’. We found 
that both the ‘continuous’ (M = 91%) and the ‘stop’ (M = 88%) conditions were 
associated with higher accuracy scores than the ‘reverse’ (M = 76%) condition 
(p < .001). However, there was no significant difference between the 
‘continuous’ and the ‘stop’ conditions (p = .13).  
 
4.1.2.2. ERP Results 
The resulting ERPs are displayed in Figure 4.5. The CPP displays a build-up 
over the course of the decision, which is disrupted by the interruption of 
evidence. To quantify this effect, we compared the slopes of the ERP before 
and during the interruption period.  
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Figure 4.5: CPP results: CPP waveforms (left) and topographies (right) for easy (a), and hard (b) trials. 
From left to right: stimulus-locked waveform, response-locked waveform, and topography averaged over 
the stimulus-locked 0 to 1000 ms interval. Electrodes used to generate the waveform are highlighted in the 
topoplots. Vertical dashed lines in the stimulus-locked CPP represent mean RTs per condition. Note that 
the mean RTs here are computed only from trials which were included to generate the waveform and 
therefore differ slightly from those displayed in Figure 4.4. Grey dots at the bottom of the waveforms 
indicate significance based on FDR-controlled comparisons of amplitude: dark grey dots indicate a 
significant main effect of ‘Interruption’, while light grey ones indicate a significant main effect of ‘Difficulty’. 
 
An ‘Interruption’ x ‘Difficulty’ ANOVA investigating the slope of the CPP showed 
that in the stimulus-locked data, there was a significant main effect of ‘Difficulty’ 
in the pre-interruption interval, F(1, 19) = 12.93, p = .002, ηp2 = .40, with ‘easy’ 
waveforms displaying a higher slope (M = .02) than ‘hard’ waveforms (M = .01). 
There was no main effect of ‘Interruption’, F(2, 38) = 1.01, p = .38, ηp2 = .05. 
There was no interaction effect between ‘Interruption’ and ‘Difficulty’, (p = .82).  
 
Conversely, in the interruption interval, there was no significant main effect of 
‘Difficulty’, F(1, 19) = .19, p = .67, ηp2 = .01 (Measy = .02, Mhard = .01), however, 
there was a significant main effect of ‘Interruption’, F(2, 38) = 9.52, p < .001, ηp2 
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= .33. We used Fisher’s LSD post hoc tests to explore the main effect further. 
They revealed that the slope of the ‘continuous’ waveform (M = .03) was 
significantly higher than the slopes of both the ‘stop’ (M = .01) and the ‘reverse’ 
(M = .01) waveforms, t(19) > 3.40, p < .003. There was no significant difference 
in slope between the ‘stop’ and ‘reverse’ conditions, t(19) = .76, p = .46. There 
was no significant interaction between ‘Difficulty’ and ‘Interruption’ in the 
interruption interval (p = .39). 
 
In the response-locked CPP, we found a significant main effect of ‘Difficulty’, 
F(1, 19) = 7.46, p = .013, ηp2 = .28, with ‘easy’ waveforms associated with a 
higher slope (M = .04) than ‘hard’ ones (M = .03). There was no main effect of 
‘Interruption’, and no interaction effect, (p > .14). 
 
We also compared the amplitudes of the waveforms associated with the 
different conditions by performing a series of FDR-controlled ‘Interruption’ 
(‘continuous’, ‘stop’, ‘reverse’) x ‘Difficulty’ (‘easy’, ‘hard’) ANOVAs. For brevity, 
we only report significant results which show a corrected p-value of < .05 for at 
least 50 ms continuously. In the stimulus-locked CPP data, a main effect of 
‘Interruption’ was observed between 466 and 783 ms (corrected p < .049; see 
Figure 4.5). Fisher’s LSD-corrected post hoc tests found that the ‘continuous’ 
waveform displayed a higher amplitude than both the ‘stop’ waveform (between 
466 and 783 ms relative to the onset of coherent motion, corrected p < .02) and 
the ‘reverse’ waveform (between 488 and 783 ms, corrected p < .046). There 
was no significant difference in amplitude between ‘stop’ and ‘reverse’ 
conditions (corrected p > .26). 
 
Further, we found a significant main effect of ‘Difficulty’ in the time interval 
between 276 and 1000 ms relative to stimulus onset, with ‘easy’ waveforms 
reaching higher amplitudes than ‘hard’ waveforms (corrected p < .046). There 
was no significant interaction between ‘Interruption’ and ‘Difficulty’ (corrected p 
> .34). 
 
In the response-locked CPP, we found no main effect of ‘Interruption’ (corrected 
p > .07). There was a significant main effect of ‘Difficulty’ during 160 out of 229 
155 
 
time points between -229 and 0 ms relative to response, with ‘easy’ trials 
displaying a higher amplitude than ‘hard’ trials. There was no significant 
interaction effect (corrected p > .9). 
4.1.2.3. Model Fit 
We fitted two race models to the data, one of which assumes symmetric 
changes in drift rate with changing evidence (Model 1, 8 parameters), and one 
which fits a new drift rate to each evidence interruption (Model 2, 16 
parameters). To compare the goodness of fit among the models, we calculated 
the BIC (Schwarz, 1978) of each model fit. The BIC takes into account the 
likelihood of the model but also penalises a model for the number of parameters 
used in order to resolve the problem of overfitting. The best (lowest) BIC was 
obtained for Model 2 (see Table 4.1). This implies that the additional drift rate 
parameters of Model 2 increased the quality of the fit enough to warrant the 
increased model complexity, and suggests that evidence is integrated at 
different rates throughout the trial. The same comparison using the AIC (Akaike, 
1973) instead of the BIC supported the same conclusion (see Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: Model Comparison: BIC and AIC values for each model. Model 1 has higher (worse) BIC and 
AIC values, despite its comparatively small number of parameters (best BIC and AIC values in bold). 
  
Model  
  
Number of 
parameters 
AIC BIC Parameters 
Model 1 8 71,992 72,053 
v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect,  
v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect,  
Sz, Ter, STer, σ2 
Model 2 16 71,875 71,998 
v-easy-continuouscorrect, v- easy-continuousincorrect, 
 v-easy-stopcorrect, v-easy-stopincorrect,  
v-easy-reversecorrect, v-easy-reverseincorrect,  
v-hard-continuouscorrect, v-hard-continuousincorrect,  
v-hard- stopcorrect, v-hard-stopincorrect,  
v-hard-reversecorrect, v-hard-reverseincorrect,  
Sz, Ter, STer, σ2 
 
 
Table 4.2: Estimated parameter values for the chosen model (Model 2): note that the response threshold A 
was set to 1 as a scaling parameter. 
Model 2: Parameters     
Starting point variability (SZ) 0.7538 
Response threshold (A) 1 
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Non-decision time (Ter) 0.2895 
Non-decision time variability (STer) 0.266 
Diffusion constant (σ2) 0.5011 
Drift rate  
(v) 
‘Continuous’ 
correct 
easy 1.4355 
hard 1.1571 
incorrect 
easy 0.02 
hard 0.0135 
‘Stop’ 
correct 
easy 0.4121 
hard 0.2447 
incorrect 
easy 0.0471 
hard 0.0163 
‘Reverse’ 
correct 
easy 0.0369 
hard 0.0534 
incorrect 
easy 0.7725 
hard 0.9237 
 
 
The parameter estimates of the chosen race model are displayed in Table 4.2. 
We found that, as expected, drift rates in interrupted conditions were lower than 
‘continuous’ drift rates. Additionally, the best-fitting drift rates in the incorrect 
accumulator of the ‘reverse’ condition (e.g. v-easy-reverseincorrect = .77) were 
much lower than the ones in the correct accumulator of the ‘continuous’ 
condition (e.g. v-easy-continuouscorrect = 1.14) despite the equally strong 
sensory evidence.  
 
Figure 4.6 shows the quality of the model fit by displaying empirical (circles) and 
modelled (lines and crosses) RT distributions for correct (bold symbols) and 
incorrect (thin symbols) responses in each condition. Each distribution is 
summarised by five quantile estimates (from left to right: 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, 
90%), the RT (x-axis) and proportion of data (y-axis) of which are shown. The 
overlap between empirical and modelled quantiles indicates that the model 
fitted the data well. The mean difference between predicted and observed RTs 
at each quantile for correct responses was approximately 36 ms, confirming that 
the race model with varying drift rates can account for decision-making with 
non-stationary evidence. 
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Figure 4.6: Model fit: quantiles estimated from behavioural data (circles) and race model (Model 2) 
simulations (crosses and lines) for easy (top) and hard (bottom) decisions. For each condition, correct 
(thick) and incorrect (thin) quantiles are displayed separately.  
4.1.2.4. Model Prediction 
The parameters of the chosen model were then used to estimate the average 
accumulation profile for each condition. Figure 4.7 displays the resulting 
predictions (a) and the corresponding EEG data (b) for stimulus (left) and 
response-locked (right) data, as well as easy (top) and hard (bottom) data. 
Visual inspection shows that the EEG and predicted profiles are qualitatively 
very similar. With stimulus-locking, both profiles show an initial build-up which is 
slower (lower slope) in ‘hard’ (dashed lines) compared to ‘easy’ (solid lines) 
conditions, but similar across interruption conditions. Both profiles also show 
that the ‘continuous’ waveforms continue the build-up, while ‘stop’ and ‘reverse’ 
waveforms display a drop at approximately the same time, before continuing to 
build up. A further similarity between the model prediction and the EEG signal is 
the unexpected finding of an overlap of the ‘stop easy’ and ‘reverse easy’ 
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conditions during the interruption period. However, there are also small 
differences between modelled and observed accumulation, such as the 
difference between ‘stop hard’ and ‘reverse hard’ profiles predicted by the 
models, which is less pronounced in the EEG waveform. Additionally, the CPP 
displays a negative dip as a response to evidence interruption while the model 
prediction shows a much reduced, but still positive slope. The response-locked 
signal is overall very similar in both the EEG and the predicted profiles, as no 
differences between conditions are seen, with the exception of a small deviation 
of the ‘continuous easy’ waveform in the EEG signal. 
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Figure 4.7: Decision variable (empirical and simulated): a) accumulation profile (correct and incorrect 
accumulator summed) per Interruption condition as predicted by the race model, for easy (top) and hard 
(bottom) trials, as well as stimulus (left) and response-locked (right) data. b) CPP waveform for easy (top) 
and hard (bottom) trials, as well as stimulus (left) and response-locked (right) data. The CPP here differs 
from the one displayed in Figure 4.5 as it is a pooled average and has been filtered and downsampled to 
match model predictions. 
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4.1.3. Discussion Experiment 1 
In the first experiment, we set out to test the impact of non-stationary evidence 
on a potential neural substrate of the decision variable, the CPP. Since we 
assume that a change in evidence must necessarily induce a change in the 
accumulation profile, we hypothesised that, in order to support its role as a 
decision variable signal, the CPP waveform should also display a non-stationary 
build-up. To test this, we observed the CPP under three different ‘Interruption’ 
conditions: a ‘continuous’ condition in which the evidence continued at the same 
level of strength throughout the trial, a ‘stop’ condition in which the evidence 
was stopped and replaced by random noise for a brief interval, and a ‘reverse’ 
condition in which the evidence was reversed to support the opposite alternative 
for a brief period. We hypothesised that these three conditions would lead to 
three different profiles, with the continuous condition leading to the 
stereotypical, smooth build-up, while the stop and reverse profiles would deviate 
from this build-up to varying extents. We also added a more established 
manipulation of difficulty to the design and hypothesised that (as demonstrated 
in Chapter 3), this would affect the slope of the different accumulation profiles. 
 
Behavioural results indicated that both the interruption conditions and the 
difficulty conditions had the expected effects on the RTs and accuracy scores. 
‘Easy’ decisions were associated with faster, more accurate responses than 
‘hard’ decisions. Similarly, ‘continuous’ trials led to faster and more accurate 
decisions than ‘reverse’ trials. ‘Stop’ trials were associated with shorter RTs and 
higher accuracy scores than ‘reverse’ trials and longer RTs than ‘continuous’ 
trials. These behavioural findings are in line with previous research, which has 
repeatedly shown that disruptions in evidence lead to an increase in RT 
(Holmes et al., 2016; Huk & Shadlen, 2005; O’Connell et al., 2012). Accuracy 
results in these studies have been less consistent, but these are arguably 
dependent on the procedures of each study. For example, O’Connell et al. 
(2012) used a target detection paradigm with no response deadline in which 
participants were unlikely to respond under uncertainty, and found no difference 
in accuracy caused by the non-stationary evidence. In the current study, on the 
other hand, we implemented a comparatively short (2000 ms) deadline, which is 
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likely to push participants into responding under increased uncertainty in 
interrupted trials. Overall, as expected, interrupted trials led to worse 
performances than continuous trials, with evidence reversal disrupting the 
decision more than a simple pause in the evidence.  
 
Importantly, we expected that the manipulations of difficulty and interruption 
would not only affect the behavioural data, but also the accumulation profile. As 
described in detail in Chapter 3, the slope of the accumulation should vary with 
difficulty (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). Furthermore, the interruption of 
evidence should lead to an interruption in the build-up of the accumulation. 
Specifically, we hypothesised that a ‘stop’ in evidence would also cause the 
accumulation to stop and plateau for the duration of the interruption interval. 
The impact of the ‘reverse’ condition on the accumulation profile is somewhat 
harder to predict as it is particularly dependent on the specifications of the 
model, as, for example, the assumption of inhibition may lead to a downward 
slope during the reversal interval, while a model that does not assume inhibition 
between accumulators would predict a mere decrease in the slope while 
remaining positive14. However, it is important to note that even the 
comparatively simple race model used here contains a large amount of 
interacting parameters, the results of which are difficult to predict conceptually. 
 
The CPP waveform revealed patterns which largely supported our hypotheses. 
We found that task difficulty affected the slope of the CPP, with ‘hard’ decisions 
leading to lower build-up rates than ‘easy’ decisions. In the ‘continuous’ 
condition, we observed the stereotypical build-up over time which peaked at the 
time of response. Importantly, we found that both the ‘stop’ and the ‘reverse’ 
waveforms displayed a clear divergence from this pattern. While all three 
conditions (‘continuous’, ‘stop’, ‘reverse’) displayed the same build-up up in the 
pre-interruption period, we observed a clear disruption of the build-up in both 
                                               
14 Note that the intuitive prediction that the reversal of evidence would lead to a reversal in 
accumulation (i.e. a downward slope) even without the assumption of inhibition is only accurate 
with regards to the correct accumulator, but not the sum of both accumulators which is used 
here. 
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the ‘stop’ and ‘reverse’ profiles, which plateaued before continuing to build up, 
approximately 300 ms later. This finding of the perturbation in evidence 
translating into a perturbation in the CPP build-up is in line with our hypothesis 
and with previous research which found that the evolution of the CPP is 
sensitive to a brief interruption of evidence (O’Connell et al., 2012). However, 
contrary to our hypotheses, we observed no difference between ‘stop’ and 
‘reverse’ CPP profiles, as both conditions displayed the same build-up and 
plateau behaviour (but see below).  
 
An additional finding worth noting is the delay in the disruption of the CPP build-
up compared to the timing of the evidence interruption. While the interruption of 
motion took place between 200 and 400 ms, the divergence in CPP amplitude 
between ‘continuous’ profiles and the two interrupted profiles was observed 
between approximately 470 and 780 ms. Although this delay was not tested 
specifically and the race model was able to account for the data without an 
additional delay parameter, we speculate that this temporal difference is larger 
than would be expected from a delay based on sensory processes alone. A 
similar delay between presentation and incorporation of the new information has 
been described by Holmes et al. (2016), although with a larger magnitude 
(approximately 450 ms). This finding further supports the role of the CPP as an 
accumulation signal, rather than a mere sensory signal, which would arguably 
display a faster reaction in response to the change in evidence. The CPP 
however, responds to the change slowly and is affected by the change for a 
longer period than the duration of the interruption interval, suggesting that it 
represents a higher-level integration of evidence.  
 
Overall, the CPP profile showed the majority of the expected patterns. However, 
the hypotheses against which the CPP was compared were largely intuitive. In 
order to gauge the extent to which the observed profiles match true 
accumulation profiles, we fitted a sequential sampling model to our data. We 
found that a race model with separate drift rates for each difficulty and 
interruption condition was able to fit our RT data well. In line with Holmes et al. 
(2016) we found that a change in evidence was better explained by a new, 
independent drift rate, rather than a symmetric drift rate, even when the change 
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in evidence itself was symmetric (i.e. in the best model, the drift rates during the 
reversal of the motion direction did not equal the inverse of the initial drift rates). 
However, Holmes et al. (2016) found larger drift rates after evidence reversal, 
while we found that the incorrect drift rate during the ‘reverse’ period was lower 
than the correct drift rate prior to the interruption, even though the sensory 
evidence associated with both was equivalent. Our findings indicate that there 
might be an inhibitory mechanism, impeding the increase of the losing 
accumulator. Although we fitted a race model which explained the data well 
without an inhibition parameter, it may be useful to explore other models which 
assume inhibition, such as the leaky competing accumulator model (Usher & 
McClelland, 2001) in future work. The difference in findings between our study 
and that of Holmes et al. (2016) may be explained by the different task 
procedures as we used brief perturbations while the evidence in Holmes et al. 
(2016) remained reversed for the rest of the trial. It is conceivable that evidence 
which opposes the winning accumulator is inhibited at first, but, if it continues 
long enough, eventually catches up and is then, potentially to compensate for 
the delay, accumulated faster. 
 
Importantly, we used the estimated parameters to simulate the accumulation 
profile associated with each condition and directly qualitatively compared the 
resulting patterns to the CPP. We found considerable overlap between the 
model predictions and the neural signal, even though these profiles were not 
fitted to one another directly. Both profiles showed the same slope differences 
between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials. Additionally, neither the model prediction nor 
the CPP showed large differences between conditions in the response-locked 
data. The model predictions also showed the same gradual build-up in the 
‘continuous’ condition and the interruption of the build-up in the ‘stop’ and 
‘reverse’ conditions, as observed in the EEG signal. Interestingly, the model 
predictions also mimicked the CPP signal in the similarity between the ‘stop’ 
and ‘reverse’ waveforms. These patterns are particularly interesting as they 
oppose our prior hypotheses and show an overlap between neural data and 
evidence accumulation which might not have been predicted based on intuitive 
reasoning alone. Overall, these similarities support the role of the CPP as a 
neural substrate of decision-making. 
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4.2. Experiment 2: Decision Bias 
 
In Experiment 2, we set out to explore a second manipulation, which, to our 
knowledge, has not been used previously to evaluate the CPP as a potential 
neural correlate of the decision variable. To this end, we tested the effects of 
decision biases on the CPP. The notion of a decision bias is a common topic in 
the perceptual decision-making literature, as it is a manipulation which is 
associated with strong behavioural effects, which can often be explained using 
sequential sampling models by varying just one parameter (Summerfield & de 
Lange, 2014). In a sequential sampling process, evidence is accumulated from 
a given starting point towards a threshold. With the introduction of a bias 
towards a given alternative, the starting point moves towards the threshold 
associated with that alternative, thereby decreasing the amount of evidence 
required to make the choice in favour of the biased alternative (Spaniol, Voss, 
Bowen, & Grady, 2011; Voss et al., 2013). Specifically, in accumulator models, 
which assume that there are two accumulators in a binary choice, each 
integrating evidence for a given alternative and racing towards a common 
threshold, biases can be implemented by increasing the starting point (i.e. 
decreasing the amount of evidence required to reach the threshold) in only one 
of the accumulators and/or decreasing the starting point of the remaining 
accumulator, making the biased choice more likely (Gao et al., 2011). 
 
Other ways to implement bias effects in sequential sampling models have been 
suggested. For example, it has been proposed that a variation in drift rate, i.e. 
the slope of the accumulation, may account for biased decisions, with biases 
towards a specific alternative leading to increased slopes (Diederich & 
Busemeyer, 2006; Gao et al., 2011; Hanks, Mazurek, Kiani, Hopp, & Shadlen, 
2011; Mulder et al., 2012). It has also been suggested that the way a model 
best accounts for biased decisions depends on the nature of the bias, as 
variations in starting point, and potentially in drift rate, may differ depending on 
whether a bias towards a given alternative is caused by its increased frequency 
or by the association of the alternative with an increased payoff (Diederich & 
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Busemeyer, 2006; Feng, Holmes, Rorie, & Newsome, 2009; Leite & Ratcliff, 
2011; Mulder et al., 2012; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). 
 
However, an overwhelming amount of evidence suggests either that a 
difference in the starting point accounts for behavioural data from biased 
decisions (Bode et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2011; Mulder et al., 2012; Ratcliff et al., 
2016; Spaniol et al., 2011; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2010), or a variation of this 
idea which claims that evidence accumulation is preceded by a process which 
evaluates a given bias and sets the starting point for accumulation (Diederich, 
2008; Diederich & Busemeyer, 2006). 
 
Biased decisions have also been explored using neural signals which have 
previously been proposed to reflect the accumulation profile described by 
sequential sampling models. Rorie, Gao, McClelland, and Newsome (2010) 
presented monkeys with a binary motion-discrimination task in which the reward 
for the two choices was either equal or unequal. It was found that the rewards 
primarily influenced LIP firing rates prior to the motion onset, with unbalanced 
payoffs leading to a baseline shift towards the rewarded threshold. These 
findings support the notion of a starting point difference in accumulation for 
biased decisions. No difference in the slope of the build-up in firing rate 
throughout the decision was observed. The same finding of a shift in baseline 
activity and unaltered slopes in LIP firing rates was supported when instead of 
unequal payoffs, directional cues were used in a motion discrimination task 
(Rao, DeAngelis, & Snyder, 2012). Similarly, it has been shown that firing rates 
in SC neurons, which show a build-up to threshold profile associated with a 
given choice, show a reduction in baseline activity with decreasing probability of 
this choice (Basso & Wurtz, 1998; Dorris & Munoz, 1998), further supporting the 
role of starting point activity in decision biases.  
 
Evidence from neural correlates of evidence accumulation in humans remains 
somewhat scarce. fMRI studies have reported correlates of a biased decision 
variable in parietal and prefrontal regions (Chen et al., 2015; Mulder et al., 
2012; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2010). EEG research on the other hand, has 
focused primarily on motor signals to track decision biases. Noorbaloochi et al. 
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(2015) recorded human EEG during a decision task with either biased or 
unbiased payoffs and explored the lateralised readiness potential (LRP) as a 
signal reflecting evidence accumulation. In line with findings from non-human 
primates, it was found that in biased decisions, the LRP amplitude was shifted 
towards the alternative associated with the higher payoff prior to the stimulus 
onset, suggesting a starting point difference. However, the behavioural data 
were best explained by a model with an additional accumulator which 
represents a fast guess process and races with the evidence accumulators, 
rather than by traditional models with starting point or drift rate variations to 
explain decision biases. On the other hand, de Lange et al. (2013) concluded 
that it is in fact a variability in starting point which accounts for bias-related 
activity. Using MEG, de Lange and colleagues found that motor-related activity 
in the beta frequency range displayed a pre-stimulus bias into the direction 
associated with the biased alternative. Together, these data suggest that biases 
push accumulation signals prior to the accumulation onset towards the 
threshold, without affecting the accumulation slope. 
 
To our knowledge, the effects of decision biases have not yet been explored 
using the CPP. In order to test whether the CPP reflects a neural substrate of 
the decision variable, we set out to explore the CPP waveform under different 
bias conditions. We presented participants with a motion direction discrimination 
task after viewing cues which either provided information regarding the likely 
direction of the following motion or gave no directional information. Based on 
the literature summarised above, we hypothesised that the presence of a 
directional cue would lead to a starting point difference in accumulation. 
However, it is unclear how this difference would translate into the CPP. One 
possibility is that a starting point difference would lead to baseline difference in 
the CPP, which, since the generation of the CPP waveform requires a baseline 
correction, would appear in the CPP amplitude (e.g. an increase in baseline 
leads to a decrease in the baseline-to-boundary distance and a decrease in the 
absolute magnitude of the accumulation). However, if, as we assume, the CPP 
reflects the sum of the accumulators, it is possible that we would observe no 
difference in the waveforms, as the increased starting point in the cued 
accumulator might co-occur with a decreased starting point in the non-cued 
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accumulator, the sum of which might be zero. Fitting a sequential sampling 
model to the resulting behavioural data and directly comparing it to the recorded 
CPP waveform is therefore crucial to yield insights into the role of the CPP as 
an accumulation signal. 
 
4.2.1. Methods 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty participants (five males), with a mean age of 30.15 (SD = 7.28) were 
recruited. Exclusion criteria required participants to achieve an average 
accuracy score of 80% in the random dot motion task at a coherence level no 
greater than 90% (i.e. 90% of dots moving coherently; see 4.2.1.2). All 20 
participants met this requirement. Each participant took part in a session lasting 
between 2 and 2.5 hours. Participants were recruited using either poster 
advertisements or emails targeted at participants from previous studies. Two of 
the participants were researchers in the current project. All other participants 
were paid £8 per hour. The experiment was approved by the City, University of 
London Psychology Department Ethics Committee. 
4.2.1.2.  Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants were asked to complete a random dot motion task. The basic task 
and setup were, unless otherwise stated, identical to the description in 
Experiment 1 (see section 4.1.1.2). All participants completed a minimum of 50 
practice trials at a coherence level of 80% in order to familiarise themselves 
with the task. During the practice trials, feedback was provided after each trial 
(‘correct’/‘incorrect’). Afterwards, each participant completed 100 trials without 
feedback in order to establish an appropriate level of difficulty for the 
experiment. For this, we again used the QUEST staircase procedure targeting 
80% correct. The resulting average level of coherence was 32.25% (SD = 
27.92).  
 
For the main experiment, each participant completed 450 trials. The trial 
procedure is displayed in Figure 4.8. Each trial began with the display of a 
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fixation cross for 500 ms (plus a jitter of up to 200 ms drawn from a uniform 
distribution), followed by a cue (500 ms) that consisted of two arrows, one 
pointing to the left, and one pointing to the right. In one third of the trials, both 
arrows were white, indicating no specific direction (‘uncued’), while in two thirds 
of the trials, one arrow was yellow, providing a cue towards a given direction. 
One half of these cued trials was cued to the left while the other half was cued 
to the right. If a directionally specific cue was given, the following dot motion 
was congruent with the cue 80% of the time (‘congruent’), and incongruent in 
20% of the trials (‘incongruent’). In each trial, the cue was followed by random 
dot motion, i.e. a coherence level of 0%. After the random motion (like in 
Experiment 1: 500 ms + jitter up to 1000 ms, drawn from a gamma distribution 
with shape parameter 1 and scaling parameter 150), the coherent motion 
started (left/right) and lasted up to 1300 ms or until the response. No feedback 
was provided after each trial, but every 60 trials, participants took self-timed 
breaks during which they were provided with feedback in the form of mean 
accuracy scores and RTs over the last 60 trials. 
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Figure 4.8: Random dot motion task trial procedure: in each trial, a fixation cross was followed by a cue 
consisting of two arrows. If both arrows were white (‘uncued’), no directional information was given. If one 
of the arrows was yellow, this cue was correctly describing the direction of the upcoming motion in 80% of 
the trials (‘congruent’), and was false in 20% of the trials (‘incongruent’). Here, the right side is cued, and 
the coherent motion following the random motion is to the right (‘congruent’). Note that the size and 
number of dots have been adjusted for illustration. 
4.2.1.2.1.  EEG Recording and Pre-processing 
Continuous EEG was recorded and pre-processed, using the same setup as 
described in Experiment 1.  
 
4.2.1.2.2. ERP Analysis 
The CPP for each condition was generated in the same way as described in 
Experiment 1. 
 
4.2.1.3. Statistical Analysis 
In order to analyse the impact of the different cue conditions on the ERP 
waveform, we compared both the slope and the amplitude between conditions. 
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Like in Experiment 1, we compared the build-up rate by fitting a straight line to 
the waveform for each participant and each condition and measuring its slope. 
The chosen time intervals to which we fitted a line were 200 to 350 ms for the 
stimulus-locked CPP, and -200 to -150 ms for the response-locked CPP (Kelly 
& O’Connell, 2013). The resulting slopes were then compared using a one-way 
ANOVA to compare ‘congruent’, ‘incongruent’, and ‘uncued’ waveforms. 
 
Amplitudes were analysed in the same way as described in Experiment 1, by 
running a series of FDR-controlled one-way ANOVAs between 0 and 1000 ms 
in the stimulus and -1000 to 0 ms in the response-locked CPP. 
 
4.2.1.4. Model Fit 
The same race model as described in Experiment 1 was used to model these 
data. In this model, two accumulators integrate evidence, one for each 
alternative, and race towards a threshold. 
 
In order to account for different bias conditions, we tested two different models, 
both of which varied only in starting point in order to account for different bias 
conditions (see Figure 4.9). In both models, the response threshold A was 
chosen as the scaling parameter and fixed to 1. Since the number of trials 
across conditions was not balanced (i.e. fewer trials in the ‘incongruent’ than the 
‘congruent’ condition), adjusted, balanced trial numbers were used to estimate 
the parameters of each model, to avoid overfitting on the ‘congruent’ condition. 
 
The first model (Model 1) assumed that starting points change symmetrically in 
response to cues. The starting point of the accumulation process in the 
standard race model is drawn from a uniform distribution with the upper limit of 
Sz and the lower limit of 0. To allow for a variation in starting point in either 
direction, we fixed the lower limit of the starting-point distribution to 0.5, and 
used an additional bias parameter to allow bias-related variation. In ‘uncued’ 
trials, the starting point distribution remained between 0.5 and Sz for both 
correct and incorrect accumulators. In contrast, in the ‘congruent’ condition, the 
starting point distribution for the correct accumulator (in line with the cue) was 
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defined by the range of [0.5 Sz] + bias, and the distribution for the incorrect 
accumulator (opposing the cue) was defined by the range [0.5 Sz] - bias. The 
opposite pattern was used in ‘incongruent’ trials, where incorrect starting point 
distributions (in line with the cue) ranged within [0.5 Sz] + bias, and correct 
distributions (opposing the cue) ranged within [0.5 Sz] - bias. All other 
parameters (Sz, vcorrect, vincorrect, Ter, STer, σ2) were fixed between conditions, 
resulting in a model with a total of seven parameters (see Table 4.3Table 4.1). 
 
The second model (Model 2) also used starting point variations to account for 
differences induced by cue conditions. However, this model did not restrict 
these variations to be symmetric, instead using two bias parameters, one for 
positive biases, i.e. responses in line with the cue (biaspositive), and one for 
negative biases, i.e. responses opposing the cue (biasnegative). In the ‘congruent’ 
condition, the starting point distribution for the correct accumulator (in line with 
the cue) was defined by the range [0.5 Sz] + biaspositive, and the incorrect 
accumulator (opposing the cue) was defined as ranging within [0.5 Sz] + 
biasnegative. The opposite pattern was used in the ‘incongruent condition, with 
bounds of [0.5 Sz] + biasnegative defining the starting point distribution of the 
correct accumulator (opposing the cue), and bounds of [0.5 Sz] + biaspositive 
defining the starting point distribution of the incorrect accumulator (in line with 
the cue). In the ‘uncued’ condition, the starting point distribution remained 
between 0.5 and Sz. All other parameters (Sz, vcorrect, vincorrect, Ter, STer, σ2) were 
fixed between conditions, leading to a model with a total of eight parameters 
(see Table 4.3, Table 4.4). 
 
Like in experiment 1, to fit the model to our data, individual RTs were pooled 
across participants to determine the best-fitting model parameters at the group 
level. Trials with RTs faster than 180 ms or slower than 1300 ms (less than 6%) 
were discarded. Modelled RTs were simulated based on the equations 
described in Experiment 1 (a total of 20,000 simulated responses), and 
compared to RT data using Quantile Maximum Probability Estimation 
(Heathcote et al., 2002). Model fits were compared using BIC and AIC and the 
best performing model was chosen to generate the appropriate accumulation 
profile and compare it to the EEG data. 
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Figure 4.9: Race model applied to biased decisions: to allow for variation of the starting point in either 
direction, the default lower limit of the starting point distribution in unbiased decisions was raised from 0 to 
0.5. a) in ‘uncued’ trials, no decision bias is expected and the lower limit of the starting point distribution 
remains at 0.5. b) in the ‘congruent’ condition, a bias towards the correct choice leads to an 
increase/decrease in the starting point values in correct/incorrect accumulators; c) in ‘incongruent’ trials, 
the opposite pattern is expected, as the cue in the incorrect direction leads to an increased/decreased 
starting point in the incorrect/correct accumulator. Note that biaspositive and biasnegative are displayed as 
bias+ and bias- respectively. While the figure displays Model 2, Model 1 only differs by assuming that the 
increase/decrease in starting point is symmetrical. 
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4.2.1.5. Model Prediction 
To generate the model predictions and the EEG profile to compare it to, the 
same procedures as in Experiment 1 were followed. 
 
4.2.2. Results 
4.2.2.1. Behavioural Results 
To assess the impact of the cues on the behavioural data, we collapsed over 
‘left’ and ‘right’ trials, and removed any trials with RTs less than 180 ms or 
greater than or equal to 1300 ms (approximately 5.34%) to exclude trials in 
which it is unlikely that the participant made a decision. The remaining data are 
displayed in Figure 4.10. We then performed a one way repeated-measures 
ANOVA to explore the effect of the ‘Cue’ (‘congruent’, ‘incongruent’, ‘uncued’) 
on correct RTs. There was a statistically significant difference between the 
groups, F(2, 38) = 42.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .69. Fisher’s LSD corrected follow-up t-
tests revealed that all three groups differed significantly from each other, with 
‘congruent’ RTs (M = 664 ms) being faster than both ‘uncued’, t(19) = 6.21, p < 
.001, and ‘incongruent’, t(19) = 7.38, p < .001, RTs, and ‘uncued’ RTs (M = 705 
ms) being faster than ‘incongruent’ ones (M = 761 ms), t(19) = 5.17, p < .001. 
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Figure 4.10: Behavioural results: reaction time (left) and accuracy (right) averages for ‘congruent’, 
‘incongruent’, and ‘uncued’ trials. 
 
Since accuracy data do not meet the distributional assumptions necessary to 
conduct an ANOVA, we used a generalised linear mixed effects model to 
explore the effects of ‘Cue’ on participants’ accuracy. Using the ‘fitglme’ function 
in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), we used a model with a logistic link 
function and binomial data model. Parameter estimates were based on a 
maximum likelihood method using Laplace approximation. The manipulation 
‘Cue’ was included as a fixed effect, and participants were included as a 
random effect (Wilkinson notation: Accuracy ~ 1 + Cue + (1 + Cue | 
Participant))15. The model revealed that ‘Cue’ was a significant predictor, 
F(1, 57) = 18.56, p < .001. In order to explore the differences between all three 
levels of ‘Cue’ (‘congruent’, ‘incongruent’, ‘uncued’), we fitted the model a 
second time, but setting the reference level of ‘Cue’ to ‘incongruent’, rather than 
‘congruent’. We found that both the ‘congruent’ condition (M = 94%) and the 
                                               
15 The dispersion parameter of the model, φ = .70, was calculated by dividing the sum of 
squared Pearson residuals by the residual degrees of freedom (Venables & Ripley, 2002), and 
indicates that there was no issue with overdispersion. 
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‘uncued’ (M = 87%) condition were associated with higher accuracy scores than 
the ‘incongruent’ (M = 71%) condition (p < .001). Additionally, the ‘congruent’ 
condition was associated with higher accuracy scores than the ‘uncued’ 
condition (p < .001). 
 
4.2.2.2. ERP Results 
The CPP waveform for each condition is displayed in Figure 4.11. In both the 
stimulus-locked and the response-locked CPP, the waveform associated with 
‘incongruent’ trials displays the highest amplitude, followed by the ‘uncued’ and 
‘congruent’ waveforms. In order to quantify the impact of ‘Cue’ on the ERP 
waveform, we first compared the slopes of the different conditions. We 
observed no significant difference in slope in either the stimulus-locked, F(2, 38) 
= .39, p = .68, ηp2 = .02, or the response-locked CPP, F(2, 38) = .40, p = .67, ηp2 
= .02. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: CPP results: Top: CPP waveform per condition for stimulus-locked (left) and response-locked 
(right) data. Vertical dashed lines in the stimulus-locked CPP indicate mean RTs per condition. Note that 
the mean RTs are based only on trials which were included in the generation of the waveform and differ 
slightly from the ones displayed in Figure 4.10. Black dots in the bottom of the waveform indicate time 
points at which FDR-controlled comparisons of amplitude showed a significant main effect of ‘Cue’ 
conditions. Bottom: ERP topographies averaged over three stimulus-locked time intervals show the 
evolution of the CPP. Electrodes used to generate the waveform are highlighted. 
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We also tested the variation of amplitudes in the CPP using a series of FDR-
controlled one-way (‘Cue’: ‘congruent’/‘incongruent’/‘uncued’) ANOVAs. In the 
stimulus-locked CPP, we found a significant effect for ‘Cue’ in 345 out of 355 
time points between 518 and 873 ms relative to the onset of coherent motion 
(corrected p < .049). Follow-up t-tests revealed that ‘incongruent’ amplitudes 
were higher than both the ‘congruent’ (for the entire duration of the main effect, 
corrected p < .02), and the ‘uncued’ ones (for 244 out of 321 time points 
between 542 and 863 ms relative to stimulus onset, corrected p < .05). 
However, there was very little difference between ‘congruent’ and ‘uncued’ 
amplitudes (corrected p < .05 only between 639 and 645 ms). 
 
In the response-locked CPP, we found a significant main effect between -198 
and -104 ms relative to the response (corrected p < .047). Post hoc tests 
showed the same patterns as the stimulus-locked data, with higher amplitudes 
in ‘incongruent’ than ‘congruent’ trials (during the entire duration of the main 
effect, corrected p < .018) and in incongruent than ‘uncued’ trials (during 76 out 
of 90 time samples between -198 and -108 ms, corrected p < .049). There was 
no difference between ‘congruent’ and ‘uncued’ trials (p > .09). 
4.2.2.3. Model Fit 
Based on the literature, two models assuming changes in starting point across 
bias conditions were fitted to the data. One model assumed that the 
increase/decrease in starting point for responses congruent/incongruent with 
the cue is symmetrical (Model 1, 7 parameters), while Model 2 let the bias 
parameter for increasing/decreasing starting points vary independently (Model 
2, 8 parameters). The best (lowest) BIC was obtained for Model 2 (see Table 
4.3). This implies that the additional bias parameter of Model 2 increased the 
quality of the fit enough to warrant the increased model complexity. The same 
comparison using AIC instead of BIC values supported the same conclusion 
(see Table 4.3). Therefore, Model 2 was chosen to generate accumulation 
profiles (note that Model 1 produced similar fits as well as similar predictions). 
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Table 4.3: Model Comparison: BIC and AIC values for each model. Model 1 has higher (worse) BIC and 
AIC values, despite its smaller number of parameters (best BIC and AIC values in bold). 
  
Model  
  
Number of 
parameters 
AIC BIC Parameters 
Model 1 7 30,675 30,723 
bias,  
vcorrect, vincorrect,  
Sz, Ter, STer, σ2 
Model 2 8 30,656 30,712 
biaspositive, biasnegative, 
vcorrect, vincorrect,  
Sz, Ter, STer, σ2 
 
 
Table 4.4: Estimated parameter values for the chosen model (Model 2): note that the response threshold A 
was set to 1 as a scaling parameter, and that all lower limits of the starting point distributions were 
generated with just two free bias parameters (0.5 + biaspositive/biasnegative). Note that, due to the raised 
starting point in the uncued condition, these parameters are not directly comparable to the ones displayed 
in Experiment 1 (Table 4.2). 
Model 2: Parameters     
Starting point variability (SZ) 0.2281 
Response threshold (A) 1 
Non-decision time (Ter) 0.0989 
Non-decision time variability (STer) 0.0755 
Diffusion constant (σ2) 0.1882 
Drift rate  
(v) 
correct 0.5993 
incorrect 0.2724 
Lower limit of 
 the starting point  
distribution 
‘congruent’ 
correct 0.54 
incorrect 0.4378 
‘incongruent’ 
correct 0.4378 
incorrect 0.54 
‘uncued’ 
correct 0.5 
incorrect 0.5 
 
  
The parameter estimates of the chosen race model are displayed in Table 4.4. 
It shows that the positive bias was slightly smaller (biaspositive = .04) than the 
negative bias (biasnegative = -.06). Figure 4.12 shows the quality of the model fit 
by displaying empirical (circles) and modelled (lines and crosses) RT 
distributions for correct (bold symbols) and incorrect (thin symbols) responses in 
each condition. It was found that a race model with varying starting points can 
account for biased decision-making, with the mean difference between 
predicted and observed RT quantiles for correct responses being approximately 
18 ms. 
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Figure 4.12: Model fit: quantiles estimated from behavioural data (circles) and race model simulations 
(crosses and lines) for each cue condition. Correct (thick) and incorrect (thin) quantiles are displayed 
separately. 
 
4.2.2.4. Model Prediction 
The parameters of the chosen model (Model 2) were used to estimate the 
predicted accumulation profile for each condition. Figure 4.13 displays the 
resulting predictions (a) and the corresponding CPP (b) for stimulus (left) and 
response-locked (right) signals. Visual inspection shows great qualitative 
similarities between the model predictions and the EEG signals. Both signals 
show a stimulus-locked build-up which peaks at the time of response. 
Importantly, both the model prediction and the CPP display an amplitude 
difference, with ‘incongruent’ decisions being associated with the highest 
values, followed by ‘uncued’ decisions, and ‘congruent’ trials associated with 
the lowest amplitudes. This pattern is visible in both the stimulus-locked and the 
response-locked waveforms in both the prediction and the EEG signal. 
Additionally, there appears to be a larger difference in amplitude between the 
‘incongruent’ and the remaining conditions, in both the stimulus and the 
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response-locked profiles. This pattern is particularly visible in the CPP data, but 
also, to a smaller extent, in the model prediction. However, the two signals are 
not identical. In particular, the amplitude differences in the EEG signal appear 
far more pronounced than the ones in the model predictions.  
 
 
Figure 4.13: Decision variable (empirical and simulated): a) accumulation profile per cue condition as 
predicted by the race model, for stimulus (left) and response-locked (right) data. b) CPP waveform for 
stimulus (left) and response-locked (right) data. The CPP here differs from the one displayed in Figure 
4.11 as it is a pooled average and has been filtered and downsampled to match model predictions. 
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4.2.3. Discussion Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested how decision biases affect the CPP waveform and, 
like in Experiment 1, compared its profile to model predictions. To this end, we 
asked participants to complete a motion discrimination task in which cues prior 
to each trial either gave no information about the direction of the upcoming trial 
(‘uncued’), or indicated the upcoming direction either correctly (‘congruent’) or 
incorrectly (‘incongruent’). We found that these manipulations had the expected 
effects on the data. All conditions were significantly different from each other in 
both RT and accuracy, with ‘congruent’ trials associated with the fastest RTs 
and fewest errors, ‘incongruent’ trials associated with low accuracy rates and 
longer RTs, and ‘uncued’ trials falling mid-range in both RT and accuracy. 
These results are in accordance with previous research, which has repeatedly 
shown similar effects on both RT and accuracy as a result of decision biases 
(de Lange et al., 2013; Mulder et al., 2012). 
 
In order to support the role of the CPP as a neural substrate of the decision 
variable, we expect these behavioural differences to be evident in the EEG 
waveform. Based on previous evidence, we hypothesised that the bias 
conditions would affect the starting point of the accumulation profile (Bode et al., 
2012; Gao et al., 2011; Rorie et al., 2010). Since we expect the boundary to 
remain unaltered, a change in starting point implies a change in the baseline-to-
boundary distance. Specifically, we expected that a bias towards a given 
response would increase the starting point towards the associated boundary, so 
that less evidence is needed for this response. The exact pattern these changes 
would evoke in the CPP waveforms of each condition is difficult to predict 
conceptually. Based on only a correct accumulator in a race model (i.e. the 
accumulator which integrates evidence for the correct alternative) we may 
expect that the ‘uncued’ decisions start around a given starting point z, while 
‘congruent’ conditions have a higher starting point (i.e. closer to the correct 
boundary), and ‘incongruent’ decision have a lower starting point (i.e. at a larger 
distance to the correct boundary). Since a baseline correction is needed to 
generate the CPP waveform, a starting point difference would not be observed 
directly, but would instead lead to a difference in amplitude with higher starting 
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points leading to lower ERP peaks. This pattern would translate into the 
‘incongruent’ CPP displaying the largest, and the ‘congruent’ CPP showing the 
smallest peak amplitude. However, we assume that different neural populations 
represent different accumulators and that the EEG signal recorded from the 
scalp is the sum of all accumulation in a race model, rather than a single 
accumulator. In this context, the expected amplitude differences are less clear. 
Since we expect that a bias leads to an increase in starting point in the cued 
accumulator alongside a decrease in the non-cued accumulator, the sum 
displayed in the CPP may in fact cancel out any difference to an unbiased 
process.  
 
There are thus a number of possible outcomes which could, at least 
conceptually, be considered in line with sequential sampling models. This 
emphasises the importance of the approach implemented in the current study. 
In addition to the varying assumptions of different models complicating 
conceptual predictions, even simple sequential sampling models are often too 
complex to allow for accurate predictions based on reasoning alone. It is 
therefore particularly important to directly compare a signal to predictions made 
through model fits, in order to comment on its similarity to an accumulation 
process.  
 
The pattern we observed in the CPP was somewhat similar to what might be 
expected for just a correct accumulator. There was no difference in slope 
between the conditions, but we found a clear difference in amplitude. The 
waveform associated with ‘incongruent’ decisions showed a higher amplitude 
than ‘congruent’ or ‘uncued’ profiles in both the stimulus and the response-
locked data. The ‘uncued’ CPP also seemed to build up to a slightly higher 
plateau than the ‘congruent’ waveform, although this difference was not 
significant in our analysis. If, as we assume, these differences in amplitude are 
due to baseline differences, they indicate that, in correct trials, ‘incongruent’ 
trials have the lowest overall starting point, followed by ‘uncued’ trials, and lastly 
‘congruent’ trials with the highest overall baseline. However, it is not clear why 
this difference is seen in the CPP which arguably represents the sum of all 
accumulators (but see below). 
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In order to evaluate to what extent this observed CPP pattern resembled the 
accumulation process as predicted by sequential sampling models, we fitted a 
simple race model to the behavioural data. Its estimated parameters were used 
to simulate the accumulation profile for each condition, and the resulting 
waveforms show that all three conditions are predicted to follow a very similar 
trajectory, only differing in amplitude. The order in which the amplitudes differ is 
identical to the one described by the CPP, with the highest amplitude seen for 
‘incongruent’ decisions, followed by ‘uncued’ decisions, and ‘congruent’ 
waveforms showing the lowest amplitude. 
 
Although both the simulated accumulation profile and the CPP display similar 
patterns, it is not immediately clear what caused this pattern. While, as outlined 
above, we expected this pattern for the correct accumulator, summing over the 
accumulators should remove any difference between the conditions. To aid our 
interpretation, we explored the accumulation profiles of both correct and 
incorrect accumulators in both correct and error trials separately and found that 
the differences between the conditions reported above were caused by dividing 
correct from error trials. While the sum of accumulation paths averaged over 
equally weighted correct and error trials showed, as predicted, no difference 
between conditions, correct trials showed that ‘incongruent’ trials accumulated 
higher (followed by ‘uncued’ and ‘congruent’ trials), while error trials displayed 
the reversed pattern. This is likely caused by a bias in inter-trial variability in 
starting point (z) (and potentially intra-trial variability in accumulation; σ2). In the 
‘incongruent’ condition for example, mean starting points are higher in the 
incorrect (cued) than the correct (non-cued) accumulator, which implies that the 
incorrect accumulator often wins, leading to error trials. Trials in which the 
correct accumulator wins are primarily trials in which, by chance, the incorrect 
starting point was further from the upper limit of the starting point distribution 
(and/or large noise in the correct accumulator pushed the correct accumulation 
profile towards the boundary), leading to a larger baseline-threshold distance. 
By averaging accumulation profiles over only correct trials (note that the sum of 
incorrect and correct accumulation profiles was generated, but averaged only 
over correct trials), we selected a biased sample, leading to the difference 
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between the waveforms reported above. Note that averaging the accumulation 
profile over all correct and error trials leads to a qualitatively similar pattern to 
the profile associated with correct trials, arguably due to high accuracy rates 
(the cancellation of any baseline effects described above is only seen with 
equal numbers of correct and error trials). This is also the case for the CPP 
waveform which does not change its shape when both correct and error trials 
remain in the average. Unfortunately, we can only speculate on the shape of the 
CPP associated with error trials, as the quality of the waveform was too low to 
confirm the same patterns that were observed in accumulation profile 
associated with error trials. 
 
Nevertheless, the CPP and the simulated accumulation profile display similar 
patterns, suggesting similar underlying mechanisms, and supporting the role of 
the CPP as an accumulation signal. Further, these findings emphasise the 
importance of a direct comparison between the CPP and model predictions, as 
the patterns reported here are difficult to predict based on intuitive reasoning 
alone.  
 
Note that, due to the design in this study, far fewer trials were obtained for 
‘incongruent’ trials than ‘uncued’ or ‘congruent’ trials (although there were 
enough for each participant and each condition to generate useful ERP 
waveforms). This imbalance in trial numbers could be avoided by inducing 
decision biases using other manipulations, such as imbalanced rewards, rather 
than cues. Note however, that different implementations of decision bias may 
have different effects on decision-making (Diederich & Busemeyer, 2006; Feng 
et al., 2009; Leite & Ratcliff, 2011; Mulder et al., 2012; Summerfield & de Lange, 
2014). 
 
Overall, the different decision biases induced qualitatively similar changes in 
both the model predictions of accumulation profiles and the CPP waveforms. 
This evidence further supports the plausibility of the CPP as a neural correlate 
of the decision variable. 
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4.3. General Discussion 
 
In this study, we aimed to test the role of the CPP as a neural substrate of the 
decision variable as predicted by sequential sampling models. The CPP is a 
centroparietal ERP component which has previously been suggested to display 
decision-related accumulation of evidence independent of sensory and motor 
processes (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 2012; Twomey et al., 
2016). We were able to support its suitability as a decision-related EEG signal 
over other potential signals in Chapter 3, using a simple difficulty manipulation. 
Here, we built on this finding and tested the CPP and its similarity to the 
decision variable using more complex manipulations as well as model fits to 
predict accumulation profiles.  
 
In particular, we aimed not only to explore the effect of previously untested 
manipulations on the CPP, but also to evaluate the resulting waveforms using 
sequential sampling modelling. Neural correlates of accumulation are often 
evaluated based on conceptual hypotheses drawing on abstract interpretations 
of sequential sampling models. However, the dynamics of even simple 
sequential sampling models are difficult to predict conceptually. We therefore 
used a race model to fit the behavioural data and compare the neural data to 
the predicted accumulation profile based on the estimated parameters. 
 
In Experiment 1, we tested the impact of non-stationary evidence on the CPP 
waveform. Previous research had indicated that the CPP is susceptible to a 
change in evidence, a necessary feature of a signal which reflects the 
accumulation of evidence (O’Connell et al., 2012). Our results support this 
finding. While continuous evidence led to a gradual build-up of the CPP 
waveform, interrupted evidence caused a disruption in this build-up. 
Surprisingly, the two different interrupted conditions, one in which evidence was 
stopped, and one in which evidence was reversed, displayed very similar 
waveforms, even though they were associated with different behavioural 
patterns. Nevertheless, the pattern of the CPP closely resembled our model 
predictions. We fitted a race model to the data which accounted for the 
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changing evidence by using a different drift rate for each evidence state, and 
simulated its accumulation profiles for each condition. The model predictions 
showed qualitatively similar patterns to those observed in the CPP. 
 
In Experiment 2, we followed the same approach, but using a manipulation of 
decision bias rather than non-stationary evidence. Previous research suggests 
that biases affect the starting point of accumulation, the effect of which on the 
EEG signal was unclear (Bode et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2011; Rorie et al., 2010). 
We found that the CPP differed in amplitude across bias conditions. In 
particular, the decisions in which a directional cue was incongruent with the 
following motion direction were associated with higher amplitudes than both 
decisions in which the cue was congruent with the motion and decisions in 
which there was no directional cue.  
 
Once again, a race model was able to account for all behavioural data, in this 
case by varying only the starting points across bias conditions. The resulting 
accumulation profile predicted by the model showed qualitative similarities to 
the CPP waveforms. Both the EEG signal and the model prediction displayed a 
pattern in which profiles associated with different bias conditions differed only in 
amplitude, with the profiles of decisions with incongruent cues showing the 
highest amplitude, followed by uncued decisions, and trials with congruent cues 
showing the lowest amplitude. The model fits showed that these differences in 
amplitudes were not strictly the result of baseline differences, which in fact 
cancelled out on average, but were instead caused by a biased representation 
of variability parameters in correct trials. 
 
Overall, the CPP showed waveform alterations for both manipulations, and 
importantly, displayed profiles which were qualitatively similar to accumulation 
profiles predicted by a sequential sampling model. Both the build-up profile and 
the absolute magnitude were shown to vary in the same way as the model 
predictions. These findings provide strong support for the role of the CPP as a 
neural substrate of the decision variable.  
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Despite the substantial similarity between the CPP and the predicted 
accumulation profiles, there were also differences worth noting. For example, in 
Experiment 1, the interruption in the ‘stop’ and ‘reverse’ conditions appears to 
cause a slight initial downward slope, while the model predicts a plateau which 
seems to retain a small positive slope. Additionally, in Experiment 2, the 
amplitude differences between the conditions are far more pronounced in the 
CPP than in the model predictions.  
 
However, it is important to note that the CPP pattern is unlikely to replicate 
model predictions exactly for a number of reasons. Firstly, any model can, at 
best, be an approximation of true biological processes. This is the case here in 
particular, as we used a race model as a representation of sequential sampling 
models in general. This model was chosen as it requires only a minimal number 
of assumptions (compared to, for example, models which include leakage; 
Usher & McClelland, 2001), while still being physiologically plausible (as 
opposed to, for example, the Diffusion model which assumes a single 
accumulator which can become either positive or negative; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
2008). While we suggest that the race model represents sequential sampling 
models as a group fairly well, it is likely that predicted accumulation profiles 
would differ slightly across different sequential sampling models.  
 
A second reason for differences between the CPP and the model predictions 
lies in the nature of EEG recordings. EEG is measured from the scalp and can 
only record the sum of all electrical activity underneath each electrode. Since 
the brain is constantly performing accumulation-unrelated computations, the 
signal-to-noise ratio is low. Most of these computations are unlikely to be time-
locked to the decisions and are therefore averaged out, and the impact of 
conducted activation from more distal sources is reduced using the current 
source density transform which increases the spatial selectivity of the data. 
Nevertheless, a proportion of noise remains. Therefore, even if the EEG 
component contains the activity of the neural populations which accumulate 
decision-related evidence (and these neural populations do so in a manner 
which resembles the model predictions exactly), the resulting ERP is likely to be 
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slightly distorted. For reasons like these, it is difficult to quantify the similarity 
between the CPP and the predicted accumulation16. 
 
In summary, the current chapter provides strong support for the role of the CPP 
as a neural substrate of the decision variable. We have shown that the CPP is 
sensitive to two manipulations which influence decision-making behaviour, 
namely non-stationary evidence and decision biases. Importantly, we fitted a 
sequential sampling model to the behavioural data and simulated the resulting 
accumulation profiles. We found that the CPP waveform closely resembled the 
modelled accumulation. This indicates that the CPP seems to reflect the 
accumulation of evidence and remains a highly plausible correlate of the 
decision variable. 
  
                                               
16 Nevertheless, ongoing work in our lab continues to explore the similarity between neural 
signals and the model predictions and quantitatively compare different model predictions to the 
CPP.  
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5. Multiple-Alternative Decision-Making 
 
For several decades, researchers have been exploring the mechanisms 
underlying perceptual decision-making, and there is now a consensus that the 
way perceptual decisions are made can be described by a family of models 
called sequential sampling models. Sequential sampling models state that to 
make a decision, sensory evidence from the environment is accumulated over 
time, until a set boundary is reached. At this point, the decision is made and the 
motor plan associated with a given boundary is executed. With these simple 
assumptions, sequential sampling models are able to account for behavioural 
decision-making data in a wide range of settings (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; 
Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Smith & 
Ratcliff, 2004; Usher & McClelland, 2001). 
 
While all sequential sampling models share the assumption of the 
accumulation-to-bound processes described above, various models within this 
framework differ in a number of aspects defining this process. Generally 
speaking, there are two types of models: random walk models with a relative 
stopping rule, and accumulator models with an absolute stopping rule (Smith & 
Ratcliff, 2004). Random walk models assume that there is only one 
accumulator, in which all sensory evidence is accumulated to a single total. 
Accumulation begins at a starting point which is centred between two 
boundaries, each associated with a given alternative, and the accumulated 
evidence can become both positive or negative (e.g. Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). 
Accumulator models on the other hand, assume that, in a choice between two 
alternatives, there are two accumulators, each accumulating the evidence in 
favour of a single alternative. The two accumulation processes race towards a 
common threshold and a decision is formed depending on which reaches the 
threshold first (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). An example 
of an accumulator model is the leaky competing accumulator model (LCA; 
Usher & McClelland, 2001), which is arguably the most physiologically plausible 
of the sequential sampling models.  
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One major advantage of these models over random walk models is that they 
can be easily extended to decisions with any number of alternatives, by simply 
adding accumulators (e.g. Brown & Heathcote, 2008). Random walk models, 
such as the Diffusion model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), on the other hand, offer 
no simple generalisation to multiple-alternative decision-making (although 
several attempts to extend the Diffusion model have been suggested; Krajbich 
& Rangel, 2011; Ratcliff et al., 2016; Ratcliff & Starns, 2013). 
 
The ability of models of perceptual decision-making to apply to multi-alternative 
choices has received comparatively little attention. Although a large body of 
research has provided many findings shedding light on how we make 
perceptual decisions, virtually all of these findings have been based on two-
alternative choices. While it is practical to reduce cognitive processes to their 
most basic form to study them in the lab, the ecological validity of the 
associated findings is questionable. Choices between two clearly defined, 
opposing alternatives are rare in everyday life, where we are more likely to face 
choices between a large number of potential responses with evidence 
supporting a subset of alternatives.  
 
To date, only a small number of studies have explored multi-alternative 
perceptual decision-making. Studies which have explored this area have 
primarily focused on testing the ability of different models to account for more 
complex behavioural patterns associated with an increasing number of choice 
alternatives (Bogacz et al., 2007; Brown, Steyvers, & Wagenmakers, 2009; 
McMillen & Holmes, 2006; Nunes & Gurney, 2016; Roe, Busemeyer, & 
Townsend, 2001). Particular attention has been paid to the LCA model, which 
has successfully accounted for multi-alternative decision-making in a variety of 
settings, including standard motion discrimination tasks extended to three 
possible motion directions, multi-alternative decisions following non-stationary 
evidence, and value-based choices between several options (Bogacz et al., 
2007; Ditterich, 2010; McMillen & Holmes, 2006; Tsetsos et al., 2010, 2011). 
 
A human behavioural study on multi-alternative decisions was conducted by 
Niwa and Ditterich (2008), who presented three subjects with a three-alternative 
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random dot motion task, and found that a relatively simple model, based on a 
race between three accumulators, each accumulating the net evidence for a 
given alternative, was able to account for the behavioural data. However, it was 
noted that the behavioural data were not able to distinguish well between 
different types of sequential sampling models. In a follow-up study, Ditterich 
(2010) showed that several different models can explain the behavioural 
dataset, but found that, while different models make similar predictions for 
behavioural data, they differ in their internal dynamics and therefore in their 
predictions of a decision variable (i.e. the accumulation profile, described by 
sequential sampling models). He thereby highlighted the need to explore neural 
data as a correlate of the accumulation process, in order to gain insights into 
how we make perceptual multi-alternative decisions. 
 
Only a small number of studies have recorded neural activity associated 
with decision-making with multiple alternatives. For binary decisions on the 
other hand, several neural signals have been studied and suggested to reflect 
the decision variable. For example, single-cell recordings in non-human 
primates have shown that firing rates of neurons in the lateral intraparietal area 
(LIP), but also the frontal eye field (FEF), and the superior colliculus (SC) 
display accumulation-to-bound characteristics in perceptual saccadic decision-
making tasks (Gold & Shadlen, 2000, 2003; Paré & Wurtz, 2001; Roitman & 
Shadlen, 2002; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001).  
 
Although a lot of research has been dedicated to studying neural correlates of 
decision-making, the vast majority of it focused solely on binary choices. Only a 
small number of studies have investigated the effects of multiple alternatives on 
neural correlates of the decision variable in non-human primates. In an early set 
of studies, Basso and Wurtz (1997, 1998) found that activity of monkey SC 
neurons decreased with the number of possible targets in a saccadic multi-
target task. A decade later, this finding was explored more thoroughly and in the 
context of sequential sampling models by Churchland et al. (2008) who 
presented two monkeys with a two and a four-choice random dot motion task at 
different difficulty levels and recorded the firing rates from neurons in the LIP. 
Behavioural results showed that, as expected in accordance with Hick’s law 
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(Hick, 1952), reaction times (RTs) were higher and accuracy scores were lower 
in the four-choice task, compared to the two-choice task. Importantly, 
Churchland et al. (2008) demonstrated a number of interesting patterns in the 
neurophysiological data. They were able to demonstrate that decisions with four 
alternatives show the same bounded accumulation profile, with firing rates 
reaching the same stereotyped level in both two and four-choice tasks. 
However, the firing rates associated with the two tasks differed in the beginning 
of the decision-making process as, in line with Basso and Wurtz (1997, 1998), 
four-choice decisions showed a large decrease in firing rate. This decreased 
level of activity at the beginning of the decision and the unaltered firing rate at 
response demonstrates a larger excursion extent in four-choice compared to 
two-choice tasks.  
 
Higher decision boundaries, or more precisely, larger baseline-boundary 
distances, are associated with higher response caution, as more evidence has 
to be accumulated to make a decision, thereby improving the signal-to-noise 
ratio, but increasing decision times (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Heitz, 2014; 
Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). Since an increase in the number of alternatives 
increases the level of uncertainty associated with a given decision, this increase 
in response caution may be necessary for effective decision-making. 
Churchland et al. (2008) were able to account for their behavioural data using 
an accumulator model. It was later demonstrated that the data can also be 
explained by a recurrent cortical circuit model (Furman & Wang, 2008). 
 
The finding of a reduction in firing rate in neurons associated with perceptual 
decision-making, with increasing numbers of alternatives has since been 
supported by a number of studies. Balan, Oristaglio, Schneider, and Gottlieb 
(2008) used a visual search task with two, four, or six elements while recording 
from LIP neurons, and found that firing rates decreased as elements were 
added to the display. Again, this difference was not seen at the time of the 
response. Similar findings have been reported for FEF neurons, as their firing 
rate during a visual-search task reduced as the number of visual elements 
increased (Cohen, Heitz, Woodman, & Schall, 2009). Another study using a 
saccadic colour-to-location task found the previously reported reduction in FEF 
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firing rate at the beginning of the trial, however, unlike previous studies, a 
reverse pattern was found at response time, with higher activity with higher 
numbers of alternatives (Lee & Keller, 2008).  
 
While, as briefly summarised above, there are some studies investigating the 
effects of multi-alternative decisions on neural correlates of the decision 
variable in non-human primates, which, overall, seem to suggest a baseline 
decrease to be associated with an increasing number of alternatives, there is 
little corresponding data on human multi-alternative decision-making.  
 
There are studies which have used functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to explore human decision-making with multiple alternatives. For 
example, Keuken et al. (2015) used a random dot motion task with three, five, 
or seven alternatives and found increased activity in the subthalamic nucleus 
with an increasing number of alternatives. Further, Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, 
Dolan, and Seymour (2006) explored ‘exploration-exploitation’ behaviour using 
a multiple-choice decision-making task, and found that the frontopolar cortex 
and intraparietal sulcus showed increased activity during exploratory decisions.  
 
However, we are not aware of any studies which directly investigated neural 
correlates of evidence accumulation in the human brain. A number of, primarily 
electroencephalographic (EEG) signals have been suggested to reflect the 
decision variable in the human brain in the context of binary decisions 
(although, to our knowledge, none have been explored in the context of multi-
alternative decision-making). Among the most prominent are the event-related 
desynchronisation (ERD) in the beta frequency range (Donner et al., 2009; 
O’Connell et al., 2012; Siegel et al., 2011), an event-related potential (ERP) 
known as the centroparietal positivity (CPP; O’Connell et al., 2012), and the 
lateralised readiness potential (LRP; Kelly & O’Connell, 2013). Each of these 
signals has been suggested to show decision-related accumulation of evidence. 
Two of these signals, namely the LRP and the beta ERD, are motor preparation 
signals and therefore comparable to accumulation-related neural signals in non-
human primates, which are typically recorded from oculomotor neurons. This 
implies that these signals, both from humans and non-human primates, 
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measure the decision-making process indirectly by tracking the preparation of 
the motor response which terminates the decision (i.e. saccades in monkeys 
and hand movements in humans). While this does not pose a problem in 
research with non-human primates which relies on single-cell recordings, 
electrophysiological recordings in humans are primarily restricted to EEG 
measures, which have low spatial resolution and therefore limited utility to 
research multi-alternative decision-making.  
 
EEG is measured from the scalp and can therefore only record the sum of the 
electrical activity of all brain areas in the proximity of each electrode. It cannot 
track the activity of a specific region or neural population. However, signals of 
motor preparation are lateralised with any limb movement being processed in 
the contralateral hemisphere. This lateralisation implies that there is enough 
spatial distance between the regions preparing left and right-hand movements 
to be tracked individually by EEG recordings. For example, a hand movement is 
associated with a negativity over motor areas which is larger in the hemisphere 
contralateral to the movement (Ikeda & Shibasaki, 1992; Lang et al., 1991). By 
subtracting ipsilateral activity from contralateral recordings, any non-effector-
specific activity is cancelled out, resulting in the LRP component (or, if power in 
the beta band is used, lateralised beta ERD), which tracks limb-specific motor 
preparation. This effector-specific nature of the LRP and other motor-related 
signals depends crucially on the lateralisation of the human motor cortex and on 
‘right vs left’ movements. It cannot be extended to more than two response 
alternatives. Hence, it is unsurprising that the effects of multi-alternative 
decision-making on neural signals in the human brain remain largely 
unexplored.  
 
In this experiment, we therefore aimed to rectify this and study the impact of 
multiple alternatives on a neural correlate of the decision variable in humans. 
Since motor-related EEG signals cannot be informative for decisions with more 
than two response alternatives, only the CPP remains as an established neural 
correlate of decision-making in the human EEG, which could potentially be 
extended to multi-alternative decisions. However, the CPP, even for binary 
decisions, does not allow for a distinction between response alternatives. It 
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arguably reflects the sum of all accumulators (see Chapter 4) and displays the 
same profile regardless of which response is chosen. Here, we therefore 
choose a different neural correlate of decision-making, which allows us to track 
the preparation of individual responses. For this purpose, we use transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS). 
 
TMS is a form of brain stimulation, which, when applied over the motor cortex, 
can induce electrical responses, called motor evoked potentials (MEPs), in the 
muscle associated with the stimulated region (Barker et al., 1985; Merton & 
Morton, 1980; Merton et al., 1982). Importantly, these evoked potentials can be 
used to index the level of motor preparation in the primary motor cortex or 
adjacent premotor areas (Bestmann et al., 2008; Hadar et al., 2012; Hadar et 
al., 2015; Kiers et al., 1997). It has been established that, given that a decision 
requires a motor response, motor preparation occurs throughout the decision-
making process (Coles et al., 1985; Gluth et al., 2013; Hadar et al., 2012; 
Michelet et al., 2010) rather than in a serial fashion after the termination of the 
decision-making process, as previously suggested (Donders, 1969; Sternberg, 
1969). Therefore, following the same logic as tracking motor-related EEG 
signals, which implies that signals of motor preparation display the same build-
up as the accumulation profile itself, MEPs can be used as a correlate of the 
decision variable. This concept has already been shown in a number of studies. 
For example, Michelet et al. (2010) found that MEPs of responding muscles 
increased over the course of a decision before reaching a constant maximum 
immediately prior to the response. Similarly, Hadar et al. (2015) smoothed 
MEPs at different time points using a Gaussian kernel to generate a continuous 
signal of corticospinal excitability, and suggested that it reflects ongoing 
evidence accumulation. In their study, ambiguous faces were presented in a 
gender categorisation task and it was found that more difficult categorisations 
were associated with longer activations in the responding muscle than easy 
ones. Additionally, the authors fitted a sequential sampling model and revealed 
qualitative similarities between its prediction and the MEP signal, further 
supporting the validity of the MEP signal as a correlate of the decision variable. 
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Building on the approach used by Hadar et al. (2015), the current study set out 
to explore multi-alternative decision-making by tracking continuous MEP signals 
as a correlate of the decision variable. To this end, a colour-discrimination task 
with either two or four response alternatives was used. By mapping two 
separate responses, each recruiting a different dominant muscle, to each hand 
and measuring the activity of both muscles in the hand contralateral to the brain 
stimulation, we were able to record MEPs associated with each response 
separately (though not during the same trials; see Figure 5.2). Like Hadar et al. 
(2015), we evoked MEPs at random time points throughout the decision-making 
process and later smoothed them to generate a continuous readout of motor 
excitability. We hypothesised that, in line with its role as an accumulation-like 
signal, the MEP signal associated with the responding muscle would build up 
over the course of the decision and peak at the time of response. Importantly, 
based on evidence from non-human primates reviewed above, we hypothesised 
that there would be a baseline difference in the MEP signal between two and 
four-choice trials, with four-choice decisions leading to a reduction in baseline 
activity.  
 
Since the approach of using a continuous MEP signal as a correlate of decision-
making is still a novel one, we also included a manipulation of difficulty. The 
impact of difficulty on accumulation has been studied extensively (Mulder et al., 
2014; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Teodorescu & Usher, 2013) and has also been 
demonstrated in MEP signals (Hadar et al., 2015). We hypothesised that their 
findings would be replicated here. 
 
To further test the role of the MEP signal as a correlate of the decision variable, 
and explore the effects of multiple alternatives, we fitted a sequential sampling 
model to the behavioural data and used the resulting parameter estimates to 
predict the accumulation profile associated with each accumulator. To this end, 
we used the LCA model (Usher & McClelland, 2001), as it is an accumulator 
model which lends itself to multiple-alternative decision-making more easily 
than a random walk model, and has been successfully applied to these 
decisions in a number of previous studies (Bogacz et al., 2007; Ditterich, 2010; 
McMillen & Holmes, 2006; Tsetsos et al., 2010, 2011). 
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Due to our unique approach, which allowed us to track the evolution of 
preparation of each response separately using MEPs, as well as predict the 
accumulation profile of each accumulator using the LCA, we were able to not 
only explore the decision variable with different numbers of response 
alternatives, but also directly compare the profile of the measured and predicted 
decision variable in a more detailed way. 
 
5.1. Methods 
5.1.1. Participants 
We recruited a total of 13 participants (five males) with a mean age 26.23 (SD = 
7.67). Each participant took part in between two and four sessions (each lasting 
between one and three hours) and completed on average 4166 trials in total. 
Participants were recruited using poster advertisements and word of mouth, 
resulting in a sample which was primarily made up of students and staff at City, 
University of London. Three of the participants were researchers in the current 
project. All other participants were paid £ 8 per hour. All procedures were 
approved by the City, University of London Psychology Department Ethics 
Committee. Extensive information about the brain stimulation used was 
provided at least 24 hours before the first sessions. Additionally, each 
participant completed a medical screening questionnaire along with the 
standard informed consent, as well as a post-stimulation questionnaire. 
 
5.1.2. Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants were asked to complete a colour-discrimination task. In each trial, 
an array of coloured pixels appeared on a screen. Each array consisted of 
pixels of four different colours (green, red, blue, yellow), and participants were 
asked to indicate which colour was most prevalent, using the corresponding one 
of four response buttons (see Figure 5.1). 
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5.1.2.1. Colour Calibration 
In order to ensure that the difficulty of the task did not vary excessively across 
different trials depending on which colour was dominant, it was important to 
match the perceived salience of the four colours. To this end, three participants 
(one male, mean age= 33.33 (SD = 7.09), all researchers in the current project) 
completed a colour-matching task, using a Method of Adjustment procedure. 
Each participant was presented with an array of coloured pixels, which initially 
consisted of pixels of two different colours, one fixed colour (green), and one 
colour that could be adjusted to match the fixed colour in perceived salience, by 
increasing or decreasing its brightness using ‘up’ and ‘down’ keys on a 
keyboard. When participants found the appropriate colour intensity, the ‘enter’ 
key was pressed to confirm their selection and a third colour was added to the 
array. Again, participants were asked to adjust its brightness before the fourth 
colour was added and the procedure was repeated. The brightness was 
adjusted by converting the original colours into HSV colour space, in which 
colours are defined by the parameters hue, saturation, and value, and 
increasing/decreasing the ‘value’ parameter by a value of 0.05 for each 
‘up’/’down’ press. Each participant completed 60 trials. The initial intensity as 
well as the order of the three colours that were to be adjusted (red, yellow, blue) 
were randomised across trials. The chosen colour intensities were averaged 
across trials and participants, resulting in the following colours that were used in 
the experiment: green (RGB [0 0.6 0]), red (RGB [0.8 0 0]), yellow (RGB [0.92 
0.74 0]), blue (RGB [0.12 0.12 0.61]). 
 
5.1.2.2. Stimuli and Experiment Setup 
All stimuli were written in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), primarily 
using the Psychtoolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 
1997), and presented on a Display++ LCD monitor (Cambridge Research 
Systems, Ltd., Rochester, UK, display size: 41 cm x 30 cm), operating at a 
refresh rate of 100 Hz and a resolution of 1240 x 786. Participants were seated 
at a distance of approximately 100 cm from the screen. Each trial presented a 
stimulus array of coloured pixels (6 x 6 degrees of visual angle; each coloured 
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pixel spanned 2 x 2 screen pixels, resulting in an array of 145 x 145 coloured 
pixels).  
 
Participants held two digital response buttons interfaced via a 16 bit A/D card 
(National Instruments X-series PCIe-6323, sampling rate 100,000 Hz) in each 
hand, one between their thumb and index finger (pinch), and one in the palm of 
their hand, attached to a plastic cylinder (grasp; Hadar et al., 2012). The pinch 
response required participants to squeeze the small button using index finger 
and thumb, contracting the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle, while the 
grasp response was made by tightly gripping the cylinder, activating the 
abductor digiti minimi (ADM) muscle. Each colour was mapped to one of the 
four response buttons. The colour-response mapping was randomised across 
participants.  
 
In the experiment, each trial consisted of a cue (500 ms), the coloured stimulus 
array (2000 ms or until response), and a brief inter-stimulus interval (minimum 
500 ms; see Figure 5.1 and section 5.1.3). The experiment consisted of both 
two and four-choice trials, as well as easy and hard trials. To manipulate the 
difficulty of the task, the percentage of pixels of the dominant colour varied 
between 33% (easy) and 30% (hard). The remaining colours each took up 22% 
and 23% of the array respectively. The cue at the beginning of each trial 
informed participants whether a given trial was a two or a four-choice trial by 
presenting either two or four coloured squares representing the possible 
choices. In two-choice trials, possible responses were either both in the same 
hand (‘within’) or both requiring the same movement (‘between’), leading to four 
potential combinations (‘within-left’, ‘within-right’, ‘between-pinch’, ‘between-
grasp’; see Figure 5.1). 
 
One third of trials were four-choice, one third were two-choice ‘within’, i.e. the 
two possible responses were on one hand (left pinch - left grasp, right pinch - 
right grasp), and one third of trials were two-choice ‘between’, i.e. responses 
from both hands were possible (left pinch - right pinch, left grasp - right grasp). 
The order of the trials was randomised. Note that the difference between the 
two and four-choice trials lay solely in the instructions conveyed by the cue, and 
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that the stimulus array and the percentage of the four colours within it did not 
change. 
 
In the first session, participants completed 150 practice trials, to familiarise 
themselves with the task and the colour-response mapping. Participants 
completed between five and six experimental blocks per session, with each 
block consisting of 168 trials (plus additional trials to regulate TMS frequency; 
see section 5.1.3). 
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Figure 5.1: Colour discrimination task: each trial began with a fixation dot in the middle of the screen, 
followed by a cue which indicated which responses were possible in the following stimulus. Then, the 
colour array was displayed for 2000 ms or until the response. a) Four-choice task: all possible cues were 
displayed, indicating a four-choice trial; b) Two-choice task: only two of the possible cues were shown, 
indicating a two-choice trial. Here both cues are on the left-hand side, indicating that a left-hand response 
is required (‘within’ trial). c) Each cue/colour was associated with a specific response: the top right cue 
(here: green) was associated with a right-hand ‘pinch’ response, the top left cue (here: blue) was 
associated with a left-hand ‘pinch’ response, the bottom right cue (here: yellow) was associated with a 
right-hand ‘grasp’ response, and the bottom left cue (here: red) was associated with a left-hand ‘grasp’ 
response. Note that the colour-response mappings were randomised across participants while the cue 
location-response mapping remained the same; d) all possible two-choice combinations. In ‘within’ trials, 
both possible responses were on the same hand, while in ‘between’ trials, the two possible responses 
were on two hands but using the same response (pinch/grasp). Note that the size of the coloured pixels 
has been increased for illustration. 
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5.1.3. Stimulation and Recording 
Participants’ muscle activity was recorded using surface electromyography 
(EMG), recorded at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz via a 13 bit A/D Biometrics 
Datalink system (version 7.5, Biometrics Ltd., Ladysmith, VA, U.S.A., 2008) and 
band-pass filtered (20 to 450 Hz). Surface Ag/AgCl electrodes (22 mm x 28 
mm, part No. SX230FW, Biometrics Ltd., Ladysmith, VA) were placed on the 
skin above the first dorsal interosseous (FDI), and the abductor digiti minimi 
(ADM) of each hand, as they contribute to the ‘pinch’ and ‘grasp’ responses 
respectively. Reference electrodes were placed at distances of approximately 2 
cm to each of the four active electrodes. The recorded EMG signal of the right 
ADM and FDI was also passed to speakers placed on the left and right of the 
participant respectively, with noise informing participants that their muscles 
were not fully relaxed between responses. 
 
During the experiment, single-pulse TMS was applied using a MagstimRapid2 
biphasic stimulator (The Magstim Co. Ltd., Whitland, UK). To induce motor 
evoked potentials (MEP) in both the ADM and the FDI of the right hand, a 70-
mm figure-of-eight coil (external casing diameter approximately 90 mm for each 
loop) was positioned on the scalp over the left motor cortex. The exact location 
and stimulation intensity was adjusted for each participant individually and was 
set at approximately 110% of the resting motor threshold. The resting motor 
threshold was defined as the minimal intensity to elicit an MEP with a peak-to-
peak amplitude of approximately 50 μV in 50% of stimulations.  
 
TMS pulses were planned in 57% of trials from each condition. In order to 
ensure a good distribution of TMS pulses during a baseline interval and over the 
course of the reaction time, TMS trials were divided into four equally frequent 
time bins between -200 and 700 ms relative to the stimulus onset (between 300 
and 1200 ms relative to cue onset). Within a given bin, the exact stimulation 
time was drawn randomly for each trial. Since the experiment followed a single-
pulse TMS protocol, the stimulation pulses were required to occur at a maximal 
frequency of 0.2 Hz. If, by chance, a planned pulse followed a previous one 
after less than 5000 ms, the task was adjusted in several ways. If the timespan 
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between the previous and the planned pulse was less than 5000 ms but more 
than 4000 ms, the inter-trial interval was increased in order to decrease the 
pulse frequency to its necessary limit. If, on the other hand, the duration 
between the last and the planned pulse was less than 4000 ms, the planned 
trial was replaced with the next planned stimulation free trial. If there were no 
stimulation free trials left, random stimulation free trials were generated in order 
to increase the interval between TMS pulses. Due to this method, an average of 
434 trials were added per session, leading, in total, to an average of 1354 trials 
per session. Planned pulses were not delivered if a response had already been 
detected, as this precluded analysis of the resulting MEP (see below). 
 
5.1.4. EMG Processing 
5.1.4.1. Pre-processing 
All EMG processing was performed in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.). 
Data from each trial were aligned to the stimulus onset and visually inspected. 
An algorithm applying the Teager-Kaiser energy operator (TKEO) was used to 
detect the onset time of muscle activity (EMG RT) associated with each 
response (Li & Aruin, 2005; Li, Zhou, & Aruin, 2007; Solnik, Rider, Steinweg, 
Devita, & Hortobágyi, 2010). The discrete TKEO ψ for a given EMG value x of 
the sample n, was defined as: 
 𝜓[𝑥(𝑛)] =  𝑥2(𝑛) − 𝑥(𝑛 + 1)𝑥(𝑛 − 1) (5.1.) 
 A threshold-based method was used to identify the onset of muscle activity. 
The threshold was determined as: 
  𝑇 =  𝜇 + һ 𝜎 (5.2.) 
With μ and σ representing the mean and standard deviation of a baseline period 
(-300 to 200 ms relative to cue onset), and h set to 3. Additionally, all trials were 
visually inspected and the EMG onset was adjusted manually if necessary. 
Visual inspection provided no information about the experimental condition of a 
given trial. Trials with muscular artifacts, no detectable EMG onset, or partial 
responses on more than one channel were excluded from further analysis 
(6.41% of all recorded trials). 
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We further excluded all trials with button RTs of more than or equal to 2000 ms 
or less than 180 ms, or EMG RTs of more than 1850 ms or less than 30 ms (< 
1% of all recorded trials). The remaining EMG RTs were normalised by the 
median EMG RT per participant and per session. 
 
In TMS trials, MEP amplitudes in both channels (FDI and ADM) of the right 
hand were defined as the difference between the minimal and maximal EMG 
values in a time window of 10 to 40 ms relative to stimulation time. Trials which 
showed muscular activity previous to the TMS pulse, defined by EMG 
amplitudes exceeding 50 μV in a period of 200 ms preceding the stimulation, 
were excluded from further analysis (4.51% of all trials). Further, trials in which 
no MEP was visible or in which the amplitude of the MEP could not be 
accurately detected due to saturation were discarded (2.02% of all trials). Trials 
were also excluded if the participant’s response preceded the planned TMS 
(4.36% of all trials).  
 
In total, 17.53% of all recorded trials were discarded, leading to a total of 44,669 
usable trials (note that 35.38% of TMS trials were excluded, with a total of 
13,588 usable TMS trials remaining for analysis). The remaining MEP 
amplitudes were z-scored per muscle, session, and participant, in order to 
normalise the magnitudes of evoked responses which are likely to vary between 
muscles.  
 
5.1.4.2. Re-categorisation 
The channels (FDI and ADM) of correct trials were reclassified into one of four 
categories. MEPs recorded from correctly responding muscles were classed as 
‘Correct’, while MEPs from the non-responding muscles were classified into 
three different error categories, ‘Error1’, ‘Error2’, and ‘Error 3’.  
 
MEPs were categorised as ‘Error 1’ if they were either non-responding but cued 
in two-choice trials, or non-responding but on the same hand as the correctly 
responding muscle in four-choice trials. ‘Error 2’ referred to MEPs from non-
responding muscles in two-choice trials which were not cued but were either on 
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the same hand as the responding muscle (‘two-choice between’) or on the 
same muscle of the other hand (‘two-choice within’), as well as to MEPs from 
the same muscle as the responding muscle but on the other hand in four-choice 
trials. Lastly, MEPs recorded from non-responding muscles which are neither 
on the same hand nor the same muscle on the other hand, as the responding 
muscle, were categorised as ‘Error 3’ (see Figure 5.2). For example, if a four-
choice trial required the correct response ‘right pinch’, MEPs recorded from the 
right FDI (right pinch) were classed as ‘Correct’, MEPs recorded from the right 
ADM (right grasp) as ‘Error 1’, while the left FDI (left pinch) would be 
categorised as ‘Error 2’, and the left ADM (left grasp) as ‘Error 3’. Note 
however, that only the left motor cortex was stimulated, eliciting MEPs in only 
the right hand. Therefore, any given trial only provided two MEPs which were 
sorted into two of the four categories. 
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Figure 5.2: MEP categorisation: a) each hand performed pinch and grasp responses, recruiting the FDI 
and ADM muscle respectively. Non-responding FDI and ADM muscles are displayed in grey, and 
responding muscles are shown in green. MEPs were only recorded from the right hand (recorded muscles 
indicated by dark red border). b) four-choice trial resulting in a right grasp response. In four-choice trials, 
the responding muscle is labelled ‘Correct’, the non-responding muscle on the same hand is labelled ‘Error 
1’, and the muscles on the non-responding hand are labelled ‘Error 2’ (for the same muscle as the 
responding one) and ‘Error 3’ (for the remaining muscle). Therefore, here, the recorded MEPs are classed 
as ‘Correct’ (‘grasp’ muscle, ADM), and ‘Error 1’ (passive ‘pinch’ muscle, FDI). c) Two-choice trial (within) 
resulting in a left pinch response. In ‘within’ two-choice trials, the responding muscle is classed as 
‘Correct’, the non-responding but cued muscle is classed as ‘Error 1’ (here, the non-responding muscle on 
the same hand), the muscle corresponding to the responding muscle but on the opposite hand is labelled 
‘Error 2’ and the remaining muscle is labelled ‘Error 3’. Here, the recorded MEPs are classed as ‘Error 3’ 
(‘grasp’ muscle ADM), and ‘Error 2’ (‘pinch’ muscle FDI). d) Two-choice trial (between) resulting in a right 
pinch response. In ‘between’ two-choice trials, the responding muscle is classed as ‘Correct’, the non-
responding but cued muscle is classed as ‘Error 1’ (here, the same muscle in the opposite hand), the non-
responding muscle on the same hand is labelled ‘Error 2’ and the remaining muscle is labelled ‘Error 3’. 
Here, the recorded MEPs are classed as ‘Error 2’ (‘grasp’ muscle ADM), and ‘Correct’ (‘pinch’ muscle FDI). 
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5.1.4.3. Smoothing 
For each correct/error category and each condition, all MEPs associated with 
correct trials were pooled across participants and sessions. To this end, the 
stimulation times were normalised for each session and participant and 
expressed as a percentage of their median EMG RT (of stimulation free trials). 
Pooled MEPs were sorted in time and aligned to both the stimulus and the 
response, then smoothed (see Figure 5.3). 
 
In order to generate a continuous signal, the amplitudes of the sorted MEPs 
were smoothed using a Gaussian kernel: 
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(5.3.) 
Where N is the number of MEPs, each being associated with a magnitude Yi 
and a time ti. The smoothed signal was calculated in time steps of 1% median 
EMG RT, using a smoothing kernel with a full-width half maximum of 5% 
median EMG RT. 
 
A smoothed signal was generated for each time-lock (stimulus and response-
locked), each correct/error category (‘Correct’, ‘Error1’, ‘Error2’, and ‘Error3’), 
and each condition (number of alternatives: two/four, difficulty: easy/hard). 
Additionally, we generated a smoothed signal for the difference in MEP 
responses between the ‘Correct’ and the ‘Error 1’ muscles. This difference 
between a responding and a non-responding muscle cancels out any non-
specific spinal influences which affect the MEPs of both muscles equally, and 
importantly, has therefore been suggested as the most suitable neurometric 
signal to reflect the decision variable in this context (Hadar et al., 2015).  
 
Although we were able to generate smoothed MEP signals for each of the four 
responses (‘Correct’, ‘Error1’, ‘Error2’, and ‘Error3’; see above), this was only 
possible by pooling MEP recordings from different trials. In order to take 
differences between MEP values and accurately remove any non-specific spinal 
effects, however, only MEPs recorded at the same time in the same trial can be 
used. Since the only trials in which we recorded MEPs for both ‘Correct’ and 
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‘Error 1’ responses simultaneously are four-choice trials in which the correct 
response is on the right hand, and two-choice ‘within’ trials, in which both cued 
responses are on the right hand, we selected these trials to create a smoothed 
MEP signal for the difference between the responding (‘Correct’) and non-
responding (here: ‘Error 1’) trials. 
 
  
Figure 5.3: MEP processing: a) MEPs are recorded from two muscles (right FDI and right ADM, shown 
here as responding and non-responding) during each TMS trial; b) z-scored MEPs from each channel are 
sorted into one of four categories (‘Correct’, ‘Error 1’, ‘Error 2’, ‘Error 3’; see Figure 5.2) and smoothed to 
generate a continuous MEP signal. 
5.1.4.4. Statistical Analysis 
Based on previous research in non-human primates (Balan et al., 2008; 
Churchland et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2009), we hypothesised that two-choice 
and four-choice trials would differ during the baseline period, with two-choice 
MEPs displaying higher amplitudes than four-choice MEPs. To test this, we 
conducted a paired t-test by first finding the mean absolute MEP size (for each 
participant) of all MEPs which were recorded prior to the stimulus onset and 
associated with a cued response. This means that, for four-choice trials, all 
MEPs during the baseline-period were used, while for two-choice trials, only 
MEPs from muscles categorised as ‘Correct’ or ‘Error 1’ were used.  
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We also expected a difference in the MEP signal depending on the difficulty of 
the task, with ‘easy’ trials displaying a steeper accumulation rate than ‘hard’ 
trials. To test this, we collapsed over two-choice and four-choice trials, and fitted 
a straight line to the stimulus-locked (between 50% and 90% median EMG RT) 
and response-locked (between -50% and -10% median EMG RT) MEP signal 
based on the difference between responding and non-responding muscles, for 
‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials. We then subtracted the resulting slope for ‘hard’ trials 
from the slope associated with ‘easy’ trials. We used a non-parametric 
permutation test with 1999 iterations to generate new sets of resampled ‘easy’ 
and ‘hard’ conditions (without replacement) and calculated the slope difference 
between them. The original slope difference was then compared to the resulting 
null distribution of differences. 
 
5.1.5. Model 
We used the LCA model to fit the behavioural data (Usher & McClelland, 2001). 
The LCA is an accumulator model and is therefore easily extended to multiple 
alternatives. The accumulation traces are defined by a drift rate v as well as 
noise, and race towards a threshold A. The LCA is a comparatively complex 
sequential sampling model as it is designed to explain the accumulation 
process in a more neurophysiologically plausible way than other models within 
this framework. To this end, the LCA includes a leakage parameter k, aiming to 
account for the finding that neural excitatory input currents decay over time 
(Abbott, 1991; Hodgkin & Huxley, 1990; Stein, 1967). Although this effect is 
decreased by recurrent self-excitation in populations of neurons, Usher and 
McClelland (2001) argued that his passive decay means that information is not 
integrated perfectly and that leaky integrators are a more physiologically 
plausible model of evidence accumulation. Additionally, the LCA implements 
physiological evidence suggesting lateral inhibition between neuronal 
populations (Desimone, 1998; Reynolds et al., 1999), by including a parameter 
β for mutual inhibition between accumulators (see Figure 5.4).  
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Thus, in a binary decision involving the accumulators m and n, the change in 
activation in accumulator m is given by: 
  𝑑𝑥𝑚 =  𝐼𝑚 − 𝑘 𝑥𝑚 − 𝛽𝑥𝑛 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)  (5.4.) 
Where I is the input into the accumulator and N(0,σ2) is noise drawn from a 
normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of σ. To further 
strengthen the neural plausibility of the LCA, the authors added a threshold 
function to prevent accumulation from dropping below zero, as the activity of a 
neuronal population, which accumulation arguably represents, cannot be 
negative:  
 𝑥𝑚(𝑡 + 1) = max (0, 𝑥𝑚(𝑡)  + 𝑑𝑥𝑚) (5.5.) 
In accordance with other models, the LCA assumes that a decision is made when 
either of the accumulators reaches the threshold A, and the RT is made up of the 
time required to reach the threshold, and a non-decision time Ter, which accounts 
for sensory and motor processes before and after the accumulation process. 
 
Figure 5.4: Standard LCA model: Left: two accumulators, one for the correct alternative, and one for the 
incorrect alternative, race towards a threshold A, starting at a starting point z (typically z = 0)and increasing 
at a rate given by the drift rates vcorrect and vincorrect respectively. Right: Two accumulators ∑1 and ∑2 receive 
input I1 and I2. The accumulation of a given accumulator is affected by leakage over time (k) and by inhibition 
from the other accumulator (β). 
5.1.5.1. Model Fit 
In order to apply the LCA to our data set, we tested a total of three models (see 
Table 5.1). In Model 1, we extended the model to include four accumulators. In 
a four-choice task, the drift rate of the correct accumulator was given by vcorrect, 
while the drift rate for all other accumulators was given by vincorrect. The starting 
point zfour-choice was set to 0, and along with the threshold A and the leakage k, 
equal across accumulators. The inhibition between accumulators was given by 
two parameters, β1 and β2. Separate inhibition parameters are chosen 
depending on the anatomical adjacency of responses, with one parameter 
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describing inhibition between different muscles of the same hand or between 
the same muscles on each hand, and one describing the inhibition between 
different muscles on different hands. Specifically, β2 describes the inhibition 
induced by the evidence associated with the opposite response and opposite 
hand relative to a given accumulator, while inhibition between all other 
accumulators is given by β1 (see Figure 5.5). This means that the change in 
accumulation for each accumulator is given by: 
𝑑𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 =  𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 − 𝑘 𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 − 𝛽1𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟1 − 𝛽1𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟2 − 𝛽2𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟3 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
𝑑𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟1 =  𝐼𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟1 − 𝑘 𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟1 − 𝛽1𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 − 𝛽1𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟3 − 𝛽2𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟2 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
𝑑𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟2 =  𝐼𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟2 − 𝑘 𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟2 − 𝛽1𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 − 𝛽1𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟3 − 𝛽2𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟1 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
𝑑𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟3 =  𝐼𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟3 − 𝑘 𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟3 − 𝛽1𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟1 − 𝛽1𝑥𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟2 − 𝛽2𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
(5.6.) 
In two-choice decisions the same four-accumulator structure was used with the 
following exceptions: based on previously demonstrated baseline differences 
(e.g. Churchland et al., 2008), the two accumulators associated with the cued 
responses (‘Correct’ and ‘Error 1’; see Figure 5.2) started the accumulation 
process at a starting point defined by ztwo-choice-cued, while the starting point of the 
other two accumulators (‘Error 2’ and ‘Error 3’) ztwo-choice-uncued was set to 0. The 
drift rate of the two accumulators associated with the non-cued responses 
(‘Error 2’ and ‘Error 3’), was also set to 0, so that only noise was accumulated in 
these accumulators (see Figure 5.5 b). 
 
Lastly, the drift rates vcorrrect and vincorrect varied across difficulty levels, leading to 
a model with a total of 10 free parameters (v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect, v-
hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect, ztwo-choice-cued, k, β1, β2, σ2, Ter). The threshold parameter 
A was used as a scaling parameter and set to 1. Model 1 is displayed in Figure 
5.5. 
 
By setting the drift rate of the non-cued accumulators to 0 in Model 1, we 
assume that attentional selection occurs at an early processing stage, gating 
the signal at a sensory level. Since this is based on speculation alone, we also 
tested a model without this assumption, Model 2. Model 2 is identical to Model 
1, with the exception that the drift rate of the two uncued accumulators in two-
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choice conditions (‘Error 2’ and ‘Error 3’) were not set to 0, but instead to the 
same vincorrect as ‘Error 1’. This resulted in a model with the same 10 free 
parameters as Model 1 (v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect, v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect, 
ztwo-choice-cued, k, β1, β2, σ2, Ter). 
 
Lastly, we also tested a model in which there was no difference in baseline 
between two-choice and four-choice conditions, but which introduced a 
difference in drift rate instead. This model, Model 3, is identical to Model 1 with 
the exception that the starting point is set to 0 for all conditions, and that two-
choice and four-choice conditions have separate correct and incorrect drift rates 
(v-easy-fourcorrect, v-easy-fourincorrect, v-easy-twocorrect, v-easy-twoincorrect, v-hard-
fourcorrect, v-hard-fourincorrect, v-hard-twocorrect, v-hard-twoincorrect). Note that, like in 
Model 1, the drift rates in uncued accumulators were set to 0. This resulted in a 
total of 13 free parameters for Model 3 (v-easy-fourcorrect, v-easy-fourincorrect, v-
easy-twocorrect, v-easy-twoincorrect, v-hard-fourcorrect, v-hard-fourincorrect, v-hard-
twocorrect, v-hard-twoincorrect, k, β1, β2, σ2, Ter). 
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Figure 5.5: Model 1: LCA model applied to the current experiment: a) Four-choice decisions: four 
accumulators race towards a threshold A. Each accumulator receives input I and starts at a starting point 
zfour-choice = 0. The accumulator associated with the correct alternative increases at a rate vcorrect while all 
other accumulators increase at a rate given by vincorrect. Each accumulator is affected by leakage over time 
(k, black, dashed arrows). Two inhibition parameters define the inhibition between accumulators. Two 
accumulators representing different responses (pinch/grasp) on different hands inhibit each other with a 
strength of β2 (pink, dashed arrows). All other accumulators inhibit each other with a strength of β1 (grey, 
dashed arrows). b) Two-choice decisions: like a), but the two uncued responses (‘Error 2’ & ‘Error 3’) only 
accumulate noise, with a drift rate of 0. The starting points of the accumulators associated with the two 
responses which were cued increases to the positive value ztwo-choice-cued. The correct accumulator 
integrates evidence at a rate given by vcorrect while the incorrect, but cued, accumulator (‘Error 1’) 
integrates evidence at a rate of vincorrect. (Note that the only difference in Model 2 is in ‘Error 2’ & ‘Error 3’ in 
b, in which v is not 0, but vincorrect. Model 3 on the other hand assumes all starting points to be 0, and that 
there is a separate set of vcorrect and vincorrect for two-choice and four-choice decisions). 
 
To fit each model to the data, the normalised EMG RTs remaining after EMG 
processing were pooled across participants to estimate the model parameters 
at the group level. A total of 20,000 simulated EMG RTs were compared to the 
empirical data using Quantile Maximum Probability Estimation (Heathcote et al., 
213 
 
2002) and parameter values were adjusted using a differential evolution 
algorithm implemented in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.; Price et al., 
2005). 
 
The three models were compared regarding their goodness of fit, by calculating 
two measures of fit which consider the likelihood as well as the number of free 
parameters of the model, namely the Bayesian information criterion (BIC, 
Schwarz, 1978) as well as the Akaike information criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1977). 
The model which best fitted the data according to these measures was then 
used to generate predictions of the accumulation profile. 
 
5.1.5.2. Model Prediction 
Once the best-fitting parameter values of the best model were estimated, we 
used the equations described above ((5.5.), (5.6.)) to simulate a total of 20,000 
accumulation paths for each condition. Since we used EMG RTs rather than 
button RTs to fit the model (i.e. the time taken for movement of effectors was 
not included), we assume that virtually all of the estimated non-decision time 
described sensory processes. We therefore started the accumulation profile 
after a sensory delay given by Ter 17.  
 
Simulated MEPs were defined as the amplitude of a given accumulator at 
random MEP latencies (generated in the same way as described in section 
5.1.3). Just as in the experimental data, only simulated MEPs that occurred 
before the decision was reached were retained. The simulated MEPs 
associated with correct decisions were then smoothed (in the same way as 
described in section 5.1.4.3) to create continuous MEP signals. Since the TMS 
paradigm used here allowed us to track each of the (up to) four responses 
                                               
17 It could be argued that a very small proportion of the non-decision time should be categorised 
as motor processing time to account for the brief interval in which the motor signal travels 
through the corticospinal tract. However, from comparing the timing of TMS pulses and MEPs, 
we estimate that this takes only approximately 30 ms. Since we compared model predictions 
and MEP signals on a qualitative basis only, we argue that this difference is negligible.  
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separately (though not simultaneously; see section 5.1.4.), we simulated and 
plotted the accumulation profile for each accumulator separately.  
 
To create a prediction equivalent to the MEP signal reflecting the difference 
between the responding and the non-responding muscle of the same hand (see 
section 5.1.4.3), we also took the difference of only the MEPs classed as 
‘Correct’ and ‘Error 1’ and generated a smooth signal per condition in the same 
way as described above. 
 
Lastly, the resulting profiles were averaged within each condition and time-
locked once to the onset of the decision-making process (stimulus-locked), and 
once to the EMG onset (response-locked).  
 
5.2. Results 
5.2.1. Behavioural Results 
To analyse potential behavioural differences between conditions, only 
stimulation free trials (remaining after EMG and MEP processing) were used 
(see Figure 5.6 a)18. Since there were no significant differences between two-
choice decisions involving one hand (‘within’) or two hands (‘between’) in RT, 
EMG RT or accuracy (p > .27), we collapsed over all two-choice conditions. To 
explore the effects of ‘Number of Alternatives’ and ‘Difficulty’ on correct EMG 
RT, we used a two-by-two repeated measures ANOVA, with the levels ‘two/four’ 
and ‘easy/hard’. We found a significant main effect of ‘Number of Alternatives’, 
F(1, 12) = 207.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .95, with four alternatives (M = 544 ms) being 
associated with longer reaction times than two alternatives (M = 445 ms). 
Additionally, there was a significant main effect of Difficulty, F(1, 12) = 117.37, p 
                                               
18 Since the application of a TMS pulse alters response times, typically only stimulation free 
trials are used in the behavioural analysis. Since we reported some unexpected findings in the 
MEP data (see section 5.2.2.1), indicating no difference between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials, we also 
analysed the EMG RT associated with TMS trials in order to rule out that the null finding in the 
MEP amplitude was caused by behavioural differences between TMS and stimulation free trials. 
An ANOVA exploring EMG RTs in TMS trials showed qualitatively similar findings to the ANOVA 
reported above (main effect of ‘Number of Alternatives’: p < .001, main effect of ‘Difficulty’: p < 
.001, interaction effect: p = .08). 
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< .001, ηp2 = .91, with ‘hard’ trials (M = 509 ms) being associated with longer 
reaction times than ‘easy’ trials (M = 480 ms). There was no significant 
interaction effect (p = .68). Note that for this ANOVA, we used EMG onset time 
as RT. However, the same analysis with button RT as time of response led to 
qualitatively identical results (main effect of ‘Number of Alternatives’: p < .001, 
main effect of ‘Difficulty’: p < .001, interaction effect: p = .76).  
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Figure 5.6: Behavioural results: a) response times (left) and accuracy (right) averages for all conditions. 
Response times are given in EMG RTs (button RTs are indicated in dashed lines). Error bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. b) Proportion of errors per error category for four-choice (left) and two-choice (right) 
trials. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .001. 
 
Since accuracy data do not meet the distributional assumptions required for a 
standard ANOVA, we used a generalised linear mixed-effects model in order to 
analyse the effects of our manipulations on participants’ accuracies. Using the 
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‘fitglme’ function in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, U.S.A.), we used a model 
with a logistic link function and a binomial data model. Parameter estimates 
were based on a maximum likelihood method using Laplace approximation. We 
used the ‘maximal’ random effects structure (Barr et al., 2014), i.e. both 
manipulations, ‘Number of Alternatives’ and ‘Difficulty’, and their interaction 
were included as fixed effects, and both manipulations and their interactions 
within each participant and within each session were included as random 
effects (Wilkinson notation: Accuracy ~ 1 + Number of 
Alternatives*Difficulty + (1 + Number of 
Alternatives*Difficulty | Participant) + (1 + Number of 
Alternatives*Difficulty | Session))19. The ‘Number of Alternatives’ 
was a significant predictor, t(156) = 5.59, p < .001, with two-alternative trials (M 
= 89%) associated with higher accuracies than trials with four alternatives (M = 
80%). Additionally, ‘Difficulty’ was a significant predictor, t(156) = 9.68, p < .001, 
with higher accuracy scores in easy (M = 88%) than in hard trials (M = 82%). 
The interaction between the ‘Number of Alternatives’ and ‘Difficulty’ was not a 
significant predictor, t(156) = 2.05, p = .052.  
 
A further generalised linear mixed model was used to compare the proportions 
of the different error categories in the data (Figure 5.6 b). We used a model in 
which two predictors, ‘Number of Alternatives’ and ‘Error Category’, and their 
interaction were included as fixed effects, and both factors, and their 
interactions within each participant and within each session were included as 
random effects (Wilkinson notation: Accuracy ~ 1 + Number of 
Alternatives*Error Category + (1 + Number of Alternatives* 
Error Category | Participant) + (1 + Number of 
Alternatives* Error Category | Session)). We found that all fixed 
effects were significant predictors (p < .004). To explore these effects, four 
further models were used. One model tested the fixed effect ‘Error Category’ on 
                                               
19 The dispersion parameter of the model, φ = 2.08, was calculated by dividing the sum of 
squared Pearson residuals by the residual degrees of freedom (Venables & Ripley, 2002). This 
value indicates overdispersion, therefore, the p-values associated with the model may not be 
accurate. To test the reported effects, we therefore additionally conducted paired sign tests 
which confirmed that both the difference between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’, and between ‘two-choice’ 
and ‘four-choice’ trials were significant (p < .001). 
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two-choice data alone. A second model was used to test the same effect, but 
with the reference set to a different level in order to evaluate the difference 
between all three levels of ‘Error Category’ (‘Error 1’, ‘Error 2’, ‘Error 3’). Two 
further models were used in the same way but exploring four-choice data20. 
 
In two-choice trials, all three levels of ‘Error Category’ differed significantly from 
each other, t(117) > 2.58, p < .01, with most errors falling into the ‘Error 1’ 
category (M = 8%), and the least errors labelled ‘Error 3’ (M = .5%). In four-
choice trials however, the only significant difference was seen between ‘Error 1’ 
and ‘Error 3’, t(117) = 2.27, p = .03, with more errors in the ‘Error 1’ (M = 8%) 
than the ‘Error 3’ (M = 4%) category. There were no further significant 
differences in the four-choice condition, t(117) < 1.7, p > .09 (see Figure 5.6). 
 
5.2.2. MEP Results 
Smoothed MEP signals were generated for each muscle category (‘Correct’, 
‘Error 1’, ‘Error 2’, ‘Error 3’) separately. The resulting signal is displayed in 
Figure 5.7. Note that two-choice traces were collapsed over ‘within’ and 
‘between’ choices, since both displayed qualitatively similar patterns (see 
Appendix 7.2.). Visual inspection of the resulting MEP signals reveals that, as 
expected, in each condition, the ‘Correct’ muscle’s activation increased over the 
course of the decision to a higher magnitude than all other muscles, while the 
‘Error 3’ muscle showed the lowest amplitude and even decreased over time. 
 
Contrary to our expectations, there was no visible difference between ‘easy’ 
(solid lines) and ‘hard’ (dashed lines) trials in any of the conditions. There were 
however, marked differences between two-choice and four-choice decisions. In 
the four-choice condition, ‘Error 1’ (same hand but different response relative to 
the responding muscle) and ‘Error 2’ (different hand but same response relative 
to the responding muscle) traces followed a virtually identical profile. In two-
choice trials on the other hand, the two cued responses (‘Correct’ and ‘Error 1’) 
                                               
20 The dispersion parameters of all models, φ, were calculated by dividing the sum of squared 
Pearson residuals by the residual degrees of freedom (Venables & Ripley, 2002) and ranged 
between 1.14 and 1.25, indicating no problems of overdispersion. 
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are separated from the uncued response traces (‘Error 2’ and ‘Error 3’) 
throughout the beginning of the recording (note that the time of cue onset is 
prior to the onset of MEP recording). Only towards the end of the decision, 
arguably when the correct response is selected, does the ‘Correct’ muscle 
increase at a steeper rate while the ‘Error 1’ muscle decreases in amplitude. 
  
Figure 5.7: MEP results (smoothed MEP signal for each muscle category): stimulus-locked (left) and 
response-locked (right) smoothed signals are displayed separately for two-choice (a) and four-choice (b) 
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decisions. In each panel, easy (solid lines) and hard (dashed lines), as well as each correct/error category 
(‘Correct’, ‘Error 1’, ‘Error 2’, ‘Error 3’) are displayed separately. 
 
Additionally, a smoothed signal for the difference between the responding and 
non-responding muscle (here: the difference between ‘Correct’ and ‘Error 1’) 
was generated (based on only a subset of trials; see section 5.1.4.3). The 
resulting profile is displayed in Figure 5.8, separately for stimulus-locked (left) 
and response-locked (right) signals, as well as four-choice (dark blue), two-
choice (turquoise), ‘easy’ (solid lines), and ‘hard’ (dashed lines) conditions. 
Each profile displays a clear increase over the course of the decision, indicating 
an increasing difference between the activation profiles of the responding and 
the ‘Error 1’ muscles. Differences between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’, or four-choice and 
two-choice trials are not apparent. 
 
  
Figure 5.8: MEP results (smoothed MEP signals for the difference between responding and non-
responding muscles): stimulus-locked (left) and response-locked (right) signals are displayed for four-
choice (dark blue) and two-choice (turquoise), as well as easy (solid lines) and hard (dashed lines) 
separately. Note that each profile displays the difference between the MEPs which were simultaneously 
recorded in the ‘Correct’ and the ‘Error 1’ category. 
 
5.2.2.1. Statistical Comparison 
In order to test our hypothesis predicting a difference in baseline activity 
between two and four-choice decisions, we used a paired t-test to compare 
MEP amplitudes. Since there was no difference between two-choice ‘within’, 
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and two-choice ‘between’ MEP amplitudes (p > .48), trials were pooled across 
both two-choice conditions. The t-test comparing two and four-choice baseline 
MEP sizes confirmed our hypothesis and showed that there was a significant 
difference in baseline amplitude, t(12) = 2.20, p = .048, d = .61, with two-choice 
trials showing larger MEP amplitudes (M = .22) than four-choice trials (M = .13). 
 
Additionally, we tested the difference in slope between different difficulty levels 
using a permutation procedure. Comparing the slope difference in ‘easy’ and 
‘hard’ trials to the null distribution of slope differences revealed that the original 
difference was not larger/smaller than the upper/lower 2.5% of the distribution, 
for either stimulus-locked or response-locked MEPs. This indicates that, 
contrary to our expectation, there was no slope difference between ‘easy’ and 
‘hard’ trials (p > .05). 
 
To further explore this unexpected finding, we compared the slope between fast 
and slow responses. To this end, we performed a median split on the data in 
order to categorise it into fast and slow bins. We then used the same bootstrap 
method described above (see section 5.1.4.4), testing the difference in slope 
between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials, to compare slopes of slow and fast trials. We 
found that slopes in fast trials were significantly higher than slopes in slow trials 
in both the stimulus-locked and the response-locked signal (p < .05). 
5.2.3. Model 
We fitted a total of three models to the EMG RT data. Model 1 (10 parameters) 
assumes that two-choice and four-choice trials are explained by the same drift 
rate, that there is no accumulation in uncued accumulators, and that cued two-
choice trials have a free starting point. Model 2 (10 parameters) is identical to 
Model 1 but assumes that accumulation occurs in all accumulators. Lastly, 
Model 3 (13 parameters) is identical to Model 1, but assumes a drift rate 
difference, instead of a starting point difference, between two-choice and four-
choice trials. Table 5.1 displays the BIC and AIC for each model, indicating their 
goodness of fit. The best (lowest) values were obtained for Model 1, indicating 
that this model provides the best account for the data. This suggests that 
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introducing multiple alternatives into a decision-making process primarily affects 
the baseline activity of the accumulation process. We therefore chose Model 1, 
and discarded the other models from the analysis. The resulting parameter 
estimates are displayed in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.1: Model comparison: BIC and AIC values for each model. Model 1 has the lowest (best) BIC and 
AIC values (best BIC and AIC values in bold). 
  
Model  
  
Number of 
parameters 
AIC BIC Parameters 
Model 1 10 141,600 141,680 
v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect,  
v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect,  
ztwo-choice-cued, k, β1, β2, σ2, Ter 
Model 2 10 142,170 142,260 
v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect,  
v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect, 
ztwo-choice-cued, k, β1, β2, σ2, Ter 
Model 3 13 144,170 142,260 
v-easy-fourcorrect, v-easy-fourincorrect,  
v-easy-twocorrect, v-easy-twoincorrect,  
v-hard-fourcorrect, v-hard-fourincorrect,  
v-hard-twocorrect, v-hard-twoincorrect,  
k, β1, β2, σ2, Ter 
 
Table 5.2: Estimated parameter values for the chosen model (Model 1): note that the response threshold A 
was set to 1 as a scaling parameter, and that the starting-point z was set to 0 for four-choice trials. 
Model 1: LCA Parameters     
Leakage (k) 0.000029 
Response threshold (A) 1 
Non-decision time (Ter) 0.2994 
Diffusion constant (σ2) 0.4863 
Inhibition 
(β) 
β1 0.000022 
β2 0.0408 
Starting point 
(z) 
two-choice (cued) 0.2355 
four-choice/ two-choice (uncued) 0 
Drift rate  
(v) 
easy 
correct 1.3199 
incorrect 0.2321 
hard 
correct 1.1781 
incorrect 0.3413 
 
The quality of the fit for each condition (left: four-choice, right: two-choice, top: 
easy, bottom: hard) is shown in Figure 5.9. The observed (circles) and 
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simulated (lines and crosses) normalised EMG RT distributions are summarised 
by five quantile estimates (from left to right: 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, 90%), and 
the EMG RT (x-axis) and proportion of data (y-axis) associated with each 
quantile are displayed. Both correct responses (thick lines) and each error 
category (‘Error1’, ‘Error 2’, ‘Error 3’; see Figure 5.2) are shown. The overlap 
between empirical and simulated quantiles indicates a good overall model fit. 
The mean difference between predicted and recorded EMG RT quantiles was 
approximately 2.5% median EMG RT for correct responses, confirming that the 
LCA was able to account for both two and four-choice decisions.  
 
  
Figure 5.9: Model fit: quantiles estimated from behavioural data (circles) and LCA simulations (crosses and 
lines) for easy (top) and hard (bottom) decisions. For each condition, correct and incorrect quantiles are 
displayed separately. 
The estimated parameters were used to simulate the average accumulation 
profile for each condition. Figure 5.10 displays the resulting stimulus-locked 
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(left) and response-locked (right) predictions for each condition and each 
accumulator (categorised as ‘Correct’, ‘Error 1’, ‘Error 2’, or ‘Error 3’). For direct 
comparison, Figure 5.10 is displayed in the same format as Figure 5.7.  
Qualitatively similar patterns were observed in both the MEP signal (Figure 5.7) 
and the model predictions (Figure 5.10). Like the MEP signal, The LCA 
accumulation profiles show a higher increase of the ‘Correct’ accumulator than 
all other accumulators over the course of the decision in all conditions, while the 
‘Error 3’ accumulator showed the lowest amplitude throughout. It can further be 
seen that in four-choice conditions, the accumulators associated with ‘Error 1’ 
and ‘Error 2’ display a virtually identical profile, while in two-choice conditions, 
the cued accumulators (‘Correct’ and ‘Error 1’) show a higher activation than the 
uncued accumulators (‘Error 2’ and ‘Error 3’). Contrary to our hypotheses, there 
was no clear difference between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ predicted accumulation 
profiles. 
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Figure 5.10: Decision variable (simulated): LCA predictions of the accumulation profile for two-choice (a) 
and four-choice (b) conditions, as well as easy (solid lines) and hard (dashed lines) conditions, locked to 
both the stimulus onset (left) and the EMG onset (right). For each condition, the accumulation profiles of all 
four accumulators (categorised into ‘Correct’, ‘Error 1’, ‘Error 2’, ‘Error 3’) are shown (note that in four-
choice conditions, ‘Error 1’ and ‘Error 2’ traces are virtually identical). See Figure 5.7 to compare with the 
corresponding MEP signal. 
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Figure 5.11 shows the model predictions for the difference between the 
‘Correct’ and the ‘Error 1’ accumulator for each condition. Overall, the observed 
patterns are comparable to those in the corresponding MEP signal (see Figure 
5.8). However, there appear to be small differences in the model predictions 
(e.g. lower amplitude in hard trials in stimulus-locked predictions), which are not 
obvious, potentially due to a high level of noise, in the MEP signal. 
 
  
Figure 5.11: LCA Predictions of the difference between responding (‘Correct’) and non-responding (‘Error 
1’) muscles: stimulus-locked (left) and response-locked (right) signals are displayed for four-choice (dark 
blue) and two-choice (turquoise), as well as easy (solid lines) and hard (dashed lines) separately. See 
Figure 5.8 to compare to the corresponding MEP signal. 
 
5.3. Discussion 
 
In this experiment, we set out to explore decision-making with multiple 
alternatives in humans. To this end, we asked participants to complete a colour-
discrimination task with either two or four choices and applied TMS to induce 
MEPs in the hand muscles used to execute responses as a measure of 
corticospinal excitability resembling the decision variable. We hypothesised 
that, in line with previous research in monkeys, a difference in the number of 
choice alternatives would translate into a difference in baseline MEP size (Balan 
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et al., 2008; Churchland et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2009). We also added a 
difficulty manipulation and expected that the MEP size (i.e. the corticospinal 
excitability) recorded from responding muscles would increase faster in easy 
than in hard trials. 
 
Behavioural results showed that both the number of alternatives and the 
difficulty of the task had the expected effects on response times and accuracy 
scores. In line with previous research (Brown et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2009; 
Hick, 1952), it was found that responses were faster and more accurate in two-
choice compared to four-choice, and in easy compared to hard trials. 
Additionally, each error was classed into one of three categories. With a total of 
four possible responses (two movements per hand), either two or four of which 
were cued, each response was classed either as ‘Correct’, ‘Error 1’ (cued but 
incorrect in two-choice trials, and correct hand but incorrect movement in four-
choice-trials), ‘Error 2’ (uncued and the correct/incorrect movement on the 
incorrect/correct hand in two-choice trials, and correct movement but on the 
incorrect hand in four-choice trials), or as ‘Error 3’ (incorrect movement and 
incorrect hand). We found, that in two-choice trials, ‘Error 1’ occurred more 
often than any other error, while in four-choice trials, ‘Error 1’ and ‘Error 2’ were 
roughly equal in frequency. These findings indicate that although the stimulus 
did not change, and the manipulation was implemented only by the cue, the two 
vs four-choice manipulation had a significant impact on participants’ decision-
making and affected not only the overall accuracy of responses but also the 
response selection of incorrect trials. 
 
During decision-making, we used TMS to induce MEPs in the relevant muscles 
of the right hand. By stimulating at random time-points throughout the trial, 
pooling the data across participants, and smoothing the resulting data points, 
we were able to construct a continuous MEP signal for each condition and each 
correct/error category separately. This signal reflects corticospinal excitability 
and has previously been associated with decision-related evidence 
accumulation (Hadar et al., 2015). Typically, within a given condition, neural 
correlates of decision-making produce a single waveform per decision. An 
example is the EEG component CPP, which arguably reflects the sum of all 
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accumulators in a given decision (O’Connell et al., 2012; see Chapter 4). 
However, in the current experiment, tracking the evolution of preparation for 
each of the four potential responses (‘Correct’, ‘Error 1’, ‘Error 2’, ‘ Error 3’) in 
each condition, allowed us to explore the behaviour of each of four associated 
accumulators and thereby provide a richer insight into the decision process than 
a single summary signal could provide. 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to track a neural correlate of the 
decision variable for multi-alternative decision-making in humans with high 
temporal resolution. We are also not aware of any studies which have 
previously attempted to track the evolution of accumulation of each alternative 
in multi-alternative decision-making. In line with our hypotheses, we found that 
the ‘Correct’ MEP trace increased throughout the trial and peaked at the 
response, clearly separating from all profiles associated with incorrect 
responses. Importantly, we observed a difference in the trajectories of the 
incorrect responses between two and four-choice decisions. While there was no 
observable difference between ‘Error 1’ and ‘ Error 2’ profiles in four-choice 
trials, or, in fact, any of the profiles during the first half of the trial, there was a 
clear separation in two-choice trials, where ‘Correct’ and ‘Error 1’ (both cued 
responses) showed a higher baseline amplitude than ‘Error 2’ and ‘Error 3’. In 
fact, we showed that MEPs recorded from muscles associated with cued 
responses during the baseline period were significantly higher in two-choice 
decisions than in four-choice decisions. This finding is in line with previous 
evidence from non-human primates which has repeatedly shown a decrease in 
baseline firing rates of oculomotor neurons during saccadic decision-making 
with an increase in the number of alternatives (Basso & Wurtz, 1998; 
Churchland et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2009; Lee & Keller, 2008). 
 
It has previously been suggested that, in the context of sequential sampling 
models, this baseline effect implies a difference in the distance between the 
starting point and the threshold, which affects the signal-to-noise ratio (larger 
baseline-threshold distances imply that more evidence is necessary to 
terminate the accumulation process; Churchland et al., 2008). In four-choice 
decisions, in which uncertainty is inherently larger than in two-choice decisions, 
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an increase in the baseline-threshold distance may compensate for this 
uncertainty at the expense of response time. 
 
Contrary to our hypotheses, we observed no difference between the MEP 
signals of easy and hard trials. Previous research has shown that manipulations 
of difficulty have strong effects on accumulation (Ho et al., 2009; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008), as well as associated neural signals (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; 
Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; see Chapter 3), including smoothed MEP signals like 
the ones used here (Hadar et al., 2015; see Chapter 2). The similarity between 
easy and hard waveforms in the current experiment may therefore lead one to 
question the role of the MEP signal as a correlate of the decision variable. 
However, it can be explained by the similarity in response times between easy 
and hard trials. Although easy decisions were associated with significantly 
shorter RTs, the difference was small compared to other experiments (see 
Chapter 4, Figure 4.4), and may have led to a similarity in RTs which is specific 
to our paradigm. In our task, the dominant colour in the easy condition of the 
colour discrimination task took up 33% of the display, compared to 30% in hard 
conditions. This difference may not have been large enough to induce visibly 
different accumulation rates. A post hoc analysis confirmed that, while there 
was no slope difference between easy and hard waveforms, fast decisions were 
associated with higher slopes than slow decisions, a typical finding for a 
decision variable, confirming the role of the MEP as a correlate of accumulation. 
 
We fitted a sequential sampling model to the behavioural data in order to 
simulate the accumulation profile and directly compare it to the MEP signal. 
Here, we chose the LCA model for this purpose (Usher & McClelland, 2001). 
The LCA is an extension of a simple accumulator model, which includes 
leakage and inhibition parameters to model a more neurophysiologically 
plausible accumulation process than other sequential sampling models. This 
relatively complex model was chosen firstly because it has been shown to 
adequately account for multi-alternative decision-making in a number of 
previous studies (Bogacz et al., 2007; Ditterich, 2010; McMillen & Holmes, 
2006; Tsetsos et al., 2010, 2011), secondly because it is an accumulator model 
which implies that it is easily extended to any number of choice alternatives 
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(Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Usher & McClelland, 2001), and lastly because the 
decision-making required in the current experiment was comparatively complex, 
inducing behavioural patterns which go beyond those seen in typical binary 
choices and are unlikely to be accurately described by other sequential 
sampling models. In particular, the inhibition between accumulators appears a 
necessary characteristic of the model in order to explain the varying behaviours 
associated with the three different error categories. By allowing two inhibition 
parameters, as well as varying starting points for two-choice trials and varying 
drift rates for easy and hard decisions, the model was able to account for the 
behavioural data with complex anatomical linkages between effectors.  
 
We tested a total of three different models and found that the best-fitting model 
assumed a difference in starting point between two-choice and four-choice 
trials, thereby supporting the findings of baseline difference observed in 
previous research in non-human primates (e.g. Churchland et al., 2008), as well 
as in our MEP results. Additionally, the model assumed that non-cued 
alternatives in two-choice trials had a drift rate of 0, indicating that attentional 
mechanisms gate the evidence at a sensory level, before accumulation occurs. 
Note that this was found, despite the fact that each stimulus contained all four 
colours, and the response options were determined by pre-stimulus cues alone. 
This finding is in line with previous research which demonstrated that a neural 
correlate of accumulation, namely the CPP only displays a build-up if the 
sensory evidence provided is directly relevant to the decision (O’Connell et al., 
2012).  
 
The estimated parameters of the chosen model were used to simulate 
accumulation profiles for each condition and each correct/error category 
separately. Crucially, the resulting profiles were qualitatively similar to those of 
the measured MEP signals. In both the simulated and the observed signal, 
there was a clear difference between error trajectories in two-choice and four-
choice trials. We found that, in two-choice trials, ‘Error 1’ and ‘Correct’ profiles 
begin higher than ‘Error 2’ and ‘Error 3’ traces, while in four-choice trials, there 
is no baseline difference and ‘Error 1’ and ‘Error 2’ trials follow the same 
trajectory throughout the trial.  
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Importantly, reproducing the pattern of the MEP signal, there was no visible 
difference between easy and hard accumulation profiles predicted by the model. 
Although drift rates were free to vary in each difficulty condition, and confirmed 
that RT differences were due to a modulation of accumulation rates, with higher 
slopes for easier decisions, the difference in the resulting drift rates did not 
produce distinct accumulation profiles. Although this is somewhat surprising 
given the significant difference between easy and hard RTs, it supports the role 
of the MEP signal as an accumulation signal, as it showed the exact same 
pattern.  
 
However, there were also marked differences between predicted and recorded 
accumulation signals, for at least two reasons. Firstly, like any model, the LCA 
can, at best, be an approximation of the true decision-making processes. This is 
an important point in this study, since we only used one model as 
representative of a family of models (sequential sampling models). We chose 
the model based on its previous application to multi-alternative decision-making 
and its ability to account for more complex decision-making processes, 
however, we must assume that other sequential sampling models or other 
implementations of our manipulations in the LCA may reveal slightly different 
patterns which should be explored in the future.  
 
Secondly, it seems that the direct comparison of the model prediction is limited 
by the quality and nature of the MEP signal. While we assume that the MEP 
signal showing the difference between the responding and non-responding 
muscles is a relatively true reflection of cortical excitability (under the 
assumption that spinal contributions to the corticospinal signal are constant 
across effectors), the MEP signal displaying each response separately may still 
contain non-specific spinal influences. These spinal signals may, for example, 
explain the slow negative drift visible in the MEP signal associated with each 
response (Figure 5.7), which is not seen in the MEP signal reflecting the 
difference between two muscles (Figure 5.8) or the model predictions (Figure 
5.10). 
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Additionally, the smoothed MEP signal used in this experiment is a labour-
intensive signal to produce. In each TMS trial, MEPs at only a single time point 
are collected, and TMS can only be applied in a proportion of trials. 
Furthermore, a large proportion of TMS trials had to be discarded for a number 
of reasons. In addition to the standard removal of noisy trials (and in particular, 
trials in which participants’ muscles were not fully relaxed prior to the 
stimulation) or trials with no, or very quick responses (i.e. trials in which it is 
unlikely that a decision-making process took place), a proportion of trials was 
lost due to the stimulation protocol. The planned TMS times for each trial were 
designed to ensure a good coverage of the whole RT distribution. This meant 
that in many cases, the response preceded the planned stimulation, leading to 
the exclusion of the trial.  
 
Therefore, it is difficult to produce enough data to quantitatively compare 
smoothed MEP signals with model predictions, which can be based on any 
number of simulations. Nevertheless, it is important to note that high exclusion 
rates are typical for this type of experiment (Hadar et al., 2015), and we used a 
large number of trials to minimise its effects and produce a smoothed MEP 
signals which show qualitative differences between conditions, similar to those 
predicted by sequential sampling models. In spite of its limitations, the method 
used here provides a unique and detailed insight into the accumulation process 
during decision-making with multiple alternatives. It allowed us to not only track 
the dynamics of the decision variable, which was comparable to model 
simulations, but also explore the evolution of each response and each 
accumulator separately, thereby arguably providing richer data than any other 
method commonly used in research with human subjects. 
 
Overall, the current study was able to demonstrate that multi-alternative 
decision-making in humans can be accounted for by sequential sampling 
models, and importantly, that smoothed MEP signals reflect the accumulation 
process. In addition, we showed that MEP signals can be used to track the 
evolution of preparation for each of four responses separately, giving insight 
into each of the four associated accumulators of a sequential sampling model. 
In addition, we demonstrated for the first time, that the number of choice 
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alternatives in a decision-making task affects the baseline activity of neural 
accumulation signals in humans. 
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6. General Discussion 
 
The current project set out to explore human perceptual decision-making by 
combining neural data with sequential sampling models. Sequential sampling 
models explain decision-making reaction time (RT) data by assuming that 
sensory evidence accumulates over time until a decision threshold is reached 
and a response is executed (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; 
Usher & McClelland, 2001). 
 
Although sequential sampling models were developed to explain behavioural 
decision-making data and make no claims about its neural underpinnings, a 
number of neural signals have been proposed to reflect the accumulation 
process predicted by these models. This similarity between model predictions 
and neural processes has primarily been shown in non-human primates, with 
firing rates in neurons in a range of oculomotor structures displaying 
accumulation-to-bound profiles in response to saccadic decisions (Huk & 
Shadlen, 2005; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002). 
 
In humans, correlations between neural signals and sequential sampling 
models are less established. Nevertheless, a number of signals in the human 
brain have been suggested to be decision-related. One of these signals is the 
event-related potential (ERP) centroparietal positivity (CPP) which has been 
shown to reflect the accumulation of decision-relevant evidence and can be 
dissociated from sensory and motor processing (O’Connell et al., 2012). This 
signal has been reported to have promising properties, as it appears to be 
independent of both the modality of the sensory evidence and the associated 
response, suggesting that it reflects accumulation itself (O’Connell et al., 2012; 
Twomey et al., 2016). However, to date, few studies have attempted to replicate 
these findings. 
 
Another neurometric measure which has been suggested to reflect the decision 
variable, i.e. the accumulation process predicted by sequential sampling 
models, is neural excitability in motor areas, measured through the amplitude of 
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motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS; Hadar et al., 2015). While it has been claimed that the CPP reflects 
accumulation directly, this MEP signal is likely to be a down-stream 
representation of the integration of evidence. This is based on the concept that, 
during a decision, the accumulation progress is continuously fed forward into 
the motor system so that the level of evidence integration is reflected in the 
level of preparation of the associated motor response.  
 
Although this signal displays accumulation indirectly, it has an advantage over 
EEG signals in that it allows us to track accumulation of each response 
alternative separately in multi-alternative decision-making paradigms. The CPP 
on the other hand, may display accumulation directly, but only tracks 
accumulation as a whole and cannot distinguish between response alternatives. 
By making use of both of these signals, depending on which is most informative 
for any given paradigm, many open questions regarding human perceptual 
decision-making can be addressed. 
 
In this project, we used these neural signals to explore human perceptual 
decision-making by comparing them directly to predictions made by sequential 
sampling models. Specifically, we used accumulator models, i.e. sequential 
sampling models with an absolute stopping rule, in which evidence for each 
alternative is integrated in a separate accumulator and the accumulators race to 
a common threshold (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Usher & 
McClelland, 2001). We chose these models over random walk models, i.e. 
models with a relative stopping rule in which evidence for binary choices is 
integrated to a single total, due to their biological plausibility. The plausibility of 
random-walk models is limited, as they assume that accumulation can become 
negative, and it is not clear how activation of a neural population can decrease 
to arbitrary negative values. Separate accumulators assumed by accumulator 
models on the other hand, can be thought of as representations of the activity of 
separate neural populations, integrating evidence for a given alternative (Usher 
& McClelland, 2001). Additionally, random-walk models cannot be extended to 
account for decisions with multiple alternatives as easily as accumulator models 
(Ratcliff et al., 2016). 
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Note that, since, as described above, the MEP signal tracks each response 
alternative (i.e. the preparation of each muscle associated with a response) 
separately, we assume that the trajectory associated with each alternative is 
modelled by the associated accumulator of the accumulator model. In a binary 
choice, the difference wave reflecting the difference in MEP amplitude between 
the responding and the non-responding muscle is therefore assumed to be 
modelled by the difference between the two accumulators. The CPP on the 
other hand cannot distinguish between alternatives. We speculate that each 
alternative is accumulated in a separate neural population in proximity to 
centroparietal electrodes, but that, due to volume conduction, only the sum of all 
activity is recorded on the scalp. We therefore model the CPP as the sum of all 
accumulators in a model. 
 
6.1. Summary 
 
Using these methods, we set out to explore the underlying mechanisms of 
human perceptual decision-making and specifically, address the questions (1) 
whether accumulation, as predicted by sequential sampling models, occurs in 
the human brain, (2) which signals are most suitable to track accumulation, 
given that it occurs, (3) what impact a number of manipulations have on these 
signals, and importantly, (4) to what extent modelled accumulation profiles 
resemble these signals (see Chapter 1). First, we will summarise the findings of 
each experimental chapter, before we describe how each of these questions 
was addressed by our studies in the following section (see section 6.2). 
 
In Chapter 2, we explored the impact of the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) on 
perceptual decision-making. Participants were instructed to make easy and 
hard decisions either as quickly or as accurately as possible while we either 
recorded their EEG or used TMS to record MEPs. The SAT has traditionally 
been implemented in the sequential sampling model literature by adjusting the 
threshold parameter, with lower and higher thresholds associated with speed 
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and accuracy instructions respectively (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Heitz, 2014; 
Ratcliff, 2002). We expected that this difference in the amount of evidence 
accumulated in each condition would translate into an amplitude difference in a 
neural substrate of the decision variable. However, evidence from studies using 
neurophysiological data from non-human primates have questioned this 
implementation of the SAT as they found no difference in amplitude of decision-
related firing rates between SAT conditions, and instead found more 
widespread changes in activity (Heitz & Schall, 2012, 2013). Our results 
supported these neurophysiological findings. Although we found that both the 
CPP and the MEP signal displayed a gradual increase over the course of the 
decision, which increased at a rate depending on the difficulty of the decision 
and peaked at the response, supporting their roles as decision variable signals, 
we found no amplitude differences between speed and accuracy conditions in 
either of the neural signals.  
 
We used two types of models to explain our data. First, we used a race model 
(i.e. an accumulator model) which, in line with the traditional approach, varied in 
threshold across SAT conditions. In our second model, we ‘rescaled’ the 
estimated parameters from the standard model. In line with previous 
neurophysiological findings suggesting more widespread changes in activity 
instead of specific amplitude differences (Heitz & Schall, 2012, 2013; Murphy et 
al., 2016), we set out to model a global modulation associated with the SAT 
using the rescaled model. To this end, we used the parameters estimated by 
the standard model (i.e. a model with variations in the threshold parameter), 
and rescaled the parameters in the speed condition so that the threshold in both 
SAT conditions was identical, and the original difference in threshold was 
transferred onto all other parameters. Note that this implementation of the SAT 
is conceptually different from the variation in threshold, but is mathematically 
identical and provides the same model fit to the RT data. We simulated mean 
accumulation profiles for each condition for each of the models. As expected, 
the original model with threshold changes led to accumulation profiles which 
differed in amplitude between SAT conditions. The accumulation profiles 
predicted by the rescaled model however, showed no amplitude differences 
and, in fact, replicated the pattern observed in the CPP and MEP signal. These 
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findings indicate that the SAT is associated not with a specific change in the 
amount of evidence required to make a decision, but with a global modulation of 
brain activity. 
 
However, our interpretation of the findings crucially depends on the validity of 
the CPP and MEP signals as substrates of the decision variable. Given our 
findings which showed that the profiles displayed by the neurometric measures 
did not match the accumulation profile predicted by sequential sampling models 
using the traditional implementation of the SAT, it could perhaps be concluded 
that the neural signals used here do not display accumulation. Instead, we 
concluded that the neural signals reflect accumulation and that the model needs 
to be adjusted. We came to this conclusion for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
neural signals displayed a number of other characteristics of the decision 
variable, such as the gradual build-up which peaked at the time of response, 
and the expected slope differences between easy and hard conditions. 
Secondly, we observed the same patterns of activity in two fundamentally 
different signals, one EEG signal which likely displays accumulation directly and 
one signal of corticospinal excitability displaying down-stream accumulation in 
form of motor preparation, each of which have previously been shown to reflect 
accumulation, and thus provide converging evidence for our interpretation 
(Hadar et al., 2015; O’Connell et al., 2012). Thirdly, similar findings, 
contradicting the traditional implementation of the SAT using threshold 
variations have been reported in previous studies using neural data in both 
human and non-human primates (Heitz & Schall, 2012, 2013; Murphy et al., 
2016), further supporting our findings. And lastly, we were able to account for 
the neural signals by making only a small adjustment to the existing model, 
which implements a conceptually different explanation, namely a global 
modulation in activity, while remaining mathematically equivalent and without 
affecting the original model fit. We therefore conclude that both the CPP and the 
MEP signal are valid neural correlates of the decision variable, and importantly, 
that our results indicate that strategic changes in focus between speed and 
accuracy of perceptual decision-making are explained on a neural level not by a 
specific change in thresholds, but by a more global modulation of activity. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to note that, by observing no amplitude difference 
between speed and accuracy conditions, we identified a clear and somewhat 
unexpected difference between predictions made by sequential sampling 
models and neural data proposed to reflect the accumulation process. This 
necessarily questions the role of the neural signals used here, particularly since 
both the CPP and the MEP signal have not yet been supported by a large body 
of research. Therefore, to further strengthen our conclusions regarding the SAT, 
and to guide future work, we set out to test the role of the neural signals in 
Chapter 3. To this end, we tested a range of previously suggested neural 
correlates of the decision variable in order to identify the most suitable neural 
accumulation signal. We chose EEG signals since they, due to their temporal 
resolution, are the most appropriate measure to track the fast dynamics of the 
decision variable, and a variety of EEG signals have previously been proposed 
to reflect the accumulation process. Note that we did not test any other TMS 
methods as we are not aware of any alternative ways to generate accumulation-
like signals to the one used in Chapter 2. However, we tested EEG signals, 
which, like the MEP signal used above, reflect motor preparation.  
 
Specifically, we tested three of the most well-established neural correlates of 
the decision variable in the human brain, namely the CPP (Kelly & O’Connell, 
2013; O’Connell et al., 2012; Twomey et al., 2016), the lateralised readiness 
potential (LRP; Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Polanía et al., 2014), and event-related 
desynchronisation (ERD) in the beta frequency (both contralateral and 
lateralised; Donner et al., 2009; O’Connell et al., 2012). Note that some of these 
signals (e.g. beta ERD reported by Donner et al., 2009) were observed using 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) rather than EEG, but are equally observable 
in EEG (O’Connell et al., 2012).  
 
In order to evaluate these signals and their roles as useful correlates of 
decision-making, we explored their profiles during decision-making with different 
levels of difficulty. The manipulation of difficulty was chosen as it is associated 
with very clear predictions regarding the shape of the accumulation profile. 
Unlike most other decision manipulations, difficulty is associated with a strong 
general consensus regarding its implementation in sequential sampling models 
240 
 
and its effects on the accumulation profile. Decision difficulty, i.e. the quality of 
sensory evidence, is known to be modelled by a variation in the drift rate 
parameter, i.e. the slope of the accumulation, with harder decisions being 
associated with lower accumulation rates (Donkin et al., 2009; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). Importantly, this modelled slope 
difference has been supported by a number of neural signals, reporting steeper 
build-up rates in neural activity for easy compared to hard decisions (de 
Lafuente et al., 2015; Hanks et al., 2011; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002). Together, 
these findings contribute to a large, unanimous body of research suggesting 
that any neural signal which claims to reflect decision-related accumulation 
must display slope differences associated with different levels of difficulty.  
 
We tested to what extent the CPP, the LRP, and beta ERD displayed these 
slope differences. We were not able to replicate previous findings indicating that 
beta ERD reflects accumulation (Donner et al., 2009). We found no difference in 
beta power slope between easy and hard decisions, but speculate that this may 
be a task-specific finding, as longer RTs may be necessary to accurately detect 
beta ERD. Conversely, we found that the CPP displayed all expected 
characteristics, with easier decisions associated with steeper slopes, supporting 
its role as a neural correlate of the decision variable. The LRP findings were 
less clear, but the waveform overall displayed characteristics comparable to 
those observed in the CPP. 
 
These findings indicate that, out of the three most commonly used EEG 
correlates of the decision variable, the CPP is the most suitable signal to track 
the evolution of the accumulation process, thereby supporting the findings 
described in Chapter 2. Additionally, we found that, in line with previous findings 
(Kelly & O’Connell, 2013) the LRP closely followed the CPP. Since the LRP has 
been shown to arise from supplementary motor areas (Ikeda & Shibasaki, 1992; 
Lang et al., 1991), this result supports the notion that accumulation is fed 
forward into motor areas in decisions requiring motor responses. Given the 
comparatively high spatial resolution of TMS, we can be confident that the MEP 
signal reported in Chapter 2 is an accurate reflection of excitability in motor 
areas (Bestmann & Krakauer, 2015; Hadar et al., 2012; Kiers et al., 1997). We 
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therefore argue that, if accumulation is represented in motor areas, as 
suggested by the LRP findings, it should also be visible in MEP amplitudes. The 
exploration of different EEG signals which have been claimed to reflect 
accumulation in Chapter 3 therefore arguably not only supports the role of the 
CPP as a neural correlate of the decision variable, but also gives some insight 
into accumulation in motor areas, indicating the validity of the MEP signal as a 
potential neural correlate of decision-making. 
 
However, while the comparison of different EEG signals showed that the CPP is 
the most suitable neural substrate of the decision variable, it did so only in 
comparison to the LRP and beta ERD. We did not test the similarity of the CPP 
with predictions made by sequential sampling models directly, and although this 
is arguably not necessary given a simple and well-established manipulation 
such as difficulty, our results can only comment on the CPP’s suitability over 
that of the other signals. It cannot give insight into the similarity of the CPP and 
the predictions made by sequential sampling models beyond what was already 
reported in the results of Chapter 2, i.e. that both the CPP and simulated 
accumulation profiles of a sequential sampling model vary in their build-up rate 
with easy decisions displaying a higher slope than hard decisions. 
 
Therefore, having established the CPP as the most suitable out of three of the 
most commonly suggested EEG correlates of the decision variable, in Chapter 
4, we set out to directly test its profile compared to model predictions in more 
complex settings. To this end, we explored decision-making with non-stationary 
evidence and biased decision-making in two separate experiments. In the first 
experiment, we used a motion discrimination task with easy and hard trials, in 
which the motion either continued in the same direction throughout the decision-
making process, or was interrupted for a brief period by either random motion or 
motion in the opposite direction. In line with previous research (O’Connell et al., 
2012), we found that the CPP was sensitive to these dynamic changes in 
evidence. However, contrary to our predictions, CPP waveforms associated 
with interruptions in evidence displayed similar profiles, regardless of whether 
the evidence was simply interrupted or reversed. A race model with intra-trial 
variation in drift rate accounted for the resulting behavioural data. We used the 
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parameters of the model to simulate the mean accumulation profile for each 
condition and directly compared the resulting waveform to the CPP. We found 
that the model predictions displayed a qualitatively similar pattern to the CPP 
waveform. Both profiles showed lower initial slopes in hard than in easy 
waveforms, and both profiles associated with un-interrupted evidence displayed 
the typical build-up over the course of the decision before peaking at the time of 
response, while profiles associated with interrupted and reversed evidence 
showed a dip in the build-up. We noted the unexpected similarity between the 
waveforms associated with the two interruption conditions in both the CPP and 
the model simulation, highlighting the necessity of using model-based 
approaches to explore more complex decision-making.  
 
In the second experiment, motion discrimination trials were preceded by cues 
which either gave no information about the upcoming trial or pointed towards a 
specific direction, which was either congruent or incongruent with the motion 
direction of the upcoming trial. We found that the CPP differed in amplitude 
between the conditions, with incongruent waveforms displaying the highest 
amplitude, followed by uncued and lastly, congruent waveforms. We used a 
race model to account for the behavioural data and found that a model with 
varying starting points across conditions was able to explain the empirical RT 
distributions. The simulated accumulation profile associated with this model 
displayed the same patterns as the CPP, supporting the role of the CPP as a 
decision variable signal. However, the model also indicated that the amplitude 
differences observed were not strictly due to starting point differences across 
conditions (which cancelled out as we summed over cued and non-cued 
accumulators, i.e. increased and decreased starting points), but due to a 
selection bias caused by only considering correct trials.  
 
Together, these findings support the role of the CPP as a correlate of the 
accumulation process. They also highlight the importance of combining 
modelling and neuroimaging approaches in order to gain interpretable insights 
into decision-making, as the shape of the accumulation profile is difficult to 
predict based on conceptual reasoning alone. Using a number of manipulations, 
including difficulty, speed stress, non-stationary evidence, and decision biases, 
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we have shown that the CPP reflects the decision variable and displays similar 
patterns to those predicted by sequential sampling models.  
 
A further manipulation which is arguably of particular interest when studying 
perceptual decision-making in the most ecologically valid way possible, is the 
manipulation of the number of response alternatives. Since perceptual 
decisions are rarely made between two opposite alternatives outside of the lab, 
any decision-making model needs to be able to account for multi-alternative 
decision-making. There have been a number of attempts to explore sequential 
sampling models under these conditions, indicating that particularly the leaky 
competing accumulator model (LCA; Usher & McClelland, 2001), can explain 
multi-alternative decision-making in a number of paradigms (Bogacz et al., 
2007; Nunes & Gurney, 2016; Roe et al., 2001). However, to our knowledge, 
neural correlates of the decision variable in perceptual decisions with multiple 
alternatives have not yet been explored in humans.  
 
We therefore set out to explore the effects of four-choice compared to two-
choice decisions on a neural substrate of accumulation in the human brain. 
However, although we confirmed the role of the CPP as a neural correlate of 
decision-making, we deemed a different neural signal more appropriate to 
explore decisions between multiple alternatives. As described above, the CPP 
tracks the evolution of the decision as a whole but cannot distinguish between 
different alternatives. To our knowledge, the CPP has not been used to track 
decisions between more than two alternatives, and although we speculate that it 
would track the sum of all accumulation, regardless of the number of 
alternatives, it cannot give a detailed insight into individual response 
alternatives which is arguably more important in multi-alternative decision-
making. MEP signals on the other hand, can track the level of preparation 
associated with each response individually and therefore provide richer data, 
more appropriate to explore decisions with multiple alternatives. 
 
We used a colour discrimination task in which participants were asked to 
identify the dominant one out of four colours. Each colour was associated with a 
different response muscle. A cue before each trial informed the participant 
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which out of the four colours were response options, thereby distinguishing 
between two-choice and four-choice trials. Besides the manipulation of the 
number of response options, we also manipulated difficulty by introducing easy 
and hard trials. By recording MEPs from two muscles during each TMS trial and 
pooling over trials, we were able to track the evolution of all four possible 
responses. 
 
In line with previous findings from non-human primates (Churchland et al., 
2008), we found that accumulation profiles displayed lower baselines in four-
choice, compared to two-choice trials. However, contrary to our expectations, 
we found no difference in slope between easy and hard decisions. We used the 
LCA model to fit the data (Usher & McClelland, 2001). This model was chosen 
as it had previously been shown to account for decisions with multiple 
alternatives (Bogacz et al., 2007; Nunes & Gurney, 2016; Roe et al., 2001), but 
also due to its neurophysiological plausibility. The race model we used in 
previous experiments is a simplified version of the LCA and accounts well for 
decision-making data in many paradigms. The LCA differs from the race model 
primarily in its assumption of leakage of information over time, and lateral 
inhibition between accumulators, both of which arguably play a greater role in 
more complex decisions like those with multiple alternatives.  
 
We found that a model with four accumulators, and varying inhibition 
parameters across response muscles, varying starting points across two-choice 
and four-choice trials, as well as varying drift rates for easy and hard decisions, 
was able to account for the behavioural data. The simulated accumulation 
profiles based on this model were similar to the MEP signals, confirming the 
baseline difference. Interestingly, like the MEP signal, the simulations did not 
show differences between easy and hard trials. Although drift rates (i.e. 
accumulation slopes) were free to vary across difficulty conditions, there was no 
visible difference in the accumulation profiles. On the one hand, this finding 
confirms the role of the MEP signals as an accumulation signal as it displays 
the same pattern as the model predictions, even when the results are 
unexpected. On the other hand however, we have previously claimed that the 
manipulation of difficulty has been associated with slope variations in a vast 
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body of both modelling and neuroimaging research, and that any neural 
correlate of the decision variable should display these variations.  
 
However, in this particular case, the difference between easy and hard trials 
was likely not large enough to translate into a visible slope difference. Although 
the difficulty manipulation led to the expected behavioural differences, as well 
as differences in absolute drift rate values, these were not seen in the 
accumulation profile. We speculate that this is a task-specific finding. All other 
experiments reported in this project, which included a manipulation of difficulty, 
also included a calibration of difficulty for each participant, ensuring not only that 
each participant can complete the task, but also that easy and hard decisions 
are different from each other. This calibration did not take place in the colour 
discrimination task. Instead, the same difficulty levels were chosen for each 
participant, and although all participants were able to complete the task, the 
difference between easy and hard trials was likely too small. This is also 
supported by the comparatively small differences in the RTs associated with 
easy and hard trials. We therefore argue that although there was no visible 
slope difference between easy and hard decisions in the MEP signal, this 
finding is explained by a lack of difference between the conditions and does not 
question its role as a neural correlate of the decision variable, which was 
confirmed by model predictions. 
 
Overall, this experiment was, to our knowledge, the first to track the decision 
variable associated with decisions with multiple alternatives in the human brain, 
and the first to demonstrate a baseline difference in activity associated with a 
variation in the number of response alternatives, which has previously been 
demonstrated in non-human primates (Balan et al., 2008; Basso & Wurtz, 1998; 
Churchland et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2009). 
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6.2. Overall Findings 
 
Based on the review of the literature in Chapter 1, we identified four main open 
questions we aimed to address in this project. In the following, we described the 
extent to which we answered these questions.  
 
First, we asked the fundamental question of whether accumulation, as 
described by sequential sampling models, occurs in the human brain. Although 
accumulation-like processes have repeatedly been established in the neural 
activity of non-human primates (Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Roitman & Shadlen, 
2002; Shadlen & Newsome, 1996, 2001), it remains somewhat unclear whether 
these findings based on anatomically different and over-trained monkeys can be 
applied to the human brain. Note also that sequential sampling models were 
designed to account for RT data and not to predict neural mechanisms. 
Although a variety of neural signals have been suggested to reflect this 
accumulation process in the human brain (Donner et al., 2009; O’Connell et al., 
2012; Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Twomey et al., 2015), a clear consensus 
regarding whether sequential sampling occurs in the human brain and how to 
record it is yet to be reached. Nevertheless, due to recent findings suggesting 
promising correlates of decision-making (Hadar et al., 2015; Kelly & O’Connell, 
2013; O’Connell et al., 2012; Twomey et al., 2016), we hypothesised that 
accumulation-to-bound dynamics like those predicted by sequential sampling 
models occur in the human brain and can be observed using EEG and TMS 
methods. 
 
The current project confirmed this hypothesis. We found that both EEG and 
TMS methods can be used to track accumulation-like signals in the human 
brain and utilised this in a variety of experiments. Specifically, both the CPP and 
the MEP signal displaying corticospinal excitability related to response 
preparation displayed a profile that is typical for the accumulation process 
suggested by sequential sampling models. Both signals build up gradually over 
the course of the decision and peak at the time of response, suggesting an 
accumulation-to-bound process. Therefore, in line with previous research 
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(Hadar et al., 2015; Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 2012; Polanía et 
al., 2014), we argue that sequential sampling occurs in the human brain during 
perceptual decision-making and that the associated accumulation process can 
be observed using EEG and TMS methods. 
 
The second question we aimed to address asked, given that decision-related 
accumulation can be observed in the human brain, which signals are most 
suitable to research this process. A large variety of signals stemming from a 
range of techniques, including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; 
Heekeren et al., 2004; Ho et al., 2009; Philiastides & Sajda, 2007), M/EEG 
(Dmochowski & Norcia, 2015; Donner et al., 2009; Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; 
O’Connell et al., 2012; Polanía et al., 2014; Twomey et al., 2015), and TMS 
(Hadar et al., 2015; Michelet et al., 2010) have previously been suggested to 
display characteristics of the decision variable. Due to its poor temporal 
resolution, fMRI is better suited to identify specific brain structures associated 
with decision-making, than to track the fast-evolving decision-variable, and was 
therefore not further considered. EEG approaches, on the other hand, benefit 
from a very high temporal resolution and are arguably the most appropriate 
method to track decision-related accumulation in humans. As indicated above, 
the ERP component CPP is of particular interest here, as it is one of the few 
EEG signals which is posited to track accumulation directly (O’Connell et al., 
2012). Note that MEG and EEG record highly similar processes and although 
we chose EEG in the current project, many conclusions would arguably also 
apply to MEG data.  
 
TMS approaches allowing for a dynamic tracking of decision-related response 
preparation, like the one suggested by Hadar et al. (2015) may provide 
additional insights, as the resulting MEP signals can arguably track individual 
responses, which is not possible using the CPP, which we argue represents the 
sum of all accumulation during a given decision. We therefore hypothesised on 
the one hand that the CPP can be used to track the decision variable, 
suggesting a parietal locus of accumulation, but on the other hand, that down-
stream accumulation can also be observed in motor areas which are related to 
the preparation of the response and can be tracked using MEP signals. 
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The results in this project confirmed this hypothesis. We found that the CPP can 
be used to track decision-related accumulation in a variety of paradigms, 
supporting previous research which identified it as a correlate of the decision 
variable (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 2012). In a direct 
comparison, we specifically identified the CPP to be the most suitable neural 
correlate of the decision variable, compared to other frequently suggested EEG 
signals (see Chapter 3). We also found that the motor-related LRP closely 
followed the profile of the CPP, supporting the notion that accumulation is 
continuously fed forward into the motor system.  
 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the MEP signal which displays the evolution of 
response preparation was also found to display the decision-related 
accumulation of evidence, supporting previous findings (Hadar et al., 2015). 
Although this signal tracks accumulation indirectly and depends on the 
association of the decision with a specific motor response, rendering the CPP 
as the more suitable signal to explore accumulation in most paradigms, it has 
an important advantage over the CPP. Since MEPs can be recorded from each 
response-relevant muscle separately, the MEP signal, unlike the CPP, can track 
the accumulation of each response alternative individually and is, to our 
knowledge, the only signal that can do so in decisions involving more than two 
response options in humans (see Chapter 5). We therefore conclude that both 
the CPP and the MEP signal are suitable signals to track the decision-related 
accumulation of evidence in the human brain, with the CPP displaying 
accumulation directly and the MEP signal showing the accumulation-dependent 
response preparation, and thereby complementing each other. 
 
Thirdly, we aimed to explore how the signals we identified as neural correlates 
of the decision-making process respond to a number of manipulations, to further 
test their roles as decision variable signals. To this end, we chose a total of five 
different manipulations (difficulty, SAT instructions, continuity of evidence, 
decision bias, number of alternatives), each of which is known to affect 
behavioural decision-making, and has previously been explained using 
sequential sampling models. We hypothesised that the neural correlates of the 
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decision variable would be sensitive to these manipulations and display 
changes in their profile which are consistent with parameter changes which 
explain the associated behavioural changes. 
 
The current findings largely supported these hypotheses. In a series of 
experiments, we recorded the CPP under a variety of conditions, including 
difficulty, non-stationary evidence, and decision biases (see Chapter 2-4). 
These manipulations have previously been associated with variations in the 
value of the accumulation slope (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), the continuity of the 
slope (Holmes et al., 2016), and the starting point of the accumulation (Leite & 
Ratcliff, 2011) in the modelling literature. We were able to demonstrate each of 
these changes in the accumulation profile in the CPP, supporting its role as a 
neural substrate of the decision variable. Additionally, we tested and observed 
the expected differences in the MEP signal in response to the manipulations of 
difficulty and a variation in the number of response alternatives (see Chapter 2, 
5).  
 
However, we also explored the impact of the SAT which is associated with a 
difference in threshold in the sequential sampling model literature (Brown & 
Heathcote, 2008), on both the CPP and the MEP signal, but did not observe the 
expected difference (see Chapter 1). As explained above, we nevertheless 
argue that both signals do in fact display the decision variable and that the 
notion of a threshold change to explain the SAT requires reconsideration. 
 
Lastly, we addressed the question of how similar the identified neural substrates 
of the accumulation process are to the predictions made by sequential sampling 
models by directly applying the models to the data, rather than evaluating the 
neural signals based on intuitive predictions. As outlined in Chapter 1, we argue 
that, in order to disentangle human perceptual decision-making, a combination 
of often separated approaches, namely modelling of behavioural data and 
neuroimaging, is necessary. Increasingly complex experimental designs in 
particular require a combination of methods to inform each other. This 
combination is particularly important in order to evaluate a neural signal’s role 
as a correlate of the decision variable, as interactions between parameters 
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often cause even simple sequential sampling models to predict accumulation 
profiles which are not predictable through intuitive reasoning alone. Equally, 
neural correlates of the decision variable can be used to inform sequential 
sampling models. This is particularly the case as sequential sampling models 
are designed to account for RT distributions rather than neural signals and can 
often explain the same data in a number of different ways, which lead to 
mathematically equivalent model fits, but qualitatively different accumulation 
profiles, which can only be evaluated using neural accumulation profiles. 
 
We therefore fitted a sequential sampling model to each of our behavioural data 
sets and used the resulting parameters to simulate mean accumulation rates 
which we directly compared to the neural signals. Using this approach, the 
model fit was only influenced by the RT data and was never qualitatively 
changed to match the neural signal. Therefore, qualitative overlaps between the 
simulated and the empirical accumulation profile provided strong support for 
both the validity of the neural signal as a substrate of the decision variable, and 
the sequential sampling model as a neurally plausible model. By using this 
combination of approaches, we hypothesised that the waveforms of both the 
CPP and the MEP signal would display qualitative similarities to the simulated 
accumulation profile predicted by sequential sampling models. 
 
We confirmed this hypothesis. In two experiments, the CPP displayed 
qualitatively similar patterns to those simulated by sequential sampling models 
(see Chapter 4). Similarly, the MEP signal was similar to simulated 
accumulation profiles, even in unexpected ways as neither the empirical nor the 
simulated profiles displayed the expected slope difference between easy and 
hard decisions (see Chapter 5). An exception is reported in Chapter 2, where 
both the CPP and the MEP signal displayed the same patterns but did not 
match the simulated accumulation profiles. However, since this is the only case 
in which the empirical and modelled profiles disagree, we used the neural 
findings to inform the model and adjusted it to match the neural signals without 
changing it mathematically. Together, these findings support the validity of the 
CPP and the MEP signal as neural correlates of the decision variable as well as 
the neural plausibility of sequential sampling models.  
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6.3. Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Overall this project shed light on human perceptual decision-making by 
measuring a variety of potential neural correlates of the decision variable in the 
human brain and evaluating each in the context of sequential sampling models. 
Although this triangulation of methods, making use of behavioural data, 
mathematical modelling, and neuroimaging, is a strong approach, there are of 
course, a number of limitations. 
 
One limitation, which is already discussed briefly above, is that our findings may 
appear somewhat unfalsifiable. It may seem like in this project, the chosen 
neural correlates of the decision variable (i.e. the CPP and the MEP signal) 
could not be questioned in their role, as different models (the LCA or a simpler 
race model) were chosen depending on which best fitted the data (see Chapter 
4-5), and even altered when their predictions did not match the neural signal 
(Chapter 2). However, we argue that this claim is inaccurate for three reasons. 
Firstly, while we chose different models depending on which best fitted our data, 
we did so only with regards to the behavioural data. We aimed to choose the 
most simple yet neurophysiologically plausible representative of the sequential 
sampling model framework and used a more complex model (i.e. the LCA) only 
in experiments with particularly complex decisions (Chapter 5). In each 
experiment, a number of models were fitted to the data and the best model was 
chosen based on the quality of the fit to the behavioural data alone. The 
similarity between the prediction of the model and the neural signal made no 
contribution to the model selection. Secondly, we adjusted the model to fit the 
neural data in only one instance (Chapter 2). In this particular case, we had a 
number of reasons which are discussed more thoroughly above, including 
ongoing debate about the validity of the original model, which had repeatedly 
been questioned in previous literature. And thirdly, we have demonstrated that 
neural signals which have been suggested to reflect accumulation can in fact be 
falsified in Chapter 3, where we rejected a previously proposed neural decision 
variable. 
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An additional limitation of this project is that, while we have explored the 
evolution of accumulation over time in the human brain, we cannot answer the 
question of which brain regions are involved in this process. Although we have 
a good understanding of the structural origins of the MEP signals (Bestmann et 
al., 2008; Hadar et al., 2015; Rothwell et al., 1987), we do not assume that 
these structures accumulate evidence directly. The CPP on the other hand 
reflects accumulation but we have little information about its source. Although 
based on its recording site, a parietal source is likely, and supported by fMRI 
findings which have suggested parietal regions to be involved in evidence 
accumulation (see Mulder et al., 2014), EEG is not an appropriate method to 
gain insight into the structural origin of a given signal. While the decision 
variable in the human brain can be studied without having identified the location 
of its source, future work, e.g. using a combination of EEG and fMRI is 
necessary to localise the neural structures responsible for sequential sampling.  
 
A further limitation is that we set out to explore decision-related accumulation in 
the human brain in the context of sequential sampling models as a whole. 
Although we necessarily chose specific models, namely two accumulator 
models (a race model without inhibition or leakage, and the LCA; Usher & 
McClelland, 2001), to fit the data, we interpreted the findings primarily with 
reference to the entire sequential sampling model framework, rather than a 
specific model. Note that, as discussed above, accumulator models were 
chosen due to their neural plausibility and extendibility to multi-alternative 
decision-making, and applied in this simple form where appropriate in order to 
make the least amount of assumption possible, and that the more complex 
version of the accumulator model (i.e. the LCA) was only used in experiments 
with more complex decision processes in which the additional leakage and 
inhibition parameters made an impact on the accumulation profile. 
Nevertheless, these models were used primarily as examples of sequential 
sampling models as a whole and were not directly compared to each other.  
 
Although we argue that this method was appropriate here as we aimed to 
comment on whether accumulation as predicted by the sequential sampling 
model framework as a whole occurs in the human brain, and chose the most 
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appropriate representatives of this framework, we are aware and even provide 
evidence (see Chapter 2) that the choice of a specific model can have a large 
impact on the profile of the simulated accumulation path. Building on our 
findings, confirming the validity of the CPP and the MEP signal as neural 
correlates of accumulation, we therefore suggest that future work directly 
compares these neural signals to accumulation profiles from a variety of 
different sequential sampling models, thereby evaluating the neural plausibility 
of each of the models as well as shedding light on the underlying neural 
mechanisms of perceptual decision-making. For example, finding that the 
accumulation path predicted by a model with inhibition between accumulators 
displays more similarities to the CPP than a model without inhibition would not 
only indicate that the model with inhibition is a more appropriate model, but also 
that neural populations which integrate evidence for competing alternatives 
inhibit each other. We therefore propose that a direct model comparison would 
provide great insights into human perceptual decision-making. 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
In summary, we set out to explore perceptual decision-making in the human 
brain in the context of sequential sampling models. Sequential sampling models 
assume that we make decisions by accumulating sensory evidence until a 
threshold is reached and a response is initiated. In a series of experiments, we 
demonstrated that these accumulation-to-bound processes occur in the human 
brain. We used a model-based approach, combining mathematical modelling of 
behavioural data and neuroimaging, by fitting sequential sampling models to 
empirical RT distributions and comparing associated simulated accumulation 
profiles with neural signals. Using this approach, we supported previous 
findings which indicated that the centroparietal ERP component CPP is a 
correlate of this accumulation process. Additionally, we confirmed that in 
decisions which require a specific motor response, accumulation is continuously 
fed forward into the motor system, and as a result, can be measured using an 
MEP signal reflecting the evolution of response preparation.  
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We found that the CPP shows qualitatively similar profiles to simulated 
accumulation profiles in decisions which vary in difficulty, the continuity of 
evidence, and decision biases, confirming not only its role as a neural correlate 
of decision-making, but also the validity of sequential sampling models on a 
neurophysiological level. Further, we gained new insights into the effect of 
speed stress on decision-making and suggest that this is not explained by a 
specific variation in threshold, but instead, by a global modulation in activity. 
Lastly, we explored, for the first time, the neural activity profile of each response 
alternative in a four-choice paradigm, and confirmed previous findings from non-
human primates, suggesting that the number of alternatives influences the 
baseline activity of the accumulation process. 
 
Overall, we showed that sequential sampling models apply not only to 
behavioural data but also account for neural processes in the human brain, and 
that these processes can be observed in both the CPP and the MEP signal. We 
have argued that a combination of modelling and neuroimaging is useful to gain 
a better understanding of human decision-making, and demonstrated that both 
approaches can inform each other. We suggest that future work makes use of 
these findings in order to directly compare different sequential sampling models 
and gain further insights into the underlying mechanisms of perceptual decision-
making in the human brain. 
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7. Appendices 
7.1. Appendix 1: Model Results for 
Normalised Data (Chapter 2, Experiment 1) 
In Chapter 2 (see section 2.1), we compared the accumulation profile predicted 
by sequential sampling models to ERP waveforms. To this end, we fitted a 
model to RT data which was pooled across participants. We generated model 
predictions based on a standard model and a rescaled model and showed that 
the rescaled model is associated with accumulation profiles more similar to the 
EEG waveforms than the standard model.  
 
Since we conducted the same experiment with TMS instead of ERP data (see 
section 2.2), which required the normalisation of data, including RTs, for 
consistency, we repeated the model comparison for the ERP data set with 
normalised data. To this end, we normalised each participant’s RTs and ERPs 
by their median RT and followed the same steps as described in section 
2.1.1.5. We found that the normalisation did not affect the results. 
 
Table 7.1 displays the goodness of fit of three different models we fitted to the 
RT data. The best (lowest) BIC (Schwarz, 1978) was associated with Model 2, a 
model in which drift rate varied across difficulty conditions, and both the 
threshold and the starting point distribution varied across SAT conditions. The 
same model was shown to provide the best fit to the non-normalised data. The 
parameters for this model, as well as its rescaled version (see section 2.1.1.5.2) 
are displayed in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.1: Model Comparison: BIC and AIC values for each model (best BIC and AIC values in bold). 
  
Model  
  
Number of 
parameters 
Parameters 
Experiment 1 
BIC AIC 
Model 1 9 
v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect,  
v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect,  
Aspeed, 
Sz, Ter, STer, σ2 
62,827 62,759 
Model 2 10 
v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect,  
v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect, 
Aspeed, 
62,741 62,665 
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Sz-speed, Sz-accuracy, 
Ter, STer, σ2 
Model 3 10 
v-easycorrect, v-easyincorrect,  
v-hardcorrect, v-hardincorrect, 
Aspeed, 
Ter-speed, Ter-accuracy, 
Sz, STer, σ2 
62,835 62,759 
 
 
Table 7.2: Estimated parameter values for the chosen model (Model 2) and its rescaled version: note that 
the response threshold A in the ‘accuracy’ condition was set to 1 as a scaling parameter. 
Parameters 
Standard Model: 
parameter values per 
SAT Instruction 
Rescaled Model: 
parameter values per 
 SAT Instruction 
 accuracy speed accuracy speed 
Starting point variability (SZ) 0.216 0.644 0.216 0.741 
Response threshold (A) 1 0.869 1 
Non-decision time (Ter) 0.531 0.531 
Non-decision time variability 
(STer) 
0.477 0.477 
Diffusion constant (σ2) 0.585 0.585 0.673 
Drift rate  
(v) 
correct 
easy 1.634 1.634 1.882 
hard 0.850 0.850 0.978 
incorrect 
easy 0.210 0.210 0.242 
hard 0.039 0.039 0.045 
 
 
Figure 7.1 displays the quality of the model fit, which is identical for both the 
standard and the rescaled model. The RT distribution is summarised by five 
quantile estimates (from left to right: 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, 90%) for each 
condition separately. The overlap between empirical and modelled quantiles 
indicates that the model fitted the data well. 
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Figure 7.1: Model fit: quantiles estimated from behavioural data (circles) and Model 2 simulations (crosses 
and lines) for easy (top) and hard (bottom) decisions. For each condition, correct (thick) and incorrect (thin) 
quantiles are displayed separately. Note that the model fit is identical for the standard and the rescaled 
race model. 
Figure 7.2 displays the normalised ERP (a), as well as the simulated 
accumulation profile for both the standard (b) and the rescaled (c) model. Visual 
inspection suggests that the rescaled model predicts profiles more similar to the 
ERP waveform than the standard model. The similarity of the rescaled model 
with the ERP was confirmed by a bootstrap test (see section 2.1.1.5.4) which 
showed that the mean squared errors between the ERP and the simulation was 
significantly lower for the rescaled model than the standard model (p < .05). 
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Figure 7.2: Decision variable (empirical and simulated): stimulus-locked (left) and response-locked (right) 
CPP for each condition. Note that the CPP here is a pooled average rather than a grand average. 
Additionally, the waveform has been low-pass filtered with a cut-off of 5 Hz for display only. b) 
accumulation profile (correct and incorrect accumulator summed) per condition as predicted by the 
standard race model. c) accumulation profile (correct and incorrect accumulator summed) per condition as 
predicted by the rescaled race model. 
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7.2. Appendix 2: Comparison of Two-choice 
‘within’ and Two-choice ‘between’ 
Conditions (Chapter 5) 
 
In Chapter 5 (see section 5.2.2), we collapsed over all two-choice trials, 
including trials in which both response options were mapped to the same hand 
(within) and those in which the two options were mapped onto two hands 
(between). Figure 7.3 shows the MEP signals associated with within and 
between conditions separately. The two conditions do not display any visible 
qualitative differences. 
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Figure 7.3: MEP results (smoothed MEP signal for each muscle category): stimulus-locked (left) and 
response-locked (right) smoothed signals are displayed separately for two-choice ‘between’ trials (trials 
with two response options on different hands, a) and ‘within’ trials (trials with two response options on the 
same hand b). Due to their similarity, we collapsed over ‘within’ and ‘between’ trials.   
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